CategoryUncategorized

The mirage of holding companies

By Rohit Chauhan
In From other blogs, General thoughts, Investment ideas, Uncategorized
December 11, 2006
1 Min read
1 comment
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I found these two investment ideas on the blog ‘Indian equity guru’.

http://equityguru.blogspot.com/2006/12/stock-idea-srf-polymers.html
http://equityguru.blogspot.com/2006/11/stock-idea-maharastra-scooters.html

Both the ideas are of holding companies. For ex: SRF polmers has a substaintial holdings of SRF. As a result if you add the value of the business to the value of holdings, the company is selling at a substantial discount to intrinsic value.

One can make a similar case for Balmer lawrie limited and BMIL. Actually I would not be surprised if there are several such stocks available. I find such ideas interesting and cannot argue against the basic logic. What I cannot get my arms around is how will the value get unlocked? There seems to be no catalyst in sight as the holding company is a means for the promoter to exercise control. As a result the holdings may never get sold. What will unlock the value then in such cases?

Somehow these ideas seem to have a mirage like quality. You can see the value out there, but may never gain from it (unless there is an underlying catalyst to unlock the value)

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Evaluating past performance

By Rohit Chauhan
In Investment process, Uncategorized
December 6, 2006
2 Min read
3 comments
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I have been doing an analysis of my past stock picks and comparing my notes with how the stock picks have turned out over time.

I have been able to divide my picks into broadly three groups

Group A – The multibaggers. These were picks like concor, marico , asian paints, blue star etc. I had no inkling that these companies would do so well and the stock price would appreciate multiple times over the last few years when I first analysed and purchased the stocks. However on deeper analysis I found that the key reason the pick turned out well was due to a double dip I received. First the gap between the intrinsic value and the stock price closed. At the same time, these companies have been able to increase their intrinsic value through some great perfromance in the last couple of years. As a result of these two happy occurences, I have been able to get good profits

Group B – Good return stocks. These were picks like kothari products, macmillan, KVB bank etc. In case of these picks there was a narrowing of the gap between stock price and intrinsic value. As a result I was able to get decent returns as a whole. However in some cases where I was late in selling the stock, the eventual returns were lower.

Group C – The dogs. These were picks like Larsen and tubro (ouch !! see here), SSI, arvind mills etc. Each pick had its own reason for going wrong from over paying for the stock, poor performance of the business, sloppy analysis etc.

The above analysis is definitely not earth shattering and I have known it vauguely for some time. But after almost 8-9 years of buying, selling and analysing stocks, I thought of doing some analysis so as to improve my future performance.

Ofcourse the logical conclusion would be to always buy stocks in group A. However most of the stocks in that group seem to be fairly or over priced. I am finding more picks in group B. Not too exicted about it, but beats overpaying for quality stocks or picking dogs. Key point for me to remember would be to sell these stocks in time if they do not show promise of improvement in intrinsic value

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Postmortem of an arbitrage opportunity

By Rohit Chauhan
In Arbitrage, Uncategorized
December 5, 2006
2 Min read
5 comments
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I was analysing a potential arbitrage for Infomedia Limited in april. I posted my analysis here and here.

At the time of analysis the stock was selling at 210. Based on a quick analysis, I felt the intrinsic value for the stock was around 180-190. As the terms of the buyback stated that for any holding greater than 50 shares, the acceptance ratio would be around 14%, I passed the opportunity as I felt that post the buyback, I may not be able to sell the stock at a price higher than the purchase price and I was not comfortable buying and holding the stock at 210.

So how did my thesis play out?

Well my thesis proved to be correct, but I still missed an opportunity as I did not track the stock subsequently. Let me explain,

If I had bought the stock at 210 and attempted to arbitrage, I would have suffered a loss of 16% on my investment (assuming a sale price of the stock at 170 after the close of the buyback on 8th August).

However had I continued to track the stock, there was a buying opportunity in june (see graph above, around 8 – 15th) when the stock traded briefly between 115- 140. A purchase at that price (and sale at 170 after buyback) would have given me an annualised return of 135 %.

So lesson for me is that I need to keep tracking an arbitrage stock till the end of the event to take advantage of any sudden opportunities which may come up.

Additional note: I read a few analysis from some brokerage houses of the above arbitrage and found that the analysis covered only the upside and had no mention of the risk or downside.
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More on Valuation of banks

By Rohit Chauhan
In Finance and Banking, Industry analysis, Uncategorized
November 26, 2006
3 Min read
2 comments
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Got the following comments on my previous post from prem sagar. Thought they were very valid points and hence I am posting my reponse to it seperately in a post.

Hi Rohit,

nice analysis. But I get some thoughts here.

1. What if the bank had been increasing leverage to increase or maintain higher ROE? The bank wud have maintained a 20% ROE, but leverage wud have gone higher and hence the risks. Would you not like to consider higher ROE maintained at stable net interest margins and stable net profit margins in your equation? Paying higher price to book just to maintain higher ROE can be a double edged sword where leverage can be dangerous. Dont we need to maintain our profitability and margin spread too?

2. What would you pay for a bank/nbfc with a low leverage (Say IDFC with leverage of around 4 times)..that has potential to increase leverage and hence ROE in future…as per your ROE equation, IDFC wud get a low Price to book.
3. Why shouldnt we consider ROA (assets net of NPA) instead of ROE in ur calculation? THis will show if constantly increased leverage was the reason in maintaining ROE or not.

I agree with all the above points. The post on bank valuation is a simplistic approach to valuing a bank. I always consider leverage an important variable expecially for a financial institution, such as a bank. As a matter of fact I tend to avoid companies with high leverage unless they are well run. Businesses with high leverage are extremely dependent on the quality of management. A small error by management can hurt the business very badly (note the number of banks and FI which have failed and been bailed out by the government on tax payers money).

What I should have put in my previous post is that all of the following factors being in favour, ROE can be used as a good variable to value a bank.

Factors
1. Leverage – This is represented by CAR (capital adequacy ratio). Higher the CAR, better the quality of the business. As a personal note, I prefer to select banks with CAR of atleast 10-12%
2. Level of NPA and asset quality. A bank can have high ROE and still have a lot of problems loans which are hidden by a practise called as greening of loans (give loan to an existing account to prevent the loan from defaulting)
3. Level of operating expense / Net interest income. This reflects the operating efficiency of the bank
4. Level of non-interest, fee based income. Higher the better.
5. Brand name, retail network and management quality. All fuzzy factors, but fairly important ones for a bank

I tend not to overwiegh ROA. An ROA of 1.3% or more is good. Acutally a very high ROA may not be a good sign (possible that the bank is lending to high yield, high risk segment)

I also agree with prem’s point that if a bank has a low leverage, then earnings can expand more easily. To put it another way, the bank will have no need to access the capital market to raise equity to fund its growth (one of the problems being faced by several public sector banks).

All said, valuing and analysing a bank is far more diffcult (according to me) than other businesses. However the ROE approach can be taken as one approach to arrive at an estimate of intrinsic value. I acutally use this instrinsic value as a starting point and then adjust this number based on the other factors, after the bank meets the basic quality standards

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Valuation of Banks – some thoughts

By Rohit Chauhan
In Industry analysis, Investment process, Uncategorized, Valuation
November 22, 2006
3 Min read
3 comments
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I have been reading the book – The warren buffett way (previous post here). There are several instances of valuations in the book on various companies such as Cap cities/ABC, American express etc. One point which caught my attention was the comparison of a company to a Long term bond investment. Buffett has mentioned several times that he uses the long term bond rates for discount in the DCF model.

Using the above comment, I have used the following thought process to look at another way of valuing a bank (earlier post on the same topic here).

The current long term rate for a 10 year bond is say 7 % (example purpose). So I would be ready to pay 100 Rs for this bond (face value). Now if I have a bond, say Bond B (of similar risk) which pays 14 % on face value, I would be ready to pay around Rs 188 for a face value of Rs 100 for the Bond B (A 7% bond would give 196 Rs in 10 years v/s 370 Rs for the 14 % Bond).

Taking the analogy to equity, lets consider a bank which has an ROE of 14%. Assume a 10 year period for which the bank can maintain this ROE ( This is the crucial part as this is the assestment an investor has to make on the competitive advantage of the Bank and its ability to maintain the high ROE). Beyond the 10 year period the bank’s ROE returns to 7% and so the bank in investment profile is similar to a Long bond.

In the above case, the Bank is similar in its return profile to Bond B. So everything else being equal I would value this bank at 1.88 times Book value.

Ofcourse the above is a very simple sceanrio. But we can add more complexity to the above case and make it more realisitic

Case 1: The ROE is 20 %. This ROE can be maintained for 10 years as in the above example. In such as case, I would value the bank at 3.14 times book value.

Case 2 : The ROE is 14%, but the Excess returns can be maintained for 20 years instead of 10. In such as case the valuation can be at 3.55 times book value

Case 3 : ROE is 20% and the period is 20 years. In that case the bank can be valued at 9.9 times book value.

So the simple conclusion is that higher the ROE and the longer the period for which it can be maintained, the higher is the instrinsic value of the bank (which is basic Discounted flow approach).

The above is a more shorthand approach of valuing a bank. I would look at the valuation in the following way now,

– What is the ROE for the bank
– What is the adjusted book value (net of NPA)
– What is the likely duration of excess return (select only a bank which is well run and hence the duration is atleast 10 years)

Based on the above factors I would prefer to invest at 1.5 – 2 times the adjusted book value (keeping a reasonable margin of safety).

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Value Traps

By Rohit Chauhan
In General thoughts, Notable value investors, Uncategorized
November 16, 2006
2 Min read
7 comments
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I think every value investor dreads a value trap which is basically a company, which seems cheap by historical standards and the gap between the price and the supposed intrinsic value does not close.

I found the following very useful comment from bill miller (he is a very famous money manager in the US whose fund has beaten the index for a straight 15 years)

“You never know for certain, but the nature of value traps is, they tend to have certain characteristics. Typically, one is that the valuation of the business or the industry is lower than its historical norms. The company or business normally has a fairly long history, so the historical normal valuations provide a lot of comfort. Therefore, when you get down toward the lower end of these valuations, value people find them attractive. The trap comes in when there’s a secular change, where the fundamental economics of the business are changing or the industry is changing, and the market is slowly incorporating that into the stock price. So that would be the case over the last several years with newspapers. They are a good example of where historical valuation metrics aren’t working.”

The complete article is here

In addition found the following interesting quote from warren buffett

“Margin of Safety is the untapped pricing power in a business.”

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Further thoughts on pricing strength of a business

By Rohit Chauhan
In Competitive advantage, Investing Philosophy, Uncategorized
November 13, 2006
2 Min read
3 comments
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The following question was posed to me by Prem sagar on my previous post. The question made me think and I am posting my thoughts on what I think is a fairly important issue in investing (earlier post on pricing )

But what would u say for an industry like say auto ancillaries or retail-proxies like Bartronics, control print, etc where the opportunity is huge, but they have little or no pricing power?

According to me, pricing is an important variable to evaluate the presence of a competitive advantage or strength. A company with strong pricing power, will be able to sustain high returns for a long time and can increase its intrinsic value over time too. So if one were to buy a company with strong pricing power (with other factors in favour), then it is likely that the investment would work out well with passage of time as the company increases its intrinsic value. So such companies can be long term holdings in a portfolio

That said, it does not mean that companies without pricing power would not be good investments. If one can find a company with low pricing power (commodity business), but with some kind of competitive advantage and selling below its intrinsic value, then such a company can be good investment. I would however not hold such an investment too long, once the stock price is close to the intrinsic value as the likelyhood of an increase in the intrinsic value is less.

I do not have much insight into retail-proxies. However as far as auto-ancillaries are concerned, I have done a bit of analysis ( see here, and here) and have not found too many companies to invest in (mainly due to valuation issues). By the very nature of the industry, these companies have poor pricing power (except for retail), have a few large buyers (OEM) and not many have achieved economies of scale in their operation (this industry is still fairly fragmented). However some auto-ancillaries do posses a few competitive advantages such as a low cost position due to focus on specific segment (fasteners for sundaram clayton?) and good growth opportunities. However as I have written earlier, I would invest in these companies only at a fair discount to intrinsic value and sell once the stock reaches the intrinsic value. I would really not hold the stock for a long term.

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Learnings from the Book: The warren buffett way

By Rohit Chauhan
In Book review, Uncategorized, Warren buffett
November 9, 2006
2 Min read
4 comments
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I have been reading again the excellent Book ‘The warren buffett way’. This book was my first exposure to Warren buffett and his approach to Investing. I have followed and learnt from him since then. The following were the key re-learnings I have had over the past few days (I am yet to finish the book)

– ROE (Return on equity) is one the most important indicator of the economic performance of a company. A company can raise this measure through five different means
o Higher Asset turns (Sales / Total assets)
o Higher margins
o Higher leverage
o Cheaper leverage
o Lower taxes.

I have seen the above happen for several companies in the past few years and have seen the stock price follow the improvement in ROE

For ex: Bluestar (better asset turns), ICICI bank (cheaper leverage, higher margins).

– Inflation does not improve ROE and actually reduces the net return to an investor
– The best companies are the ones which have strong franchies like crisil. Over time some of them become weak franchises. Further weakning of the franchise leads to a good business and then finally to a commodity company.
– Pricing strength is a key attribute of Franchises. These companies can raise prices even when the demand is flat and can earn good returns.

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Blue star india – A quick look

By Rohit Chauhan
In Company analysis, Investment ideas, Uncategorized
November 2, 2006
3 Min read
Add comment
B

Blue star india is primarily in the commercial air conditioning and refrigeration business. The three main business segments are

1.Central air conditioning: This is the main business for blue star. It accounts for 70 %+ of the company’s revenue, has been growing at 25 % and has a pre-tax ROCE of almost 60 %. Blue star is fairly dominant in this sector and has a good market share of almost 30%. This sector is dependent on industrial demand, IT/ITES sector and retail. Lately the industrial sector, IT/ITES and retail sector have been boyant due to which Blue star has a good backlog of orders.

2.Cooling products: This comprises of Window, split A/c and other retail products such as water coolers, cold storage etc. This is a fairly competitive segment with strong brands such as carrier aircon and other vendors. This segment had a good volume growth and revenue growth of 30%. However as this segment is competitive, the pre-tax ROCE is at a respectable 15%.

3.Professional electronics and industrial equipment: This segment had a good growth last year on a small base of 60 Crs. The segment is small accounting for less than 10% of the total revenue. The pre-tax ROCE is high at almost 70%+.

Key competitive strengths
Blue star has key advantages via a strong brand in its key segments. It has a good reputation in terms of project execution and after sales service for the institutional segment. There is certain amount of lockin once a customer (especially if it is an institutional one) has selected and installed a blue star system. Subsequent orders would likely be for the same vendor. Due to high market share, blue star has certain demand and production economies of scale, which allows it to be a low cost provider. The central air conditioning segment is project driven, where project skills, experience and scale matters as the margins are fairly low (pre-tax margins were < 10 %) and hence a company has to be efficient to be a profitable business.

Problems areas
The company has performed well on most parameters such as revenue growth, NPM, ROE etc. However for the last 1-2 years, the free cash flow of the company has been dropping. The current year’s FCF was around 40 % of the operating profits. The main culprits have been account recievables and inventory. The recievables ratio has dropped from 6 to 4.9 and the inventory ratio has dropped from 9 to 7.9. The drops are not alarming and are still good in an absolute sense. However they need to be watched closely to see if the growth is not coming a high price (write-offs of bad debts and inventory later)

Valuation
Assuming (a big assumption though), the company can manage its Working capital, the Net profit can be taken as Free cash flow. The last year EPS (post split) was 5.8. The current year EPS should come be conservatively at 7. Using a DCF (with various assumptions) I would value the company roughly at 140-160 Rs/ Share. My personal opinion is that the stock is fairly priced.

Disclosure : I have owned the stock for the past few years.

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Hidden Value : Kirloskar oil engines

By Rohit Chauhan
In Company analysis, Investment ideas, Uncategorized
October 29, 2006
3 Min read
Add comment
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Analysis date: Aug 2006

Kirloskar oil engines, a company from the kirloskar group has two main business segments

Engines: This business segment accounts for almost 80 % of the revenue and is the main business segment. This business caters to the farm sector, power sector, industrial machinery, Construction and material handling equipment. In addition the company has contracts/ relationships with OEM manufacturers, the armed forces and has its own service dealers and service personnels. The company has products in a wide HP ranges and has technical collaborations too. The highest volume comes from the small engines segment followed by the medium engines.

Autocomponents: This business segment accounts for the balance 20% and had an above industry growth due to capacity constraints. In addition the company has OEM relationships with some prominent companies such as maruti, sundaram clayton etc. The main products are valves and bearings

Other business: Some other minor businesses such as manufacturing grey iron castings, trading, power generation and sales (which is under review due to dropping sales)

The Company has benefitted from the recent improvement in the capital goods sector and upturn in the power sector. The period from 1996 to 2001 such low growth (20% in almost 6-7 years). Due to the improvement in the business climate the topline and margins have improved dramatically in the recent past. The company is seeing good volume growth in its core business and has also delivered good performance in the export sector which crossed 100 Crs this year.

Due to the nature of the industry (capital goods) with limited and large buyers, and due to cyclical nature the topline and margins are also cyclical. The NPM has fluctuated between as low as 2-3 % to 15 % in the recent past. I would put the average NPM at 6-7 % over a complete business cycle.

The company has become fairly efficient with the Fixed asset turnover ratios expanding from 4-5 to 7-8 in the recent past. Wcap ratios have gone through a dramatic improvement and is now almost 14. This freeing up of the capital has raised the ROE from 8-10 % to almost 30% +. In addition on a total capital base of 795 Cr, almost 500 Crs is investments.

This 500 Crs of investment at market value is almost 1000cr which translates into almost 95 Rs/ share (net of debt)

Valuation: The last year Netprofit is almost Rs 10 / share (net of exceptional items). With almost 95 Rs / share of investment, I would value the stock at approximately 350 Rs / share (max). There are various assumptions behind this valuation, namely

1. Rs 18/ share for current year’s earnings are during a cyclical high. The average earnings are more like 14-16.

2. Rs 95/ share of investments is not really realisable as a major part of this investment is in other group/ JV’s, which are unlikely to be sold off soon.

3. The company has some competitive advantage such as customer relationships, some economies of scale etc. But in the end it is in a cyclical industry with moderate to weak pricing strength and hence I would not accord the core business a PE multiple of more than 16-18.

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