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Avoiding failure

A

The following is from my annual letter to subscribers. I will be posting the letter soon on the blog

There are a few irrefutable statistics of the India stock market. Over the last 10-year period around 50% of small caps (and roughly the same for midcap), lost money for their investors. Only 10% of the companies in this space accounted for most of the returns of the index.

In such a scenario, rejecting stocks is an equally important task in building a portfolio.

We have been focused on this aspect from the beginning of the model portfolio but have not discussed it in depth. The last two years has brought this factor into the spotlight and I want to share the process we use to filter ‘out’ stocks.

The first step in filtering out stocks is quite simple. I look at an idea and reject it if any of the following conditions are met

  1. Management has past record of illegal actions or are known for bad governance practices. This is a subjective criterion, but one can filter out the obvious cases
  2. Debt equity (other than financials) is greater than 1.5
  3. PE is greater than 60
  4. Company operates in an industry with poor economics (return on capital over a business cycle has been below 5%)
  5. IPOs

Some of you may look at this and point out that ‘so and so’ company has been a value creator in spite of meeting some of these conditions.

To this my response is this – An elimination process works on probabilities. If you pick 100 companies which have a very high PE or very high debt, 80% or more will lose money for their shareholders. There will always be some which buck the trend.

I am not trying to win an intellectual contest of picking a winner with odds stacked against it. If you play this game long enough, the probabilities eventually catch up with you.

If the idea survives this step, I move on to the next series of checks. These checks are detailed out in the spreadsheet I upload for every company. I have extracted the specific sections used to reject an idea and uploaded here for reference.

Please keep in mind these checks are not quantitative and there is no mathematical formulae which will throw up an answer. Think of these points as checklist/questions to dig deeper into the company

  1. Fragility – I added this section recently and use it to check whether the business would collapse if some of these risks materialize. For example – Does the company have a major concentration with a single customer or supplier. What will happen if this partner pulls out?
  2. Management checklist – I have had this section for a long time and have added to it over the years. There are sub-sections to check if the management actions have been ‘suspect’ in the past and point to unethical behavior
  3. Accounting – This has an exhaustive list of possible accounting games companies play. I have created this from multiple books on financial fraud and accounting malpractices. 2018/19 had a few repeats and some new ways of fudging accounts
  4. Risk analysis – I added this section a few years back and it is for a deeper analysis of risks and their probabilities.

As you can see from the file, this is a checklist to ensure that I don’t miss something obvious. At the same time, this will not prevent mistakes from happening. A management may be able to hide some of its behavior for a long time and it may come to light after we make an investment.

These points are not black and white and involve a judgement call on where to draw the line. In the past, I have been more tolerant of management behavior, but have realized that even if a particular idea works out, the long term average of such decisions will be disappointing ( I have called this riding a tiger in the past)

As you will note, this process works on evidence or past history of a company and its management. If that is missing, we are flying in the dark. This is another reason for me to avoid IPOs. In most IPOs, the business has been dressed up for sale and all the skeletons tumble out after the listing.

The aggregate performance of all the IPOs in the last 2 years bears this point. Pointing out a few successes, only proves that they are the exceptions and not the rule.

The downside of this process is that I may end up rejecting a company which turns out to be a success. I am comfortable with that problem as long as I can avoid failures. A portfolio of 20 companies out of a universe of 3000+ stocks means that will we miss a lot of winners.

The more important criteria is to avoid the losers.

Are we on a different Planet?

A

I was recently analyzing the asset management industry and started looking at HDFC asset management and other companies in the space. As I always do, I started comparing with other asset management companies around the globe. The valuation gap has blown my mind. I often wonder what Indian investors are smoking to be so optimistic.

The opportunity size is large and all kinds of nice things can happen, but this gap is not so big that valuations of Indian firms should be 5X of a similar firm.

Let me give you one such example – KKR & Co. This is a global private equity firm which has expanded into other aspects of Alternative asset management. The company has been investing in real estate, private credit, public markets and other hedge funds. The company has around 210 Billion in AUM and is valued at around 24 Bn or 11% of AUM

In contrast, HDFC AMC manages around 51.7 Bn and is valued at 11 Bn or 21% of AUM. So 2X the valuation on the face of it. Just hold that point for now.

The first reaction of most Indian investors would be to say that India has a long runway, HDFC is a strong brand, we will soon be a 100 Gazillion economy yada yada yada. The problem is that once the stock price rises, people come up with stories to justify it.

I am not denying that HDFC is a storied name and has good growth opportunities. However that does not mean you can justify any valuation. Let’s look at some facts

  • HDFC AUM has grown by around 21% CAGR over the last 5 years. KKR has grown its AUM at around 14% CAGR in the last 5 years. Just as HDFC has growth opportunities in India, KKR is growing globally and in multiple product categories such as Hedge funds, credit and other forms of alternative investments
  • I will argue that every dollar of AUM for KKR is much more valuable than that of HDFC. HDFC AUM is into Equity and credit mutual funds. HDFC AMC revenue was approximately 0.6% of AUM. Let’s bump it up to 1% to be generous.
  • In comparison, KKR invests in private equity, hedge funds and other alternative investments. If you have studied this sector, you would know that fees for such vehicles is higher than vanilla mutual funds. KKR earns a management fees of 1-2% and accrues a percentage of profits above a threshold, also called as carry. KKR earned around 1.8% of AUM as income in 2018 and for reasons I don’t have space to explain, it was much lower than what the company will earn in steady state. It will be safe to assume that KKR will earn around 2.5% of AUM as topline income as some of its newer funds mature
  • ROE is not important as asset management is an asset lite business and does not need capital for operations

From an AUM perspective, KKR may be growing slower than HDFC, but has better economics than the latter.

Wait, there’s more

Now let me share something which will make you think really hard

KKR invests its own capital (shareholder capital) in its private equity and other such funds. These funds have earned 15% CAGR (in dollar terms) over the last 20+ years. If you follow the global markets, you will know that is a great return. In other words, an investor in KKR is buying an AMC (like HDFC AMC), but also investing in the underlying Private equity and other funds.

KKR has around 18.22 dollars/ share (or 15 Bn) invested in such funds. This is the book value of the firm. If we exclude this number for a like to like comparison with HDFC AMC, the company is valued at 4.4% of AUM. This is for a firm growing its AUM by 13% where the topline is suppressed due to newer funds which are under-earning compared to the older funds.

In effect HDFC AMC is valued at 5X KKR for now. Also keep in mind, that there is pricing pressure on mutual funds globally (their fees are reducing) whereas alternative investments face no such pressure.

Think twice

Is the growth profile and runway for HDFC so much more than KKR? Does being India focused provide HDFC more stability than KKR? Btw, KKR is also invested in India via some of its PE and other strategies. HDFC can expand into alternative investments and grow that business, but that is nowhere on the horizon.

As I am not invested in HDFC AMC, the downside for me from being wrong is low. However investors in the company needs to think long and hard on what is so special about the company that it should be valued at such a premium.

Is it the whole brand name and quality narrative of 2019? (similar to the small and midcap narrative of 2017). What is so special about quality in India v/s all the other countries?

Are we on a different planet?

Good company, bad stock

G

I look at long term trends in the market and try to understand what I am missing. For example, amazon has always sold for an astronomical PE and I thought it was over-valued. However, the continued over-valuation, had me puzzled and I started reading up more on it.

I cannot get into the specifics here, but amazon is a case where the company is investing via its P&L (expensing the investments) due to which its current profits are suppressed. Think of it as a collection of businesses where one group is making above average profits and those profits are being re-invested in other loss-making new businesses. When you add the two together, the consolidated profit appears to be low. As a result, PE for the company appears to be optically high

I have used this learning to look closely at some of my ideas and tried to back out the investments which are being expensed in the P&L account. This ensures that I look past the optically high valuations and arrive at the steady state valuation, which may be lower.

Every company is not an Amazon

I wrote a post on this topic – The value of overvalued stocks, which is one of the most read posts on the blog. Since then quality and durability of growth has become near religion in the markets. Any one challenging or questioning this belief is seen as touch of step with the market. It is similar to the religion in mid & small caps in 2017 when I published this note – The Indian bitcoins

We have some companies in India, which continue to sell at high valuations and have done so for a long period of time. Are they similar to amazon?

For starters some of these companies are not growing at high rates. Some of them have grown at a low double digit CAGR in the last 10 years. In addition to that, these companies are not suppressing their cash flows to invest in new businesses like amazon. So, their PE is not optically high.

There is an element of truth behind this phenomenon. These companies enjoy a dominant position in their industry and have shown steady growth for a long period of time. The problem is that this growth is now being projected to last in excess of 20+ years. Can it last that long? Sure, it can – but a lot can change in that period too.

Nothing new under the sun

The interesting bit is that this is not a new phenomenon. If you looked at Infosys or WIPRO in 2000, you could have easily made a case for quality along with a large opportunity space for them. Both the companies did not disappoint – Infosys grew its revenue from around 900 crs to 87000 Crs over a 19-year period.

How did the stock do from its peak in March 2000 (PE of around 100) till date (before the recent drama)? It has given a return of 7% CAGR which is less than an FD return.

The company did its job and did not disappoint (26% topline growth for 19 years). It’s the investors who overpaid for it. There are more such examples from the recent past where the company has done well, but the returns were sub-par as investors overpaid for the stock.

Quality is a means, not an end

Quality is an input in the valuation and analysis of the company. It gives you the ability to project the cash flows of the company with higher certainty into the future. However, there is always a limit to this certainty.

If a company sells at 50 times earnings and is growing at 13% CAGR (1-2% above nominal GDP growth rate), it will require one to be sure of the cash flow for the next 23 years. That is a hell lot of certainty! and by the way in this scenario, the company has to perform better than this assumption for an investor to make higher than risk free returns (remember the Infosys example?)

Now some investors would like to argue that this is such a fantastic company, that the PE will keep rising. Welcome to the greater fool theory. You are in effect betting that the person buying from you expects the cash flow growth to extend beyond 23 years with certainty. Good luck with that

The end game

Some companies selling at high multiples are growing rapidly and if they can sustain this growth, will grow into this valuation. However, that is not the case with all the companies. Some companies have a very high market share in their industries and are unlikely to grow at super high growth rates.

A lot of these low growth, high valuation names face the risk of market moods. If the mood changes, valuations and stock price will drop. Unfortunately, the growth rates will not be high enough to bail out the investors over the long term.

These companies will continue to do well, and their sales and earnings will keep rising. Once the market fancy shift, investors will have to endure a long period of sub-par returns. This period can often stretch to years at a time.

In an age of instant gratification, how many investors have the patience to hold onto such ideas for years waiting for the earnings to catch up with the valuation? In case of fund managers, if they lag the markets for a year or two, they will lose investors and will be forced to move to something else.

Why no names?

I have not provided any quantitative analysis in the post. I could provide stats and numbers to make my point – but that will be useless. If you hold such a company, you will come up with reasons on why your specific case is unique or different (I have done the same in the past too).

I will resist naming these companies as I have no interest in getting trolled on social media. Calling them out is the equivalent of calling someone’s child ugly. It is better to keep such opinions private.

It is near impossible to accept something against the companies you hold. On top of that these are high quality, universally admired companies which have given good returns in the past. Most investors would never entertain the idea that these are good companies, but bad stocks

Corporate tax cut – 3 Bucket analysis

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I will keep politics aside as I dont like to muddy my thinking with that. The government announced a tax reduction recently from 33% to around 25%. The market has responded positively to this announcement. I will not get into the macro impact of this decision as it is too complicated for me due to the second and higher order effects.

I will use a functional equivalent to understand the impact on our portfolio positions. Think of this tax cut as similar to a permanent drop in the input cost. The impact of such a drop will not be the same across all companies. I would like to bucket it in three groups

Group 1: Companies with a strong competitive position and high growth prospects which allows them to deploy all their profits into future growth

Group 2: Companies with a strong competitive position which will enable it to retain the extra profits. However due to lower growth prospects, the company may return some of it to shareholders via dividends

Group 3: Companies with weak competitive position where most of the extra profits will be competed away.

The net impact

The drop in tax rate will create the most value for shareholders in group 1 companies. We are already seeing the evidence of that. Its quite possible that the market is under-appreciating the long-term benefits of compounding in such cases.

Group 2 companies will see an increase in fair value, but due to the absence of compounding of retained profits (as they are not able to re-invest their current profits fully), this increase is much lesser than that of Group 1.

Group 3 companies which account for almost 80%+ of all the companies would see an increase in fair value only if the demand for the industry improves as a result of price reduction and an improvement in GDP growth. It is difficult to estimate this increase as this will take time for this change to flow through the economy and there are other factors which would play an equally important role

I am not raising the valuation for our positions even though we hold a few in group 1 and group 2. I would like to see this effect flow through before I do that.

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