CategoryWarren buffett

I came across a transcript buffett’s talk with the students at Tuck school of business. I have pasted the link below. What i found intersting (actually the entire talk was very interesting) were the replies to the following two questions

Q: I have worked in various technologies businesses, but I understand that you do not typically invest in the technology sector. Why is that? How do you view technology as an individual and as an investor?
A: Technology is clearly a boost to business productivity and a driver of better consumer products and the like, so as an individual I have a high appreciation for the power of technology. I have avoided technology sectors as an investor because in general I don’t have a solid grasp of what differentiates many technology companies. I don’t know how to spot durable competitive advantage in technology. To get rich, you find businesses with durable competitive advantage and you don’t overpay for them. Technology is based on change; and change is really the enemy of the investor. Change is more rapid and unpredictable in technology relative to the broader economy. To me, all technology sectors look like 7-foot hurdles.

Q: I worked in the paper and packaging business this past summer and really enjoyed my experience. None of my classmates are interested in the paper business and the company I worked for has not had MBA interns in years. Clearly the paper business has its challenges, but do you see this as an opportunity or a roadblock?
A: Well, you’ve got it right that the paper business is challenged. High capital intensity, low margins, cyclical. It is a brutal business; no one cares who made the box their Dell computer came shipped in. In general, commodity businesses, even you’re the low-cost producer, are difficult. There are generally two recommendations I offer to college and business school graduates. The most important thing about where you work is that you admire/love it. So it sounds like you liked your experience, and that’s great. But we come to my second recommendation, which is to get on the right train; that is, moving in the right direction. There’s no course in business school called “Getting on the Right Train”, but it’s really important. You can be an average passenger but if you get on the right train it will carry you a long way. You want to learn from experience, but you want to learn from other people’s experience when you can. Managing your career is like investing – the degree of difficulty does not count. So you can save yourself money and pain by getting on the right train.

So makes one think, how will some of the current ‘performers’ like maruti, tisco, telco and others will perform in the long run. Some of these have high return on equity, but is it sustainable over a complete business cycle

here’s the link :http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/clubs/investment/WarrenBuffet.html

just read the 1969 partnership letter. This was the year when buffet shocked his partners by deciding to close his partnership. That was highly unusual for a money manager , especially if the preceeding year had been as good as it had been for buffet and on top of that if the market was in a bull phase. But buffet rationally decided that there were no bargains to be found and it was better to quit the game than set yourself up for failure.
what struck me in the letter were two points
a) buffet in 1969 clears says that considering the situation then, the conventional wisdom that stocks are a better investment than bonds did not hold true and an investor could expect the same level of return from both. As a result an investor would be better off holding bonds instead of stocks. now this is important as most of the people equate buffet with ‘buy and hold’ which has now become buy and hold ( irrespective of the valuations). This letter clearly shows buffet’s thinking in this matter. Hold you stock till one has rational and well thought out reasons that the stock is not grossly overvalued
b) the second point is mainly buffet’s recommendation of bill ruane to his investor and his very rational and sound assesment of bill ruane’s past performance and ethics. He logically explains and sets the right expectations for his investor and also gives some pointers of how to evaluate a money manager. i found this very enlighting

I read the article below and found it to be very interesting. Makes you think on the importance of free cash flow v/s earnings (on which analysts are fixated).
If free cash flow is important, then what should be the value of companies like – moser baer, some of the cement companies, steel companies which make a lot of money (at least in the upcycle ) , but need buckets of cash to invest in new plant, R&D , working capital etc.
One would see analyst getting excited with the huge earnings growth and the low PE. I would temper my expectations because
a) earnings are high as demand and pricing is strong
b) PE are low in a cyclical stock during an upcycle
c) earnings are ignoring the impact of Capex ( which is high in these companies)

article taken from wallstraits.com
BUFFETT: FOLLOW RETAINED EARNINGS
In the 1934 edition of Security Analysis, Ben Graham introduces his readers to Edgar Lawrence Smith, who in 1924 wrote a book on investing entitled Common Stocks As Long-Term Investments (Macmillan, 1924). Smith put forth the idea that common stocks should in theory grow in value as long as they earn more than they pay out in dividends, with the retained earnings adding to the company’s net worth. In a representative case, a business would earn a 12% return on equity, pay out 8% in dividends, and retain 4% to surplus. If it did this every year, the stock value should increase with its book value, at a rate of 4% compounded annually.
With this in mind, Smith explains the growth of asset values through the reinvestment of a corporation’s surplus earnings in the expansion of its operations. Graham, however, warns us that not all companies can reinvest their surplus earnings in expansion of their business enterprise. Most, in fact, must spend their retained earnings on simply maintaining the status quo through the replenishment of expiring plants and equipment. Predicting future earnings of any enterprise can be very difficult and given to great variance. This means that making a future prediction of earnings can be fraught with potential disaster.
Warren Buffett concluded that Graham’s assessment of Smith’s analysis was correct for a great majority of businesses. However, he found that under close analysis some companies were an exception to the rule. Buffett found that these exceptions over a long period of time were able to profitably employ retained earnings at rates of return considerably above the average. In short, Buffett found a few businesses that didn’t need to spend their retained earnings upgrading plant and equipment or on new-product development, but could spend their earnings on acquiring new businesses or expanding the operations of their already profitable core enterprises.
We want to invest in businesses that can retain their earnings and haven’t committed themselves to paying out a high percentage of their profits as dividends. This way the shareholders can benefit from the full effects of compounding, which is the secret to getting really rich.
Capital Spending for Maintenance vs Growth
One of our key stock screens for our WS8 Portfolio, as our Intelli-Vest members are well aware, is to think carefully about how management allocates capital. How much is paid as cash dividends? How much is required to be invested in maintaining or replacing plants and equipment just to maintain current levels of sales and profits? How much is spent on expanding production to create new business, new sales and new profits? To understand the investment merit of any business, we must be able to answer these capital allocation questions.
Making money is one thing, retaining it is another, and not having to spend it on maintaining current operations is still another. Buffett found that in order for Smith’s theory to work he had to invest in companies that (1) made money, (2) could retain it, and (3) didn’t have to spend those retained earnings on maintaining current operations.
Buffett discovered that the capital requirements of a business may be so demanding that the company ends up having little or no money left to increase the fortunes of its shareholders.
Let me give you an example. If a business makes $1 million a year, and retains every cent, but every other year it has to spend $2 million replacing plant and equipment that were expended in production, the company really isn’t making any money at all; the business is only breaking even. The perfect business to Buffett would be one that earns $2 million and spends zero on replacing plant and equipment.
Buffett used to teach this lesson when he conducted a night class on investing at the University of Nebraska at Omaha Business School (image enrollment demand if he still taught such a class today!). He would lecture on the capital requirements of a company and the effect that it had on shareholder fortunes. He would do this by showing his students the past operating records of AT&T and of Thomson Publishing.
Buffett would demonstrate that AT&T, before it was broken up, was a poor investment for shareholders, because though it made lots of money, it had to plow even more money than it made into capital requirements — research and development and infrastructure. The way that AT&T financed the expansion was to issue more shares and to sell lots of debt.
But a company like Thomson Publishing, which owned a bunch of newspapers in one-newspaper towns, made lots of money for its shareholders. This was because once a newspaper had built its printinig infrastructure it had little in the way of capital needs to such away the shareholders’ money. This meant that there was lots of cash to spend on buying more newspapers to make its shareholders richer.
The lesson is that one business grew in value without requiring more infusions of capital and the other business grew only because of the additional capital that was invested in it.
Warren Buffett decided he wanted to search for a few businesses businesses that seldom required replacement of plant and equipment and didn’t require ongoing expensive research and development. He wanted a few companies that produced a product that never became obsolete and was simple to produce and had little competition: the only newspaper in town, a candy bar manufacturer, a chewing gum company, a razor blade producer, a soda pop business, a brewery — basic businesses with products that people never want to see essentially change. Predictable product, predictable profit. And he found a few, and he became the richest man on the planet!

One of the things warren buffet repeats across his letter is his focus on limiting the downside to his portfolio. He considers a performance of -10% v/s -20 % of Dow better than a +20% v/s +10% of the dow. This clearly demonstrates the fact (which he has pointed out too ) that the portfolio was unconventional but also had a lower risk.
Warren buffet had put this approach in the inital letters and made it one of the key objectives in managing the portfolio.
The above approach bring to mind the quote from buffet –
rule 1 – Dont lose money
Rule 2 – dont forget rule 1

This is a very powerful approach to manage a portfolio. If one is convinced that the stock market would do well over the long term , and can limit the downside of the portfolio during bear markets , then as even buffet acknowldeged ,even if one cannot match the market on the upside , one should come out fine.

I have been reading the letters further and have read till the 1965 letter. After initial formal / fact driven style of letters, the latter ones are more informative and one can see the buffet humor in those letter coming through. These letters are closer to the BRK letter from the chairman and i was quite surprised to find example, quotes which buffet has repeated later through his BRK letters.

He discusses the ‘joys of compounding’ in the latter letters and stresses on the importance of compounding at a higher than average rate and the impact on one’s terminal networth.

There is a section on taxes (which has appeared later in the BRK letters) which discusses the importance of focussing on the post tax returns and focussing on investing based on this measure. Buffet points out to the folly of trying to minimise taxes at the cost of the post tax returns. He stresses on focussing on post tax returns and if the course of action enables the investor to save taxes , then thats added benefit. however the ‘means’ should not be confused with the ‘end’.

In addition buffet discusses about a workout (arbitrage) situation as an example. These workout enable buffet to post a great performance during the down markets. The second category is ‘generals’ which is mainly the undervalued stocks and this was the highest proportion of the partnership most of the times.

The third portion is the control situation and buffet has discussed about dempster mills in detail and how he was able to extract value out of it . The point he makes several times is the focus on buying at a such a good price that a mediocore sale is good enough. He even states that buying is 90 % of the task and selling the balance 10%. This is illuminating !!!

i am enjoying reading the letters

I have been reading the buffet partnership letters. One of the board members from the MSN – BRK boards emailed the letters to me. I had been looking out for these letters as they cannot be downloaded directly.

I knew of the superb performance of the partnership and was keen on going through these letters as they would give me an idea of how warren buffet has evolved into the greatest investors of all time

What struck me was the clarity of thought, a regular and clear communication of the partnership’s mode of operation and clear setting of expectations from the partnership .

There are a few things which struck me as warren buffet’s core operating belief which one can see in the later years in his BRK letters

– Warren buffet stresses repeatedly on the long term performance (and long term focus) v/s a short term focus

– circle of competence : focussed on investing in undervalued stocks , workouts – arbitrage , and control situation. These themes evolved into Berkshire hathaway ( control ) and the equity portfolio ( undervalued stocks )

– refusal to predict the stock market and trying to profit from it – warren buffet talks about it right from the time he started the partnership.

As i read the letters from 1957 onwards , i could see the letters increase in length (maybe warren buffet wanted to share his mode of working with the partners as the partnership grew), more discussion on his thought process ( and thenbuffet jokes / wit appearing more often )

i am still halfway through the letters and finding them very interesting