CategoryUncategorized

The practise of giving price targets in research reports

T

I have always wondered why analysts give price targets, when it is extremely difficult to predict the price level of a security, which is dependent on a host of factors with a few of these factors related to the psychology of the market at a future date.

The typical research report ( at least the free ones which I typically read) usually starts off with a very brief background of the industry. It would then discuss the latest results with a brief analysis of the last 2-3 years. The next 2-3 years income statement and balance sheet is projected. The report would typically end with a price target with simplistic analysis which is typically based on the projected EPS and a PE no.

The more rigorous analyst would give his logic for the PE assumed(often  based on the past PE of the company ). Most don’t bother to do even that.

PE as a measure is fairly flawed measure as it does not consider the ROE of the firm, its competitive advantage, impact of industry dynamics etc. At the same time the number used in backward looking (based on past PE, earning etc).I would assume a more rigorous mode of valuation would be based on DCF, with various scenarios being considered and valuation range being arrived at (with degree of confidence for this range).

But then the analyst is giving the consumer (the investor) what he wants – A precise price target (which would be hopefully achieved in the future) , a certainty,  where none exists.

It’s not that all analyst reports are of a poor quality. Some do discuss the industry in depth and attempt to do a more thorough valuation exercise. But most are superficial and not worth reading. I have found the original source of the information – The annual reports, far more useful than the analyst reports and have never made a serious commitment of capital based on an analyst report.

Do we have any good source of analyst reports in India? If you are aware please email me.,

Good post on ‘Understanding Risk & Fear of Consequence’

G

Saw a good post by arpit ranka who has a good blog on Value investing & Behaviorial finance.

This post reminded me of a comment by warren buffett on risk and tendency of investors to gamble everything on a single decision/ event ( The LTCM episode – where the hedge fund was full of these super brilliant guys, but still blew up)

from memory – ‘I have never understood why one would bet everything he has for something he does not need’

Looking at exide industries

L

I came across a few research reports on exide industries and liked what I saw . In a nutshell

  • Exide industries is in the business of  Automotive batteries with brands such as Exide and Standard furukawa.
  • Exide supplies to OEM customers in cars ( Maruti, Hyundai, Ford etc), 2 wheelers ( Bajaj, Honda etc ) and has now made an considerable in roads in the tractor segment too. It has a very high market share of around 80%+ in the OEM segment
  • Exide has a dominant position in the replacement market ( 60%+) market share and a strong brand and extensive distribution network ( Read  competitive advantage )
  • Exide has a strong balance sheet with ROE in high teens and consistent topline and bottomline growth inspite of increases in lead prices ( lead account for around 65 % of Raw material costs )
  • Exide seems to have a reasonable pricing power due to its strong brand and is a preferred vendor for a number of OEM customers
  • The company is now expanding into the export market ( which accounts for only 5 % of the topline currently )
  • The next few years look good for the company as the Automotive sector ( cars, CV and 2 wheelers) has seen good growth and as the replacement cycle is around 18-24 months, strong demand from the both the OEM segment and replacement segment  should kick in.


A few negatives

  • Lead pricing would have an important bearing on the margins going forward. However over the next 2-3 years the impact of higher lead prices could be reduced if Exide is able to pass through the cost increases.
  • Valuation – The company is priced at around 15 times FY06 earnings. For me it is on the higher end of the price range. If I am able to get more comfortable and confident of the  business (need to read about other companies in this industry), then 15 times FY06 earnings may have a margin of safety. But for the time being, I am still evaluating and trying to get my arms around it.

A good article on brands in fortune

A

For those interested in the discussion on brands and how strong, and powerful brands add value to a business, there is an article in fortune which discusses the top ten brands across the globe.

How to Build a Breakaway BrandHow ten companies, making products from drills to waffles, took good brands and made them much, much better.By Al Ehrbar
What do Gerber, Google, and Eggo have in common? They’re all selling familiarity, trust, and quality—those intangible traits summed up by the word “brand.” Right now that word is more important than ever before, because competitors are more instantly reactive and consumers more sophisticated than ever before. The Model T Ford was in production for 18 long years with little change; Sony’s Cyber-shot digital cameras go out of production while the packaging is still crisp. And once upon a time shoppers pretty much believed the hype; these days Internet-powered bargain hunters are armed with accurate pricing and product information—and brutal in their search for value.
In this cutthroat marketplace, which brands have been most successful? To find out, FORTUNE turned to Landor Associates, a brand and design consultant in San Francisco. Landor mined a huge database of brand perceptions called the BrandAsset Valuator, or BAV, to identify ten products that scored the largest increases in brand strength from 2001 to 2004. (Landor is part of WPP Group’s Young & Rubicam division, which owns the BAV.) Landor’s partner, the New York consultancy BrandEconomics, then calculated the pop in economic value each of these breakaway brands gave their parent companies.
Here’s how it works. First, Landor and BrandEconomics asked consumers—9,000 of them—what they thought of 2,500 U.S. brands. Then they looked at brand strength. This is a combination of two properties: differentiation and relevance. Differentiation is the degree to which a brand stands out. Relevance is the degree to which consumers believe a brand meets their needs. That all sounds rather obvious, but what’s surprising is that the two factors don’t necessarily go together. Rolls-Royce has stellar differentiation but hardly any relevance, since few people can pay $300,000 for four wheels. Kleenex is highly relevant but undifferentiated: Most tissues feel alike. The brands that do best are those that deliver on both counts.
In addition, the BAV measures a brand’s stature, which can also be broken down into two components—esteem and knowledge. Esteem is how well regarded the brand is, while knowledge refers to whether the consumer understands it. And once again, those two qualities don’t operate in lockstep. A high-esteem, low-knowledge profile may be a sign of a brand on the rise—the consumer’s curiosity is piqued. A high-knowledge, low-esteem profile, on the other hand, is the consumer’s way of dissing a brand: We know it, and it’s nothing special (think Dodge or Coor’s Lite).
Weakening brands tend to depend more on coupons and discounts; muscular ones can command a premium. How much does that matter? A lot. The intangible value of a company is its market value minus its tangible capital (i.e., property, plant, equipment, and net working capital). A BrandEconomics analysis found that companies with strong, well-regarded brands had an intangible value of 250% of annual sales; companies with listless brands had one of only 70%.
In important ways, though, the value of a brand is incalculable. A rising brand secures more customer loyalty, higher margins, greater pricing flexibility, and new opportunities for growth. And brands on the way up, BrandEconomics research shows, ride through economic downturns with less trauma. “The combination of faster growth with less risk,” says Hayes Roth, vice president for global marketing at Landor, “is business nirvana.” Here’s a look at ten brands that are pretty close to paradise right now.

It is easy to know what will happen in the market, but difficult to know when

I

The above comment is from warren buffet. He has also written in the annual letters that he prices the market, rather than time the market. The difference is substantial between the two approaches. The first one, is based on valuation and understanding when the market price is way above the intrinsic value and then going ahead and selling the overvalued security.

The second approach of timing the market is based on psychology of the market and is very difficult (at least for me) to do consistently. People try technical analysis, charts etc to time the market and there could some investors out there who could be good at it. But I have never tried it, as it is too difficult and not really productive for me.

The approach in ‘pricing’ the market works in areas beyond the stock market too. Let me give a personal example

Interest rates in India have fallen for quite some time. From a 10% in 2001 to around 6-7 % by 2004. This was the time to be an investor in debt as debt funds gave good returns. In 2004 I was looking at a housing loan and had an offer of 7.75 % fixed versus 7.25 % Variable. The loan officer ofcourse was very enthusiastic about the variable loan and kept pushing it. I however was keen on the fixed loan and had worked the following math (with assumptions)

Long-term inflation – 5-6 % (assumption on the lower end, can be higher)
NPA – 0.5-1 %
Cost of loan servicing for an HFC – 0.25 – 0.5 %
Return on asset – 1.5 % (for an HFC to earn a reasonable return on equity)

The effective cost (rate an HFC should charge me) should be around 7.5 % – 9 %. So with all the optimistic assumptions built into the ‘value’ of the funds, it should not be priced below 7.5%.

As the bank was offering 7.75 % fixed for a tenure of 20 years, I felt the loan was underpriced and opted for a fixed rate loan.

I could be wrong in my decision if

  • Inflation for next 20 years remains below 5 %
  • NPA for most of the HFC are below 0.5 %


But the odds are that over a 20-year period, we could have periods of high inflation and high NPA. So I went ahead with the fixed rate loan. At the same time I moved out of debt funds and into floating rate funds.

I found the approach of pricing (and working on odds) the market much more productive. I am not right immediately and so there is no instant gratification (all my friends in 2004 kept saying that floating rate is the way to go). But if my logic is correct and I make a rational, informed decision, it has worked out for me.

Please share any such experiences you would have had




Pidilite industries – results and a change of opinion

P

Pidilite industries is one of the leading companies involved in adhesives, sealants and construction chemicals business. It has several top brands like fevicol, Fixit, M-seal etc.

I had looked at this company in 2001 and had made a small investment based on the following points

  • Good ROC of 20 % +
  • Sustaniable competitive advantage due to strong brands, extensive distribution network and high market share/ mindshare
  • Consistent revenue and profit growth for last 10 years

What stopped me from committing myself more was the tendency of the management to do strange, under-related commitment of capital to businesses like windmills !. In addition they had some IT disputes. All this made me uncomfortable.

A few weeks back I looked at their latest annual report and liked what I saw. A few notable point

  • Capital allocation has been rational and has added to the core business. Management has acquired brands like Mr Fixit, M-seal etc and have grown these brands after acquiring them
  • No funny diversifications into stuff like windmills !!
  • An increasing dividend flow indicating a willingness to return excess capital back to shareholders
  • Focus on EVA / Return on capital ( The management discussion talks about these points which kind of indicates the managements commitment to it)
  • Impressive growth in the core business of adhesives, sealants, construction chemicals
  • Growth of the business to international markets

All in all, I am ready to re-think on the capital allocation attitude of management, which I feel is fairly pro-shareholder and rational. But the price is a bit higher than what I would like. So I guess, I would wait and watch for the price to be in happy zone before I take a swing

Is a strong brand a profitable franchise ? – comments / thoughts/ cases

I

I had posted my thoughts on the difference between a brand and franchise. Initially my understanding was that they are the same and a strong brand equates to a good franchise (franchise can be defined as a business which earns more than its cost of capital and has a sustainable competitive advantage).

However I have seen cases where the two are not the same ( ex : titan, Mercedes etc, general motor brands etc).

I put out a question asking for comments and got replies from bruce (see below) and from george who has put his thoughts on his website Fat Pitch Financials.

I am listing a few criteria which came to my mind after I got the comments from bruce and george

So here goes
A strong brand would equate to profitable franchise if price is not the key differentiator or is not key factor in the purchase decision. I can think of the following cases

  • Low value purchase v/s high value purchase (borrowed from george’s post on his website). I cannot think of anyone putting as much effort in buying a cola v/s buying a car. As a result a strong brand can charge more for a product
  • A complex purchase decision requiring substantial information to asess the true price of a product. For ex: high end electronic products – A bose system ?
  • Emotional association with the product – Disney products / Barbie dolls – try giving a child a regular lower price but equally good doll and you will understand what I mean
  • Social proof / Association tendency – High prestige product which confer a social status on the owner . Ex : tiffany’s


Ofcourse the above are not sufficient for a strong brand to be a profitable franchise. Cost structures and other factors would also be important for the business to be a profitable franchise.

Now why go through all this in trying to distinguish between a franchise and good business (with or without a brand). If I remember correctly, warren buffett in his annual report has written about newspapers as very strong franchise with a kind of a toll bridge business model. Later with internet and other media, he commented that newspapers were still good businesses, but not bullet proof franchise. In the same section he also did a rough valuation exercise of a good franchise v/s good business and showed how strong franchises are worth more than good businesses.


Please share your thoughts on the above topic.


Comments :
Bruce said…
Here’s my abstract opinion (there are a LOT of ways of looking at this one question). A brand/franchise/whatever is something which signals a contract with the customer. It’s a popular solution to the prisoner’s dilemma problem that plagues all economic transactions to some extent. Game theory deals with this subject very well.A vendor spends a great deal of time and money developing an easily recognizable public image that is protected by law (from having other vendors use the same image). That image slowly becomes a reputation, but it also signals a commitment from the vendor not to cheat the customer quickly and then run away. The average consumer must keep track of a very large and growing number of brands and franchises. They don’t want to have to do the enormous work to validate a vendor every time they want to make an economic purchase. A brand/franchise allows them to make quick decisions, often in unknown places. So in a sense, a brand/franchise becomes a contract between the buyer and the vendor. The cost in establishing the brand (and also the value in not destroying it) is a fuzzy guarantee placed into the public by the vendor.When you have a comodity product or service, that brand becomes less important. Someone stands by the side of the road with a rock that you want to buy. They have no brand, but all you want is a rock which is easily verified during the purchase. Anyone spending lots of money to establish a brand is at a cost disadvantage to someone who just gathers rocks and stands at the side of the road. For that reason, comodity markets are won by whoever has the lowest cost. If the market demands 10,000 rocks, then you essentially line up the vendors from lowest cost to highest cost. You start with the lowest cost and work your way up until you buy 10,000 rocks (well, it’s more complicated than that due to the supply/demand curve). The market price essentially becomes the highest cost rock among the 10,000.So call it a brand or franchise or whatever, it’s really a sort of contract. It’s very important that the law upholds the property rights of the brand or everything breaks down. In fact, it’s always important for property rights to be upheld for economic activity to be efficient and effective. India has come a long way over the years and I suspect it will become a very major economic superpower so long as it continues on the path of free markets and property rights.
7:02 PM
Bruce said…
What makes a strong brand? Well, one view is covered very well in The 22 Immutable Laws of Marketing. But a better answer is to look at your own behavior and where you rely on brand. Buffett made some comments about Coca Cola that make a lot of sense. One type of very good brand is small, repeat purchases that are almost habit.When you look at what a brand is all about (a contract), then you can ask yourself when is that contract valuable from the vendor’s perspective. One good thing is lots of confusion and doubt in the minds of customers. Another is a long delay before the customer finds out whether what they bought was good quality vs poor quality.
9:47 AM
George said…
This is a very interesting topic. I posted my comments about it over at my blog, Fat Pitch Financials. It would be nice to put together a set of criteria by which to gage how likely a brand will lead to a franchise.
8:04 PM

Q&A with Warren buffett (Tuck school of business)

Q

http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/clubs/investment/WarrenBuffett.html

Some excerpts from the Q&A

Q: In your letters you speak frequently of the importance of not over-complicating things. What are your secrets to keeping your life simple?A: When making investments, pretend in life you have a punch-card with only 20 boxes, and every time you make an investment you punch a slot. It will discipline you to only make investments you have extreme confidence in. Big money is made by obvious things. If using a discount rate of 8% vs. 10% is going to make or break an investment idea, it’s probably not a good idea. Back in 1951 Moody’s published thick handbooks by industry of every stock in circulation. I went through all of them, thousands of pages, motivated by the hope that a great idea was just on the next page. I found companies like National American Insurance and Western Insurance Securities Company that nobody was paying attention to that were trading for far less than their intrinsic values. Last year we found a steel company on the Korean Stock Exchange that had no analyst coverage, no research, but was the most profitable steel company in the world


Q: I have worked in various technologies businesses, but I understand that you do not typically invest in the technology sector. Why is that? How do you view technology as an individual and as an investor?A: Technology is clearly a boost to business productivity and a driver of better consumer products and the like, so as an individual I have a high appreciation for the power of technology. I have avoided technology sectors as an investor because in general I don’t have a solid grasp of what differentiates many technology companies. I don’t know how to spot durable competitive advantage in technology. To get rich, you find businesses with durable competitive advantage and you don’t overpay for them. Technology is based on change; and change is really the enemy of the investor. Change is more rapid and unpredictable in technology relative to the broader economy. To me, all technology sectors look like 7-foot hurdles


Q: In many of your letters you speak about the importance of looking through the windshield and not the rearview mirror. What issues do you think people today are mistakenly looking at through the rearview mirror?A: Investors are always looking for the holy grail, the next great idea that will carry performance and pension returns for the several years. Right now its ‘alternative investments’ – private equity, hedge funds, the assets that have outperformed public equities for the past five years since the tech bubble burst. There’s so much money chasing these ideas now that the returns in the future will probably not be as good. At some point, public equities will become good investments again and fewer people will be looking at them. At Berkshire, we look at a lot of “super-cat” (super catastrophe) insurance business that few firms will write. The challenge is determining when there’s a paradigm shift, when the future will no longer look like the past. It’s probable that the next hundred years of hurricane activity will not look like the past hundred years. Another example, we write a lot of D and O insurance, Directors and Officers liability. Post Enron, I feel strongly that juries will award much harsher penalties to victims of corporate fraud, etc. than they would have five years ago before the average juror watched hours of news stories about all the scandals. There’s no model that can quantify that added risk, but it’s a risk that won’t be captured looking at historical data.

My thought –  The last Q&A  throws up an interesting question for Indian investors. After 3 years of great returns, are we as investors also operating with a rear mirror view? Any thoughts ?

Subscription

Enter your email address if you would like to be notified when a new post is posted:

I agree to be emailed to confirm my subscription to this list

Recent Posts

Select category to filter posts

Archives