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Replying to a comment, a correction and misc thoughts

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I got the following comment recently

If I take u back to 1994, how would u have spotted Infosys. The only way one could spot it could be through the market opportunity, good results and good management.or u may enlighten if there was any other way. So it could have been a kind of recurring deposit wherein one wud have seen good results and put money in that company every quarter.

I agree there could have been companies where the growth wud have stopped, but then its like finding out 20 horses in a race of 5000 and then slowly and steadily identifying the best horse through results only. When I say results I mean higher EPS also and not just a company like Teledata or any other which diluted its equity too.

Thats what big companies like GE, Tatas do. Hire gud people and then thru performance weed out the non performers.

Agreed that Educomp is richly valued or investing in Infosys in 2000 wud have been burning fingers. What I am saying is that implmenting the value investing approach with growth companies.Take micro technologies for instance. It has been growing at CAGR of >50% for last 4 years. It has a book value of 206 approx. It trades at 220. EPS of around 50. Almost no debt. Mcap of 60% CAGR for last few years.

These companies are not richly valued at all.Thru Value Investing combined with Growth, I could see huge returns. Unfortunately I did not put a lot for money. e.g Rajesh Exports in a single year increased its sales from 200 to 2200 crore somewhere around 2003. That time the stock did not appreciate and had excellent value(128 book value, eps around 40, Price around 150. It gave 25 times returns since then), That was the time to enter and make huge money. and I did but with a small amount as I was learning then.

Following is my response :

Hi anonymous
There is a book, The gorrila game, which talks about an approach on how to invest in tech companies.

Approach is similar to the one you mention ..buy the whole basket ..and then follow the results of each. sell the poor performers and invest the cash into the good performers. That could have been a way to make money in infosys.

However it would have been diffcult to have the foresight in 1994 that infosys would do so well.even employees working in infosys did not recognise that (employees who were given options then thought the options were worthless).

I think growth is compatible with valueinvesting. Growth in the end, is a variable in the valuation process. As long as your are paying less than the growth implied intrinsic value, you will do well. So microtechnologies and Geodesic may fall in that bucket. They maybe insanely undervalued due to the excellent prospects. I have however not looked at these companies and hence cannot comment. However I would definitely look at them now.

Regarding your experience with rajesh exports, I can understand what happened as I have gone through similar experiences several times – namely how do you know beforehand that you are right on a company. I think as one gains experience, one learns to identify and benefit from such opporunities.

A correction
In the valuation of several companies I have used the following formulae to check the valuation

Mcap – cash on hand = Net Mcap
Net Mcap / Net profit = effective PE.

There is an error in the above approach. Typically the above cash earns 8-10% as part of the other income. The net profit should be adjusted with this non core income to arrive at the effective PE, otherwise you end up double counting the cash.

The error, lucklily has not changed most of the valuations I have done, but it is an error all the same and has a bigger impact if the cash as a % of market cap (mcap) is high. It is such an obvious error, but I have missed it till now. Well, better late than never.

A quote

I saw this quote from Keynes (A famous economist)

When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?

Reply to a criticism during the Great Depression of having changed his position on monetary policy, as quoted in Lost Prophets: An Insider’s History of the Modern Eonomists (1994) by Alfred L. Malabre, p. 220

This quote is very apt in investing. One analyses companies based on present facts and a set of assumptions. Valuation is finally an exercise of projecting the future. By being conservative, you can reduce the possiblity of an error. However when facts change dramatically, I am reminded of the above quote and find it prudent to change my mind – nothing wrong with that. Even a 60-70% success rate in picking stocks (being right 6-7 times out of 10) can give very good results in the long run.

Misc thoughts
I am reading through the Annual reports of several companies which I follow. I will be posting my analysis on the same. The market seems to be going one step forward and one step back. There are
problems developing in the US and the markets may start weakening in the US. In india, inflation seems to be high and somehow the policy response has still not been strong enough. I think the RBI thinks that this inflation is temporary and it will cool on its own.

I hope they are right for everyone’s sake. If however they are wrong and they forced to hike the rates further to kill inflation, then we could have nasty times ahead of us in the market.

Analysis: NIIT tech Annual results

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Warning: Parts of this post are boring as I would be discussing about Hedge accounting, reserve adjustments etc. However if you are invested in IT stocks, I would recommend you to get a good understanding of these concepts as they are now critical to understand how the company is doing.

Results summary
The company had an average performance for the year 2007-08. The ROE was maintained at 30% level. The sales growth was lower at around 6% (reduced partly by the rupee appreciation) and the net profit growth was around 3%. The net profit margins were maintained at 14.3%. The operating margins also held steady at 19%.

The key segments of BFSI, Insurance and travel now contribute to more than 80% of the revenue. Europe continues to the major geographic segment with the contribution to revenue at 50%. The other performance parameters such as % revenue from top customers, no. of new customers etc showed decent improvement.

The company completed the accquisition of ROOM solutions during the year. This business was not profitable during the year as it is in the investment mode as per the management. In addition the company made another small accquisition of Softec in the airline IT solution space. Thus the company is pursuing a strategy of both organic and inorganic growth in the focus verticals, especially in Insurance and transportation.

The positives
The company did not perform as well as the tier I vendors. However the company is now pursuing a strategy of focusing on key verticals. It is growing through accquisitions in these verticals and accquiring the required IP and customers via these accquisitions. This strategy makes sense for mid size companies such as NIIT tech, which cannot compete with the Tier I companies on scale alone.

The company maintained its margins and ROE inspite of the slowing markets and currency fluctuations. The company performed as expected and as the valuations are currently discounting a terrible performance, the stock price did not suffer.

The cash and equivalents for the company now stand at 220 Crs which is almost 30% of the mcap. The company continues to sell at around 2.5 times earnings (or slightly higher than book value), which means the market expects the company to be out of business pretty soon.

The negatives
The volume growth for the company was poor for the year 2007. The company is definitely not performing as well as some of the Top tier companies.

The accquisition for ROOM solutions was done at 100 Crs. The company is currently making losses. NIIT tech Management has paid quite a bit for the company and must have seen a lot of value. I hope they are right. Although subsequent poor performance of ROOM may not hurt the company a lot, it would definitely put the capital allocation skills of the management into question. I would personally rethink my entire thesis about the company if the accquisition turns out to be a dud

The performance of the accquisition is more critical than it seems on the face of it as the company has a large cash holding. This cash holding would grow further in the future and the management would be looking at new accquisitions with this cash. A poor track record would hurt the performance in the long run.

The accounting
The company accounted a forex loss of around 6.7 Crs in the P&L account with net impact of +.8 crs ( still trying to figure how they arrived at this number).

Now for the dry part,
The company maintains effective and non-effective hedges. The effective hedges are used to hedge the revenue and recievables. The company booked a loss of around 15.5 crs against reserves in the year 2008. These reserves have increased to around 65 Crs in Q12009. So if the rupee remains at the current levels, the company will close the hedges (which cover 27 months of revenue) over the next 27 months and take a loss of 65 Crs on the P&L account.

So the question is – Has the company already incurrend a loss of 65 Crs ? Yes and No. If the company were to close the contracts then it will have to account for the losses. However NIIT tech is not in the business of derivatives. These derivatives and contracts are used to hedge forex revenues. It is possible that the exchange rate could go in the opposite direction and the losses could worsen or they could go in the intended direction and the company could make profit and come out smelling roses.

The valuation impact
How should one account for forex gains/ losses? I think it would stupid to consider these losses as an ongoing one and capitalize it.

For ex: 2008 net proft was 137 Crs. So would you net the above loss of 15 Crs and say the Net profit is 122 crs and use this number for the final valuation ?

I would rather do the following

Say we take the appropriate PE as 15. The value of the company is 137*15= 2055. I would net off 15 crs from this value to arrive at the final value of 2040 Crs. I would apply the same logic if the company made a profit.

Over the long term, I think the forex gains or losses should be a wash (net impact should be minimal). Unless the treasury department is foolish (which doesn’t look likely) or very smart, the hedges should end up serving their purpose of reducing the impact of exhange losses or gains.

Ofcourse I am assuming the company will not start looking at Forex hedges and derivatives as a source of profit. That is a different ballgame completely. If the company gets in exchange speculation (and some companies have tried that stunt), I will take a very dim view of it.

The employee benefit (AS15) impact is not too high for the year and hence I would not concern myself too much about it.

Reading up

I am currently reading AS30 standard to get a better understanding of the new accouting standard for mark to market accounting. It is quite a dry read. However if you are interested in understanding the accounting and results of IT companies, then it is important to understand these standards. I would say, that if you are into fundamental analysis, the understanding all the AS standards is crucial.

Ofcourse reading AS standard is as entertaining as getting your dental work done. But investing is not always fun ..is it ? 🙂

I have still not changed my mind about the company. The market expects a far worse performance and as long as the company can do better than what is expected, the returns for an investor should be good.

The analysis for NIIT tech is uploaded here. Earlier posts on NIIT tech here, here and here

Infosys accquisition of Axon group: My view point

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Infosys recently announced the accquisition of the Axon group. Most of the analysis I have seen is centred around whether the deal is EPS accretive or dilutive. I think this kind of analysis is superficial and misses the point. A deal can be EPS dilutive and still be adding value and vice versa (more on that in a later post).

In this specific case, Infosys is accquiring an ERP (SAP in this case) consulting firm with net margins of around 10%. ERP consulting is a high margin, high growth business for Infosys. The typical gross margins are sometimes in excess of 50%.

How do I know ? disclosure : I worked with infosys in their ERP practise in the past. The ERP business for Infosys has seen phenomenal growth in the last 8 years and has done exceedingly well. Their Oracle and SAP practises have done very well too (I have personally seen the practises grow in the last 6-7 years). Infosys has managed to constantly increase the offshore component of ERP projects and thus maintain high margins.

Axon has gross margins in the range of 25-30%. In addition they are based out of UK, US and Malaysia. I am not sure of how much offshoring Axon does, but any improvement in the onsite/ offshore component of their existing projects due to the backend infrastructure of Infosys will enhance their margins. This is a good deal where Infosys gain the front end part of the business ( clients, onsite consultants, relationships , Knowledge etc) and Axon (which will be now be a part of infosys) will see improvements in margins due to higher offshoring.

Is everything hunky dory then ? Not necessarily. Integration of Axon into infosys will be a challenge. Infosys has an ‘Indian’ company culture (I do not mean it in a negative way). They are very conservative on expenses and there are other typical ways of doing things. Axon (about which I do not have any special insight) must have a more European culture. Integrating two such diverse culture will be a challenge. The key asset for an consulting company are its people. If the integration is poor, then employees from Axon (or even from exisiting practise in Infosys) could leave. I think that may not be a major issue in the long term. The company will work on retaining the key employees.

So overall, there is more to this deal than just plain EPS numbers. The ERP practise (especially SAP) is doing well for the company. Addition of Axon will provide further scale to the SAP consulting business of infosys and will add value down the road.

Additional disclosure : I hold infosys stock

My personal investment journey – II

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In the previous post, I described my investment journey till 2003. By mid of 2003, I had spent close to 6-7 years on reading and studying about the topic. I had read dozens of books on warren buffett and other value investors. In addition I had been analying companies for the past 5 years. So I understood the basics of investing, valuation and other aspects of investing.

What was missing was the experience and the softer aspects of investing. I had allowed myself to be swayed by the surrounding euphoria (partly though) in 2000. In addition by 2002-2003 when there were values all around (companies like L&T, blue star etc were available at a bargain), I was still not confident enough to go the whole hog.

If you have gone through this phase or are going through it, you will understand. If you have not seen a lot of success (mine was relative, I had done well compared to the market) and even if you feel that your are doing the right thing, it is not easy to jump in again completely. So during this phase, I increased my holdings, but I was very cautious (maybe overcautious) about it.

The market had gone nowhere for the last 10 years and so unlike today, no one was interested in stocks.

So what were the key learnings for me till 2003 ?

  1. Do not over pay for a stock. I learnt this from SSI. Yes, sky is the limit for these hot companies. However for every Infosys or PRIL or L&T, there are 10 pretenders. In addition this kind of early stage investing requires a different mindset. I do not have that kind of mindset.

    2. focus on companies with sustainable competitive advantage which have a profitable growing business and are available at a reasonable price. I have made the best returns from this group. Ignore the long shots ..companies which will be the next HDFC, next infosys, next L&T etc. Buy HDFC if it is available at a reasonable price otherwise find something else.
    Valuation and price matters. Promise is all great, but if a company does not meet the promise then the stock price gets killed. I learnt it from SSI and a lot of other investors are learning that lesson now via other companies.

    3. Be honest and brutual about your mistakes. Do blame others like analysts, media, friends etc. If you have made a mistake, accept it and move on. In short – don’t whine !!

2003 – 2006 (Beating the market and making some money)

By the end of 2003, the market was up 73% and I beat the market by a few points. As I had beaten the market during the bear phase too, I had gained in absolute terms by the end of the year.

The portfolio mix was roughly the same, with a new addition by end of the year of kothari products which was a small position (I started experimenting with a few graham type stocks)

By 2004 year end, my portfolio was doing fairly well. I had done better than the market with good gains in asian paints, concor, blue star etc. In addition I created a new position in BayerABS and Balmer lawrie by the end of the year.

I did no major additions or sale during 2005. Most of the stocks did well and the valuation gaps closed for several of my earlier picks as the market started recognizing these companies. I was able to do better than the market and was now fairly confident of my approach, which was now working well.

2006 was also a year with almost no activity in terms of buying or selling. To certain extent, I was still riding my earlier picks and to a certain extent I was finding it diffcult to find ideas which were as attractive as my exisiting one. I had done most of my picks during the bear market of 2001-2003 when good companies were available at throwaway prices. I was still searching for similar opportunities in 2006. That ofcourse was a foolish thing to do then. I was not going to get those kind of opportunities in a bull market.

By end of 2006, most of the companies I held, seemed to be fully valued. I liquidated almost 60-70% of my portfolio and ended the year with small holdings in asian paints, reliance (which I got through my RPL holdings), Bayer ABS and balmer lawrie. In addition I started building a small position in Merck and KOEL.

As an aside, in 2004, I discovered blogging and created my blog. This was my first post.

2007 (rethinking the approach)

I began 2007, with a fairly liquidated portfolio and few holdings.The really good companies seemed to be fairly valued and so I was not interested in them. As this time I started exploring graham kind of opportunities.

Till 2007, my approach was always to buy good companies and hold them for a long time. However I was always split between the idea of buying and holding even after the company was selling at or above my estimate of intrinsic value.

In 2007, I read a book by Mohnish pabrai (Dhando investor) and also a few other books and comments by warren buffett. I kind of realised that if one is interested in making higher returns then you have to look at buying undervalued companies and selling at intrsinsic value. The portfolio churn is more and you have work harder at finding new ideas, but the returns are higher. So I had a slight change in approach in 2007.

I built a position in KOEL (kirloskar oil) and sold when it hit intrinsic value. I created new positions in cheviot, India nippon, novartis, VST, manugraph, HPCL, grindwell norton etc. In addition I bought and sold IGL (after I felt I was wrong in my analysis), and did the same with MRO tek when it reached intrinsic value.

2007 was a crazy year. Anyone could have made money. I did well too (maybe too well). However I did not go whole hog as I was not comfortable with the valuation for most companies. I had not forgotten my earlier lessons. Frankly I don’t care how well others are doing or what they are recommending. Maybe some people can trade profitably by looking at the tides, but that’s not for me. Real estate companies, Capital goods companies looked like IT companies of 2000 and so I stayed away from them.

2008 (Doing more of the same)
Jan started with a major high in terms of the market and low activity from my end. I have been analysing companies since then and looking for new ideas constantly.

2008 has seen the market tumble from the all time highs. As I was not comfortable with the valuations by the end of 2007, I did not add much to my holdings. I try not time the market, but time the price (this is a quote by warren buffett). What that means is that my buy and sell decisions are based on the discount at which good companies are selling to their intrinsic value. If there is a big discount I will buy irrespective of the market level. Ofcourse, most of the times this approach takes you out of the market at highs and makes you more active when the market is tanking.

My activity levels in terms of buying or selling are higher this year. My portfolio was in a semi-coma state for a long period as there was not much to do. However with a slight change in approach and better values, there is more activity now.

Future ?

I don’t know how things will work out. What I know for sure is that I plan to keep reading and learning. I plan to add arbitrage to my portfolio and make it a higher percentage. However overall, I plan to develop my approach further and deepen my understanding of various areas such as accounting, options pricing, and economics etc . The focus is to learn topics which would improve me as an investor.

If you have been with me for these two posts, you can see why I have a strong preference for value investing. This approach has worked for me and allows me get a good night sleep. It fits my temprament of slow and delibrate thinking. I do not like fast paced action and thrills (in my portfolio, movies are a different matter).

Even among valueinvestors, there are varying styles and each one selects a different set of companies for his or her portfolio. I think it is driven a lot by one’s experiences. In my case, I have stayed away from high growth, hot sexy companies due to my bad experience with SSI and other IT companies. On the other hand the boring, dull but solidly profitable companies have given me great returns. Hence my preference for those kind of companies.

 

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