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Company analysis – Sesa goa ltd

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About
Sesa goa ltd is the largest private sector iron ore producer and exporter. It has access to 240 Million Mt of ore with mines in Goa, Karnataka and Orissa. The company achieved a turnover of around 5221 crs in 2009 with a net profit of 2710 Crs. The company exports almost 85% of its production to china

The company has three divisions with Iron ore accounting for 85% of the revenue, Pig iron representing forward integration represents 12% of the revenue and rest is accounted by Metallurgical coke. The company is principally a mining operations and logistics company.

Financials
The company achieved a topline growth of 30% and a profit growth of around 16% in 2009 inspite of the severe recession in Q3 and Q4 of the financial year. The company was able to achieve this performance due to the increase in volumes and pickup in demand in china, which account for 84% of its total volume.
The company has around 4000 crs in cash and equivalents on an asset base of 4800 crs. This translates to a stated ROE of 60% and 300% on the invested capital.
The company has a 10 year topline growth of almost 35% per annum, with majority of the growth coming in the later years. The net profit has grown by an even higher rate, with the last 5 year CAGR coming to around 33%.

Positives
The company has clearly been able to manage the business well during the downturn. It has been able to keep costs under control and maintain its profit levels. The company has a very strong balance sheet with a lot of surplus cash to re-invest in the business.
In addition, over a 10 year period the company has become fairly efficient and profitable. The net profit margins are close to 50% as the mines are owned by the company and the business enjoys considerable operating leverage (overheads do not increase in proportion to volumes).

Risks
China accounts for almost 84% of the total demand for the company. China currently accounts for almost 40%+ global steel production and hence the demand supply situation in china will have huge impact on the fortunes of the company.
In addition, iron ore export is a sensitive topic and the government can and has imposed export tariffs to favor the domestic steel industry. This can impact the net profit levels of the industry and the company in particular.
Finally, the company at the current rate of production (without growth) will exhaust the reserves in around 16 years. As a result the company needs to constantly explore and add to existing reserves on an ongoing basis. The cash on the books is not really free cash as it will be required to sustain the business in the future.

Management quality checklist
– Management compensation – Fairly low, based on the size of the company. Good for the shareholders.
– Capital allocation record – This is difficult to evaluate as the company has kept the dividend low and retained most of the profits which is now held as cash and equivalents. It remains to be seen how the capital will be deployed. The management has stated that the intention is to acquire mining assets with the excess capital.
– Shareholder communication – The shareholder communication is actually quite good. I have rarely seen Indian companies (outside of some IT companies) discuss their operations with honesty and detail. The company has actually detailed all the risks to the business quite clearly and with complete honesty.
– Accounting practice – appears conservative.
– Conflict of interest – doesn’t look like conflict of interest, but a 1000 Cr intercompany deposit with a fellow subsidiary is not something good over time.
– Performance track record – good in terms of operational performance. Capital allocation (investing the surplus cash) performance needs to be seen.

Valuation
Sesa goa is a mining company and it would be silly to value this company using a PE approach or Discounted cash flow. I have seen valuations where the company is said to be cheap as it sells at a PE of 13-14. That is stupid. The simplified equation should be
Company value = value of current reserves + future value from reserves to be added.
The company achieved a profit of around 130 crs per Million MT of ore . As the existing reserves are around 240 Mn MT, the asset/ cash value of the company is around 19000 crs (if the company were to develop no new reserves). This is the current cash or baseline valuation of the company. If the company sells below this price, it’s a bargain as it was in early 2009.
The company currently sells for 30000 crs which includes the value the company will generate through additions to its reserves and new mines. I need to evaluate the average reserve additions over the years to get a sense of the company’s capability to add to its reserves.
My current thought is that the company seems to be fairly valued till I can get a better sense of how the reserve addition will work out in the future.

Conclusion
The company is performing fairly well and has a strong balance sheet to support additions to ore reserves. At the current price however the company does not look undervalued to me. In addition there was a recent FCCB conversion which has added to around 3% to the equity base. Finally there seems to be some fraud investigation going on regarding the company. I have not been able to find much in terms of details and not sure how it impacts the company.
The company was bargain at any price below 200.

The art of not investing

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You have a lot of cash burning in the pocket and are looking for an opportunity to invest. An old time favorite is now selling for cheap. All and sundry feel that the company is undervalued especially if a series of ifs and buts get resolved. You look at the annual report of the company and it appears cheap by historical standards. Feeling confident, you go ahead and put in a decent amount of money.

Smart decision? maybe, but then maybe not.

Looking forward
Although no one can predict the future, it is an unfortunate reality of the stock market that stocks are priced based on the expected future of the company. I am using the word ‘expected’ as no one knows for sure. If someone claims that they are a 100% confident, then either the person is a complete moron or trying to sell you something.

If you are in the business of stock recommendations and tips, appearing anything but 100% confident is professional suicide. So I would blame the investor more for the garbage sold in the market than the seller. Do you really think all this junk would sell if there was no demand? anyway I digress.

So if one cannot predict the future, how does one invest? There is no surefire approach, though one can improve the chances of success by picking a company in stable industry. If the industry is fairly stable and not undergoing too much change, it possible to guess (all investing is finally a guess ..sometimes a good one or sometimes bad) with reasonable accuracy on how the company will do in the next 3-5 years.

An example
Let’s consider two companies. I am comparing these companies not from a valuation or investing standpoint, but purely trying to contrast their business performance. Stock performance in the short term is a different issue.

Let’s take the example of Gujarat Ambuja and Bharti airtel.
Gujarat ambuja is in the business of manufacturing and selling cement. It has grown at an average CAGR of 13-15%, maintained a net margin of 15% and an ROE in excess of 25%. It is not possible to know the exact profit or sales (many try that though) for the next 2-3 years, but looking at the business and the economics one can make a fair guess that business could clock 5%+ growth and 15% ROE for the next few years. Anything can happen, but the probability of the business achieving these numbers is high.

Bharti telecom is a telecom service provider, which has done extremely well over the last few years. The company has grown the topline at 30%+ and profit at 45% per annum for the last 5 years. The company has maintained an ROE in excess of 25%. These kind of numbers would warrant a PE in excess of 20. However the market is currently assigning a PE of 11 which values it as a commodity business. So is the market wrong? Some would say so looking at the past performance.

However there are certain structural changes and realities in the telecom industry

1. The industry has been witnessing severe price competition for sometime now. All the other companies other than bharti do not have great fundamentals (please look at the complete financial statement for all these companies and not the P&L account alone to understand what I am saying)

2. The industry has faced a lot of change in the past and will do so in the future. Do you really think anyone can be sure how the industry will look like in the next 5 years? What will be the technological changes, new entrants, government regulations etc?

3. Bharti is now expanding internationally via the Zain acquisition. They are looking at additional acquisitions too. All this activity at the very least introduces more uncertainty into the equation.

The reason I have taken the example of bharti and ambuja cement is because I have analyzed both the companies in the past and gave a pass to both for different reasons. Ambuja cement was not cheap enough for me.

In case of bharti, if i was looking at the just the past data, it would be an incredible buy. However as I said earlier, investing and valuation requires looking ahead and in case of bharti my crystal ball is completely cloudy. It may be my own limitations, but that is precisely the point. If one does not have the confidence of being able to assess the long term economics of a company and its industry, then one should give the stock a pass. The last thing one should do is depend on someone else’s analysis to make a decision.

There is no penalty for missing on a stock idea – there are 5000 public companies and a decent portfolio requires 15-20 stocks at the most. I see no point in buying something where there are too many unknowns and I am not confident on how it will all work out.

Whats on my mind – Feb 10

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I wrote a post in Nov 09 discussing some general topics such as dollar depreciation, auto sector etc. I also promised a monthly post, which I have not done for the last two months. Maybe my mind went blank for the last two months 🙂

Dollar depreciation
Predicting the demise of the dollar is an industry in itself. I wrote about it in November and think the long term direction for the dollar may be down. However there is a catch in this thinking – down against what?. Currency values are relative. The dollar could go down against the rupee, but appreciate against the Euro (as it is happening now due to the Greece debt crisis).

One has to be careful in making such open ended comments. However as this a personal blog, and no one will hold me accountable for it, I can write what I think :). Heck, others get paid for writing the same crap and are still not accountable for the stuff they write !.

So let’s see where the dollar goes in the next few years. My investing decision are rarely top down and I have not factored the dollar depreciation, central govt budget, the infrastructure boom in india or the mating habits of the kangaroo in my portfolio decisions. I will let the smarter folks do that ..for me the equation will remain the simple ..buy below fair value and sell when the price exceeds it. It has worked in the past and most likely to work in the future.

Stock ideas
A lot of work is going on here, but as of yet there is no output. The key is to keep analyzing companies, understand their economics and estimate the fair value. If the price is not right, then it makes sense to just wait for it to come to you. I don’t think cash has ever burnt a hole in my pocket and sometimes doing nothing is a good choice too.
As of now I am analyzing graphite india. I came close to pulling the trigger on Mangalam cement, but the price suddenly spiked , before I could start my buying.

Quarterly results
I have completed the quarterly result review of all my holdings and published
a few here. In general, the results are as expected and as a result my estimate of intrinsic value has remained more or less the same for most of the companies.

In the case of BEL (bharat electronics), I have been surprised by the improvement in the performance. I had a major concern about BEL. The business had become extremely skewed by 2008, where in almost 80% of the profit was booked in the last quarter of the year. This is generally not good as it results in a sales push in the last quarter to meet the numbers and as expected, the accounts receivables started going up.

BEL has since then reduced the skew considerably and has improved its cash flow position. I have increased the fair value of the company by around 15-20%.

Waiting for a crash ?
I think this year will require more effort in generating decent returns. 2008-2009 was a test of guts. If one had the guts or the foresight (depending on how you look at it) to invest a bunch of cash in early 2009, one would have made a great return by now. However the common mistake a lot of investors do is to wait for history to repeat itself. I can bet there are quite a few investors waiting for the next crash to happen.

It may happen, who knows ? I am however not basing my decision on such hopes. Investing has to be done based on what we know now, not what may happen or wish will happen. The best preparation one can do for a crash is to be mentally prepared and have some spare cash lying around.

Working on mental blocks
It have started looking at the various mental blocks I have and am currently working on eliminating them. One mental block I have is an aversion to commodity companies (not banks as some readers think). I am currently reading and analyzing such companies – steel, cement, metals etc in more detail and working out the fair value of such companies.

At the current prices, I don’t find any of them attractive. I have developed a spreadsheet where I analyze and record the fair value of each of these companies and track it with the market price. When the price drops below a certain level, I will start building a position. So it’s a wait and watch mode for most of these companies as of now.

I do not have mental block against options and derivatives. I only have a different opinion of these instruments. These instruments in the hands of a new investor is like a blade in the hands of a monkey – most likely the monkey will hurt himself.

If you are wondering, I belong to the same monkey class and hence other than some small positions, I have yet to go whole hog on these instruments. My plan is to learn more of these instruments, start small and then increase my commitment over time. If this monkey is going to get cut, it’s likely to be a small razor blade and not a 2 feet sword 🙂

Special opportunity framework

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Following is a guest post from ninad kunder. I have been working with ninad and arpit on arbitrage deals for some time and we exchange notes and ideas. In the post below ninad has explained the framework we follow for an arbitrage or a special situation.

In addition, I have upoaded a template which I use to track such opportunities (look for file – arbitrage delisting template).
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My friend Rohit had in his earlier posts detailed out the Elantas Beck opportunity and the various milestones associated with the special situation opportunity.

The objective of this post, taking the example of Elantas Beck, is to list down the framework (in our limited intelligence 🙂 for managing a special situation opportunity and the thought process associated with it.
Before I run thru the framework and the thought process, let me just run thru a brief background about Elantas Beck.

About Elantas Beck
Elantas Beck is the subsidiary of Altana AG which is a specialty chemical major based out of Germany with operations spread across the world. Altana historically had a pharma business and a specialty chemical business. The company divested its pharma business and transformed itself into its current form.

Altana has four key divisions
1) ECKART
2) BYK
3) ACTEGA
4) ELANTAS

Elantas beck India is a 88% owned subsidiary of Altana and is aligned to the Elantas division globally. The other divisions at present have a marginal presence in the Indian market.

Process Framework
In any delisting opportunity and the same framework can broadly be applied across other special opportunities, there are 3 risk points in the transaction
1) Time Risk
2) Price Risk
3) Deal Risk

Let me address each of these risks with respect to the Elantas opportunity.

1) Time Risk
In any arbitrage opportunity even though the deal might go thru and at the price that we had defined, there could always be time delay involved in the deal which will shave off potential returns. This is especially true in the Indian context when there are court approvals required in certain special situation opportunities like mergers.
In the Elantas beck deal time risk was eliminated by constantly monitoring the milestones achieved in the deal. The entry point was timed only post the shareholder approval and once the company had filed with the BSE for the delisting process.

2) Price Risk – There were 2-3 ways to handle price risk in this transaction. This of course would be different for every transaction.

a) Valuation – As Rohit pointed out step 1 was to ascertain the fundamentals of the company and Rohit & Arpit (They are good at this :-)) arrived at a fair value of Rs 600 for the Elantas stock.

b) Ability / Inclination of the parent company -The interesting point is that the largest shareholder of Altana is taking Altana private and Elantas was the only listed subsidiary in the world. Market cap of elantas was 360 crores. So the parent would have had to cough up about 40-50 crores to do the delisting. It wouldn’t have been a big amount considering their balance sheet and 15-20% more wouldn’t have been difficult to stretch. Also having run their global balance sheet and other communication, it was clear that India was a high focus area for Altana and the other divisions were waiting to enter the country.

c) Expectation of market participants – When the delisting was announced ICICI emerging star had about 2.25% stake of the 11.5% public holding. They exited at around the 460-470 mark post the delisting announcement. So market participants who bought that 2.25% holding, at that price clearly bought it with an intent to tender it at a higher price in the delisting process.
Factoring in all the above variables Rs 600 was a reasonable estimate that was arrived for the delisting price.

3) Deal Risk – which brings us to the most imp variable in this transaction. We saw a high deal risk because of the dispersed nature of shareholding and out of the 8 lac outstanding shares there were 2 lac shares in the physical form. Though the current SEBI amendment has allowed physical holders to tender in the delisting process, we saw not too many shares getting tendered on this front.

Factoring in a high deal risk we defined 2 clear exit points which ever came earlier.
1) Price point – 520-525 levels (my comment: take advantage of the 10-15% pop in the prices)
2) Time point – Exit midway thru the book building process.

The call was clear not to wait till the reverse book building process closes and take whatever money was available on the table and not live with the deal risk. There is of course the behavioral angle to the transaction where the dopamine kicks in when one is actually in the thick of action and tends to not necessarily follow what was defined at the start of the transaction :-).

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