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My Worst invesment decision till date

M




My decision to sell L&T in 2003 (after holding for 4 years) has been my worst investment decision till date. Although my cost basis was 190 odd (pre-divesture) and I sold at 230 odd (again pre-divesture) and did not lose money on it, I consider it to be one of my worst decisions because of the following reasons

  1. The stock has since then become a 10 bagger (sells at around 2250 without considering the value of cemex)
  2. I sold off because I became exasparated with the management. Between 2001 and 2003, they would constantly pay lip service to divesting the cement division and would then drag their feet on it. What I failed to realise at that time was that the Kumarmangalam birla group would be able to force the management to divest the business eventually.
  3. Did not appreciate the importance of the business cycle. The E&C sector was in doldrums at that time and as a result L&T (E&C) division profits were depressed. The E&C sector turned around big time after 2003 and every E&C company has benefited since then
  4. Did not do the sum of parts analysis – basically that the sum of value of the various L&T divisions was more than the complete entity.

In the end, my regret is not that I missed a 10 bagger. What clearly pricks me is that my analysis was sloppy and I did not evaluate all the factors clearly. I was looking at the company with a rear mirror view (the Margins and the ROE were poor then and I expected it to continue).

However, I have tried to learn something from this disaster. So here goes

  • understand the sector dynamics when investing in a stock.
  • Appreciate the importance of business cycle. Although predicting it is not critical, but a basic understanding is a must.
  • Focus on sum of parts versus looking at a company as a whole, especially if the company has various different businesses.
  • Have patience
  • Try to avoid a rear mirror view.

Have you had such an experience?

The sensex at 10000 …a historical perspective

T




It’s difficult to miss that the sensex is at 10K. Frankly, I personally think that 10K is no different than 9900 (ofcourse it is 1% higher). Fundamentally nothing much has changed when the sensex rose from 9500+ to 10K. But at the same time with the index at these levels, I updated my worksheets and generated the graphs above. What does the data tell (and everyone will have their own interpretation)

– ROE is 20% +, highest in the last 15 years. This clearly shows that the cost cutting and restructuring that indian companies went through, has paid off.
– Earnings which were roughly flat between 1997 and 2003, have exploded since then. The reason is not diffcult to see. Good economic growth, higher efficiency due to the restructuring, low interest rates etc etc.
– P/E ratios do not appear very high, but have to be seen with reference to the ROE which is above the past averages and the earnings growth has been very high.

So does the data give me an insight into what is likely to happen in the future?

ROE appears high and may come down a bit in the future to the average levels. But on the other variables like PE (which is dependent on market psychology) and earnings I frankly don’t have any special insight. My guess is as good as anyone else’s. For now, I am not doing much in terms of buying or selling.

But the price levels on some of the individual securities which I own, are now in the ‘alert’ range. What I mean by alert is that once the price crosses my upper estimate of intrinsic value, I relook at the scrip and start selling slowly (around 5% for every 2-3 % price increase). Why 5 % for every 2-3% increase. Nothing scientific or smart about it. I have developed this approach so that if the price keeps increasing I am able to sell at a higher average price and don’t feel regret of losing out on the gain. Conversely if the price starts dropping, then I end up doing nothing (as the scrip is now below my estimate of intrinsic value).

Kelly’s betting system and portfolio configuration

K


Michael J. Mauboussin recently published a paper on the legg mason website called ‘size matters’ on the Kelly criterion and importance of money management.

The paper is slightly technical on probability and an extremely good read. The key point of the paper is that investors should use the kelly criteria of defining the optimum bet size based on the edge or information advantage one has over the market. The formulae is very simple, namely

F = edge/odds

Where F is the percentage of portfolio one should bet. Edge being the expected value of the opportunity and odds being gain expected from the opportunity.

So if one has a meaningful variant perception or edge over the market (translating into a positive expected value) and expects to win big, then the above formulae helps in deciding the size of the bet as a percentage of the portfolio.

In simple terms, if one’s expected value (probability of gain*gain+probability of loss*loss) is high and the gain is also high, then one should bet heavily.

Conceptually I find the above approach very compelling. My own approach has been the similar. For example, if I am confident of a stock (after all the necessary analysis), I tend to allocate a higher amount of money. My definition of low, medium and high is around 2 % , 5% and 10 % of portfolio for a single stock.

Ofcourse the above approach is sub-optimal and would not lead to highest returns over a long period of time. It is not that I have a problem with the formulae. My problem is how do I know that my ‘edge’ is really an edge. Ofcourse whenever I have put money into a stock, the unstated assumption is that I have an edge. but then i invested in tech stocks in 2000 thinking i had an edge. Although I have a quantitative approach of going for a high expected value with a 3:1 odd, I cannot be sure.
So to safeguard myself (against my own ignorance, risk aversion or stupidity or whatever you can call it), I tend to adopt a suboptimal approach which gives me lower returns, but lets me have sound sleep (I have sleep test for risk, if I lose sleep on something, then it is too risky)

But irrespective of how one executes the above concept, it is a very sound one and should be followed to manage risk prudently

Value investing and the role of catalyst

V

As a value investor I have always been concerned about a value trap. A Value trap is a company, which remains cheap forever, and you are not able to make any money out of it.

Now a company can be a value trap for a variety of reasons, which can be

1.The company performance keeps deteriorating and as a result the intrinsic value keeps going down
2.The market just ignores the company and the sector because there is nothing exciting happening in that sector and most of the companies are hardly glamorous
3.Management action can result in a value trap too. The management keeps blowing away the excess cash into unprofitable diversification instead of returning it to the shareholders

So how does one avoid a value trap. I think this is a very important consideration of value investors especially if one is investing in ‘graham’ style bargains. A ‘Catalyst’ is something which one should look out for to avoid a value trap.

A catalyst can be any of the following

1.Likely management action such as buyback, bonus etc
2.Likely asset conversion opportunities such as LBO, de-merger, accquisitions (think L&T for an example of de-merger)
3.Likely shift in demand supply in favor of the company due to changes in the business cycle – steel and commodity companies in the last few years come to mind.
4.Regulatory changes – Banking comes to mind
5.Unexpected earnings increase
6.Finally time – However one should have a defined time horizon in which one would expect the investment to work out.

So when I look at value or deep value stock, I tend to look beyond the numbers. Is there a likely catalyst, which would unlock the value, or am I getting into a value trap? and how long will it take for the catalyst to be play out. That would define my expected returns too.

Ofcourse this concept of catalyst is not some original concept of mine. It is referred to frequently by Mario gabelli and Marty whitman.

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