CategoryInvestment process

Arithmetic return is what you see, geometric return is what you get

A

I am reading a fairly enjoyable book ‘A Mathematician plays the stock market’ (see section ‘currently reading’ under sidebar). Found the discussion on geometric mean v/s arithmetic mean (for returns) fairly relevant for an investor.

Let me explain

Arithmetic mean (or returns) is the simple average of returns over the time period being considered.

For ex: consider a stock X that has the following returns for the year
Week 1 : + 80 %
Week 2 : -60 %

The average return for a two week period is +10%. The ‘average’ return for the year would be 1.1^52 = 142 times the original investment. If average return is what an investor gets, then anyone can be fabulously rich in no time.

Geometric mean of the same stock will be derieved by the following formulae
Total return = (1+0.8)*(1-0.6)*(1+0.8)…….( for 52 weeks) = 0.000195

The scenario in the above formulae is that the investor makes a positive return the first week, followed by negative the next and then positive and so on. So the real return he/she actually gets is less than 1 % of capital invested

Another example
An investor is on the lookout for a hot mutual fund. He looks at the mutual fund rankings and sees a fund, which has returned 100 % last year. He invests his money in the fund. The hot fund promptly proceeds to lose 50% next year ( reversion to mean or maybe bad luck ).

The return the fund publicizes is 25 % (average for 2 years ). An investor who was invested for 2 years is lucky to get his money back. The performance chasing investor looses half his money. The fund manager and his company get their asset management fee and are able to show great performance at the same time.

Reminds me of a famous title of a book – ‘where are customer’s yatch?’

There is another interesting discussion happening on the BRK board on MSN (registration required ) on the same topic.

Concept of variant perception

C

I have been reading a book ‘No bull’ by Micheal steinhardt. He was hedge fund manager and was able to deliver around 30% returns for almost 30+ years.

I found his concept of variant perception useful. According to micheal, every investment idea should be explainable in 2 minutes and four points

  • The idea
  • The consensus view around the idea
  • The variant perception of the analyst
  • The trigger event which would unlock the value

For example, if there is a solid growth company which is expected by the market to grow at 20%, and as an investor my expectations are close to the same number, then I am not going to make more than the cost of equity if the actual numbers meet the expectations (for more detailed understanding of how to evaluate market expectation read the book Expectations investing)

I have used this concept of variant perception in some form although not exactly in the same manner as explained by micheal. Let me give an example

Marico in the year 2003-2004 was selling at around 10-12 time trailing earnings. A simple DCF would easily show that the market was discounting 2-3 years of competitive advantage period -CAP (for detailed understanding of CAP, please read this article) with growth in low teens. Now if one looks at the brands, the history of their New products and their distribution network and management,it is easy to see that this company could grow in low teens for considerably more than the market implied CAP of 2-3 years.

So basically my variant perception was not centred around the growth (which is the the usual variant perception generally given by most of the analysts) but around the CAP of the company.

Marico now sells for a much higher PE and the growth was also much higher than implied by the market (around 15% +).

To a certain extent, one can see the same kind variant perception being exploited by warren buffett, except that he is a genius at recognising such businesses with CAP much higher than implied by the market price (ex: coke, GIECO etc)

My problem with stock screens

M

Most of us know the problem with simple stock screens such as one’s based on low P/E ratio, low P/B ratio etc. A lot of stocks which get filtered through the screens are typically companies with poor economics. I have tried to overcome this problem by building a screen which has the following additional screening criteria

  • An ROCE/ROE of atleast 13% or more
  • No loss during the past 5 years
  • Above average growth over 5 years in NP
  • D/E < 2

Adding the above stock screens has filtered out companies in the following industries (partial list below)

  • auto components
  • bank
  • cement
  • Chemical
  • Shipping
  • Fertiliser
  • Shipping
  • Paper
  • Textile

I have started analysing one company at a time under each of the classification. Unfortunately the reason these companies have filtered out is either due to a cyclical uptick in the industry (cement, shipping, paper etc) or it is tier II company in the industry with high operating leverage and has seen a reduction in interest cost. Due these reasons , the recent PE, ROE etc of these companies is good, debt is down and these stocks look good.
My concern is how these companies would fare once the cycle turns downwards. Let me explain using the example of shipping industry which I am analysing currently.
The main companies in the shipping industry which have filtered out through the screen are

  • mercator lines : High asset addition recently through debt which has resulted in high earnings and high ROE. The risk to the business is high if the business cycle reverses as the company may be unable to service its debt
  • Varun shipping / Shreyas shipping: high operating leverage, high debt and high growth in earnings in recent times due to high shipping rates. Earnings risk is high due to operating leverage
  • Essar shipping : High earnings due high shipping rates. Also ROE is high to asset revaluations. This stock looks interesting and worth investigating further.

I guess the stock screen is throwing up a lot of companies which may be statistically cheap but not really a value stock. So essentially I am not be able to come up with a list of companies which are great value. I guess it is to a certain extent an indication of the kind valuation levels existing in the current market (The same filter in 2003 gave much better companies). So I guess I will have go through the entire list and maybe at the end (the list has 100+ companies) come up with a few good stocks. It defintely not a waste of time because it helps me to understand more companies/ industries which could be helpful in the future

any suggestions on improving the above screens ?

Mistakes

M

I keep checking on bruce’s blog regularly. He is a frequent poster on fool.com and writes fairly well on topics related to investing. He has a post on mistakes he has made in the past.

The following comment resonated with me a lot. I have had the same experience on my mistakes and agree completely with what he says ( once bitten twice shy ??)

Which leads to ACLN. In hindsight, I probably lost more money in missed opportunities from a loss of confidence by making a mistake in ACLN than the money I actually lost in ACLN. And I think that’s a more important lesson. It was easy to learn how to avoid another ACLN. It was much harder to avoid seeing ACLNs everywhere I looked. As someone said about Barrons (Bearons): the bearish case always looks more intelligent and more responsible.If there’s anything for certain, I’ll continue to make mistakes. If Buffett keeps making mistakes even lately, what chance do I have? I believe the answer is to apply the methodology and rely on experience and do whatever is possible to have a higher batting average.


Bruce has also added a reading list to his blog. Definitely worth noting down the recommended books.

My Investing mistakes

M

It is well documented and known that the pain of loss is much higher than the  joy of gain. I have had my share of losses (some due to greed, some due to ignorance). However, as buffet and munger have repeatedly reminded, one should try analyzing one’s mistakes and learn from it.

I am listing some of the errors I have made , and the lessons learnt. My typical holding is 4-5 years and so if I am wrong in analyzing an investment, the impact is much higher for me.

An error of commission
I started investing actively 6 years ago. While reading a magazine, I come across a recommendation for SSI ltd. This was (is ??) a company in the computer education business competing with the likes of Aptech and NIIT. The key differentiator for the company was its short term courses in Java and other technologies which were useful for IT professionals to land a good job. It was selling at a PE of 50 at that time.

The balance sheet was strong , with low debt and the company had recently made an acquisition in the US using its stock (@ a price of 2200 rs / share). The acquisition enabled the company to get into IT services and would have served as a good additional revenue stream.

Shortly after I bought the stock, the Dotcom bubble burst. Recruitments by IT companies slowed down and the IT services market dried up. As a result SSI got hit by a double whammy. Their education business suffered big time and also their IT services company never scaled up in the tough environment. I bailed out of the stock after losing more than 90 %.

My learnings

  • Never buy a richly valued stock. The companies future seemed bright, however the stock was more than reflecting it. So when the downturn came, there was no margin of safety to cushion the blow
  • Do not invest in a company whose economics you cannot foresee with reasonable probability
  • Do not invest in a company whose management you don’t trust. SSI’ s management seemed to be involved with Ketan parekh in boosting the stock. This should have been a red flag for me

An error of understanding a catalyst event in unlocking value
My next big mistake did not result in my losing money. But more so, I lost out on a huge gain. The stock is L&T. I bought the stock back in 1998. The company had mediocre performance till then. Post 1998, the performance nosedived. The cement division was doing badly due to the demand supply mismatch and the engineering division was doing average due to a recession in the capital goods market.

On top of that the management, stubbornly kept diverting capital from a high return business (capital goods) to Cement (commodity with low returns). There were media reports that the management would spin off the cement division (but I think it was just a ruse played by the management). Eventually I got disgusted with the management and sold off at minor profit.

A few months later, the Kumarmangalam birla group , after a corporate battle , bought out the cement division. The management (as expected) went ahead and allocated 10% of the equity to the employees and added a poison pill to prevent  a repeat takeover attempt (The management is still anti shareholder and I have not changed my mind on that). However with the cement division out of the way, and the capital goods market doing well, the  performance improved and the stock has gone up by 8-9 times.

My learning

  • I should have done a sum of part valuation. I should have valued the engineering goods and the cement division separately and calculated the intrinsic value based on the sum
  • Patience – The takeover bid had started. I simply got disgusted with the management and bailed out. Should have been more patient.

I will keep listing more of my investing miscues (which I have many) and share my learnings. Please feel free to share yours …

Porter’s five forces model and buffet’s concept of moat

P

Buffet refers to the concept of moat or sustainable competitive advantage as one of the most critical factor in determining the returns for a long term investor (in addition to other criteria)

I have been reading porter’s book ‘on competition’ and trying to get a better understanding of how to evaluate a company’s competitive advantage for a long term investment.

The five forces model is very helpful in understanding the industry structure and kind of long term returns to expect in an industry. What i was able to ‘understand’ this time (have read the topic several times ) is that not all the factors are equally important and for an investor it is critical to asses which factors impact the industry and the company more and would influence the long term returns.

More important for a long term investor is to understand, how the five factors of competition will change and determine the future returns.

I am now trying the above exercise for some industries like FMCG/IT services / Banking etc . A good evaluation and insight into the trends would be far more useful that chasing some price targets or trying to predict the next quarter which in munger’s words would be ‘twaddle’

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