CategoryCompany analysis

Analysis: Maharastra seamless – conclusion

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I wrote about maharastra seamless a few weeks back. The initial part of the analysis is here. The rest of the analysis follows

Competitive analysis

There are several companies in the steel tubes and pipes space. Some of the key companies in this space are Welspun corp, PSL, APL Apollo tubes etc.

Welspun corp is one the biggest companies in this space with a total capacity of around 1.5 MMT (3 times Maharastra seamless) which is slated to rise to around 2 MMT. The company is into LSAW, MSAW (higher dia pipes), ERW and seamless pipes. The company has maintained its ROE numbers at around the 20% levels. The company has also maintained its net margin levels at around 6-8% levels which is much lesser than MSL (at around 9-10%).

PSL is one of the largest HSAW pipe makers with a installed capacity of around 1.8 MMT. The company is expanding capacity by 75000 MT in 2012. The company also has a presence in the middle east (UAE) and US.  The company has maintained an ROE of around 15% with a net margin of around 3% in the last few years. The company however has a high debt equity ratio of around 1.6.

MSL seems to have better financials than the other companies in the same sector. The company has an operating margin which is higher than the other companies in the sector by atleast 4-5% which has led to a better ROC and higher cash flows. This higher operating margin seems to be the result of better pricing and lower overheads.

Management quality checklist

  • Management compensation: Management compensation seems to be reasonable. The MD made less than 0.5% of net profit in 2011 which is on the lower side for promoter led companies
  • Capital allocation record: The capital allocation record is a mixed bag. The company has consistently maintained a high gross margin on its product and thus been able to generate a high return on capital and good cash flows. These cash flows have been used to pay off debt and is also being used for capacity expansion (horizontal and vertical). At the same time the company raised money through an FCCB offer in 2005, which was not utilized by the company. I would give some benefit of doubt to the company on this point as they have been trying to expand into a billet plant (Which is the RM for ERW pipes) and have not been able to make progress due to land acquisition issues.
  • Shareholder communication: Seems adequate. The management provides adequate information about the business and has quarterly presentations about the same on its website. In addition the company conducts quarterly conference calls and shares the transcripts on its website
  • Accounting practice: Seems adequate and in line with the standards. Nothing stands out
  • Conflict of interest: There were no related party transactions which seem to be out of line. However the management has lent out around 177 Crs to a company (highlighted by the auditors) in 2011 which is a point of concern.

Valuation

The company sells at around 7-8 times  core earnings. One needs to exclude the impact of excess cash and non –core income (income from deposits and other sources) to arrive at the core earnings which were around 300 Crs last year. A normalized margin of around 14 % (rough average of last 5-6 years excluding impact of non core icome) gives an approximate net profit of around 270-290 Crs.

If  you exclude the excess cash on the books, the company is selling at around 7-8 times earnings.

The other companies in the same sector sell at around the same valuation. If one considers that maharastra seamless has superior financials, then one can make a case for a premium. The company is also selling on the lower side of its historical valuations, which has ranged between 5 to 20 times earnings.

In summary the company appears to be undervalued on various measures. At the same time, I still have doubts on the sustainability of the margins. In view of the capacity expansion in the industry and higher level of competition (due to dumping from china), it is quite likely the margins would trend downwards.

Conclusion

This is an industry with a limited number of players in india and with low levels of competitive advantage. The main competitive advantage comes from economies of scale and client relationships (takes time to become an approved supplier for the major O&G companies). In addition, there is a lot of competition from the Chinese companies in the same space and this has led to price pressure in india.

At the same time, the user companies of oil and gas, power utilities and water supplies are growing and is likely to result in robust demand over the medium and long term. We thus have two opposing trends (growth in topline and pressure on margins) and it is difficult (for me) to understand how this will impact profits eventually.

I have the company on a watch list for the time being and 10% drop in the price would be a good point for me to start a small position.

Two differing ideas – Akzo nobel and Techno fab engineering

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I have a constant struggle in my mind – Do I pay for quality (overpay?) or do I buy cheap stuff, which may turn out to be a value trap.
The ideal situation would be to get a high quality stock at a cheap price. But then if wishes were horses!, I would be a good looking billionaire with my own private island J.
So let’s look at my current dilemma
Akzo nobel
Akzo nobel is a global company in the business of decorative and auto paints and other industrial chemicals. The company acquired ICI plc a few years back and thus got the Indian business of ICI with the acquisition.
 ICI paints (atleast in the late 90s) was a company with good brands and was fairly aggressive in the paints business. At one point, they even tried to acquire asian paints by buying out the stake of one of the promoters.
ICI paints is one of the oldest paint companies in India and is fairly strong in geographical pockets (West Bengal) and in specific products (premium paints). The company has however not been able to capitalize on its strength in the past and did not seem to have a focused strategy. The new management however seems to be developing a focused strategy of introducing new products, expanding distribution and spending on brand building.
The paints business is a very profitable business with very high entry barrier (I saw this first hand when I was working in the industry). As a result, most of the companies in this business have enjoyed above average growth and high returns on capital
Akzo nobel india has a Return on capital of 100%+ (excluding excess cash on the books) and has been able to grow the topline  and profit by 30% in the last 5 years . In addition the company has been shedding the non-core businesses and freeing up capital. The company is also investing in manpower, its brands and expanding its distribution.
My hesitation in investing is the valuation. If one excludes cash, the company is selling at around 18-19 times earnings. On a comparative basis, the company is cheaper than other paint companies such as asian paints (around 30 times earnings). However I don’t believe much in comparative valuations and find the current valuation a bit high compared to the prospects.
Techno fab engineering
Technofab engineering is in the EPC space and is involved in various turnkey engineering projects in  industries such as power, industrial and oil & gas.
The company came out with an IPO in 2010 at a price of around 235 per share. The stock currently sells at around 142 / share (selling below the IPO price does not mean it is a bargain!)
The company has been in this business from 1970s. The company has grown its topline and profit by more than 30% per annum in the last five years (which means that in the past the business barely grew). The company clocked a turnover of around 290 Cr in 2011 and has around 900 Crs open order book (almost 3 yr visibility)
In addition to the above, the company has around 100 Crs of cash on the books (some of it due to the IPO) which will be invested in expanding capacity to manage the higher order volumes. The company is thus selling at around 2 times earnings, has shown 30% growth in the recent past and delivered a 30%+ return on capital during this period.
The company looks like a complete bargain?
I am not so sure. The EPC industry is characterized by moderate to low entry barriers, high levels of competition (from the likes of L&T and others) and high working capital needs. In addition it is also a very cyclical industry with drop in margins and cash flows during the down cycle.
The dilemma
So the dilemma is whether to invest in an above average business which may be fully priced or in an average business which is very attractively priced.
There is no obvious answer in the above case and it depends on each individual’s mindset. I have invested in technofab types of businesses  in the past with decent, though unspectacular results. In contrast if I am able to invest in a good business at decent prices , then the returns are fantastic
I have not made up my mind yet and have no position in either stock. I plan to dig deeper into Technofab engineering to get a better picture of the industry.
It is quite likely that I will just file away these companies and watch them till either the price is better (in case of akzo noble) or the business quality improves (in case of technofab engineering).

Analysis : Maharashtra seamless

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About
Maharashtra seamless is in the business of seamless and ERW steel pipes. These steel pipes are made from steel billets and HR coils respectively.

Seamless pipes are used mainly in the oil and gas and other such industries where there is a need to carry fluid under high pressure application. ERW pipes which have a higher diameter are also used in the same industry, in water distribution and other applications in airports, malls and other civic locations.

The company now has a capacity of around 550000 MT in seamless pipes and produced around 220000 MT. In addition the company has a capacity of around 200000 MT of ERW pipes and produced around 115000 MT.

The company is a certified supplier to several prominent O&G companies such as ONGC, Oil india and GAIL and other companies such as SAIL, NTPC etc. In addition the company is also an approved supplier to several global O&G companies such as Chevron, Saudi aramco and occidental oman etc. The company has benefited from the imposition of anti-dumping duties on seamless pipes from china, due to which its products have become competitive in various foreign markets.

Financials
The company has increased its revenue from around 383 Crs in 2003 to 1760 Crs in 2011 with an annual growth of around 18% per annum. The topline growth has however slowed from 2007 onwards. The net profit has grown at a CAGR of around 20% from around 62 Crs in 2003 to around 346 Crs in 2011 (excluding other income).

The net profits have grown at a higher rate than the topline due to improvement in margins. The net margins have mainly improved due to reduction in overhead expenses as % of sales.

The company has paid off its debt completely and now has a surplus of around 700 Crs on the balance sheet. The company raised around 300 Crs of capital via FCCB in 2005 for expansion which was converted to equity in 2006. This capital has however not been utilized as the company has been able to generate sufficient capital from operations to fund its capex, pay off debt and maintain its dividend.

Positives
The company has been able to maintain an ROE in excess of 25% for the last 8-9%. To get the true picture of the core business ROE, one needs to adjust for the excess cash and revaluation of fixed assets. The ROE numbers have dropped in 2011 mainly due to revaluation of fixed assets which caused the networth numbers to go up by almost 67% in one year.

The company has been able to maintain a reasonable growth in topline which has however slowed down in the recent past. In addition the company has been able to improve its margins from 12-13% levels to around 16% levels. It remains to be seen if this level of margin will be maintained.

The company has been able to pay off its entire debt and has close to 700 Crs excess capital on the balance sheet. The company has imported a plant from Romania for seamless pipes which it is installing near its current facility. This new plant will take the capacity up from 350000 to 550000 MT. In addition the company is also going in for backward expansion in steel billets which is a key RM for the seamless pipe (remains to be seen if the expansion is a good move). The company can easily meet all its expansion plans with the excess capital on the books.

Risks
The company sells a product which is a commodity product. The company has been able to maintain its gross margins inspite of fluctuation in steel prices which account for more than 60% of the total cost. It remains to be seen if the company will be able to maintain these margins in a slower growth/ higher competition environment (where other companies are expanding capacity too).

The company has managed the liability side of the balance sheet quite poorly. The company raised around 300+ crs in FCCB in 2005-06 which been idle since then. This is expensive capital which has been lying on the books and earning low rates of return. This excess capital has depressed the return numbers for the company.

Next post: Competitive analysis of the company, management review, valuation and final conclusion.

Analysis : OIL India

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About
Oil India an E&P company (oil exploration and drilling) which came out with an IPO in 2009. The company is a category – I, miniratna which allows them operational flexibility from the government (atleast on paper). The company operates mainly in the north-east with additional fields in Rajasthan and a few JVs in the foreign markets such as Iran, Sudan and Venezuela.


Financials
The company has delivered fairly good results over the last few years. The company has been able to deliver an ROE in excess of 20% from 2003 onwards (the year from which the results are available). If one excludes extra cash on the balance sheet, then the return on capital is in excess of 50%. The company is debt free and has excess cash to the tune of 30% of its market cap.

The company has delivered a topline growth of around 15% per annum for the last 8 years and net profit growth of 24% per annum during the same period. The company had a topline of around 8859 Crs and profit of 2610 Crs in 2010. The company has been able to generate a net margin in excess of 25% and fixed asset turns in the range of 1.7-2. The company operates with low working capital requirement and has also operated with negative working capital for a couple of years.

The company has been able to invest the internally generated cash to acquire new assets (exploration blocks in India and abroad) and thus maintain and grow its oil reserves at a decent rate.

Positives
The company has a great balance sheet. It has almost 9000 Crs of excess cash on its balance sheet. This cash can be used by the company acquire oil assets and thus grow the business.

In the oil and gas business, the only way to grow the business is to continuously acquire rights to new oil fields and carry out exploration (read drilling) activities. The nature of the business is such that a few of the exploratory wells will be unsuccessful (no oil or gas), but the successful ones will more than cover for it and more. In addition new technologies such as 3D seismic surveys help the companies in finding attractive places to drill so that the chance of finding oil or gas is higher (and lower the chance of drilling a dry well which is literally a sunk cost).

The company has been able to grow its oil reserves from 33 MMKL to 38.3 MMKL and gas reserves from 29.1 MMKL-OE to 37.9 MMKL-OE in the last 5 years. Higher the oil reserves, higher the oil & gas which can extracted and hence higher the topline and profits.
In addition to the above positives, the company has been able to improve its return on capital by increasing the total asset turns from around 0.95 in 2003 to almost 1.7 in 2010. The company also pays almost 35% of its profits via dividends

Risks
So whats not to like in the company? On the face of it the company has great margins, high return on capital, great balance sheet and good growth prospects (India needs more oil and gas).

There is one word for the key risk – Government of India. Currently OIL India shares almost 33% of the fuel subsidy with the rest being borne by the downstream company. If you have been following the news lately, you must noticed that oil recently crossed 100 $ a barrel. The state owned oil companies as a whole are losing money at the rate of almost 1lac crore/ annum (no it’s not a typo).

The India government has two options – raise the price of fuel or pay for the subsidy through the budget. The government may raise fuel prices by a bit, but it is a politically difficult decision. The other option is to take the subsidy on the budget and blow a hole in the deficit. The third option can be a mix of these two options and to get the upstream oil companies to share the loss.

If the downstream companies such as IOC, HPCL are bleeding money, how likely is it that the government will allow the upstream companies like ONGC and OIL to make decent profits? What stops them from increasing the subsidy burden?

The last time oil prices crossed 100$/ barrel (2008), the company was able to maintain the margins and the subsidy burden did not hurt the margins. So we have some level of comfort from the recent history, though the price spike was for a short period. We do not know how the government will react if the oil prices remain elevated for a long period of time.

Conclusion
I currently have no position in the stock. I am not able to evaluate the above risk. It may just be that I am over estimating the risk. At the same time one has to consider the possibility that oil could remain over 120 levels and the government may decide to increase the subsidy sharing, driving down the company’s profits.

If the above risk materializes and every other analyst is screaming a sell on the stock – it may be a good time to buy.

Quick analysis – Amara raja battery

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I am currently in the process of looking for new ideas and have shortlisted a few. I have done some preliminary analysis and these ideas have made through the initial filters. However, these ideas need deeper analysis to make a final buy decision. I am discussing one such idea in this post – Amara raja batteries

Amara raja Batteries
The company is the no.2 batteries manufacturer in india and supplier to the industrial, automotive and telecom sectors. The company also has a strong presence in the after market with the amaron product range.

The company has grown its topline at 25%+ per annum and its net profit 20% per annum. This growth has not been a smooth upward trend. The company had a drop in profitability during the 2003 to 2005 time period. The company has managed to pay off most of the debt it acquired for adding capacity and now has a debt equity ratio of around 0.1

The company has maintained a return on capital in excess of 20% in the last 5 years, however the period from 2000-2005 was a period of poor returns due to lower margins and requires more investigation on the causes of the poor performance. The asset turns of the company has improved steadily from 2000 onwards.

The company has been expanding its retail distribution and is also expanding its relationship with various OEMs. The company is focusing on expanding its relationship with 2 wheeler OEMs now.

The company has done well over the years and provided good returns to the shareholders. The company has provided almost 36% annual return over the last 10 years, excluding dividends. This return has come partly through PE expansion during the period (from 4 to around 10 now) and the rest through an eightfold increase in the net profits.

In summary, the company is atleast worthy of a more detailed analysis.

IT companies
I have exited all my holdings in the IT industry. I have had positions in Infosys, patni and NIIT tech at various points of time. I have exited these companies mainly for valuation reasons. I personally feel that the risk reward for IT companies is not attractive at currently valuations.

If the prices were to drop to 2008 levels (when midcaps were selling for 2-3 times earnings), I will not hestitate in creating new positions again.

Analysis : Noida toll bridge

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I typically have a look at my current positions every 6-12 months independent of the quarterly/ annual results. This allows me to evaluate the company independent of the recent results (which would bias my thinking)

About
The Noida Toll Bridge Company Limited was incorporated as a Special Purpose Vehicle for the Delhi Noida Bridge Project on a Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT) basis. The Delhi Noida Bridge is an eight lane tolled facility across the Yamuna river, connecting Noida to South Delhi.

The company initially had financial issues after the toll bridge was completed as the initial traffic projections did not materialize. The company had a highly leveraged structure (high debt) and hence had to get the debt re-structured. In addition the company also raised equity in 2006 to improve the debt equity ratio.

The company has since then paid off substantial amount of its debt and has a low debt to equity ratio of 0.3:1.

Business model
The business model of toll bridge is quite interesting to say the least. The initial capital investment is fairly high in an infrastructure project. Once this capital is invested, the ongoing maintenance and operational costs are very low and most of the incremental revenue flows to the profit.

However if the initial revenue projections do not materialize, then the debt load can crush a company, which occurred in case of noida toll bridge, due to which the company had to undergo the re-structuring. The company was thus able to buy time for the traffic projections to come through. The toll bridge now handles around 105000 vehicles per day (ADT or average daily traffic) which is around 45% of the rated capacity.

Current financials
The company had a toll revenue of around 71 Crs in 2010. The company is also able to sell rights for outdoor advertising around the bridge and was able to earn around 8 Crs from it. There is some miscellaneous income of around 5-6 Crs in addition to the above.

The company was able to make a net profit of around 28 Crs on the above revenue base. The company has an operating expense of around 30% of which the main heads are staff costs (salary) at around 8%, depreciation at around 6% and O&M (operating and maintenance) costs at around 8.6%.

The depreciation expenses are bound to remain fixed as there is not much addition to the fixed assets. A portion of the O&M expenses are now paid as a fixed charge to a 51% subsidiary and are not based on the traffic volumes. The salary costs and some other expenses such as legal fees, travelling expense etc are variable and are bound to increase over time.

The company thus has around 40-45 Crs of pretax profits available to service the debt. The company has been paying down debt which now stands at around 145 Crs in the latest quarter. At the current profit levels, the company should be able to payoff its entire debt in less than 3 years (though it may not happen due some of the re-structuring clauses).

The valuation model
Noida toll bridge may be one of the easier companies to model to arrive at a fair value. The average daily traffic (ADT) has grown at around 15% in the past. One cannot assume that the traffic will continue to grow at that pace, however one can easily assume that the traffic will atleast grow at 3-5% annum till we reach the 100% capacity of the toll bridge.

The average fare per vehicle is around 19 Rs. One can assume atleast a 5% increase in the fare over time (slightly less than inflation). These two figures – ADR and average fare can be used to estimate the toll revenue.

The current operating costs are a mix of fixed (depreciation) and variable (staff and other costs) expenses. On an optimistic note, one may assume that these expenses may go down as percentage of revenue. However if one, wants to be conservative, then the expenses can be assumed to be around 30-35% of the revenue.

There are two additional factors to consider in the valuation. The first factor is the advertising revenue which the company can earn with minimal expenses. In addition to this, the company also has a leasehold title to around 99 acres of land which was awarded by the government as compensation for shortfall in the revenue. The company estimates this title to have a value of around 300 Crs. I have personally not ascribed full value to it as I don’t have an idea on the status of this leasehold title or what the company plans to do with it (which the company describes as a risk)

The risks
Noida toll bridge was assured a 20% return on the cost of the toll bridge through toll collection and development rights for 30 years. In the initial years, the traffic projections did not come through and hence the actual returns were much lesser than the assured returns. The shortfall in the returns has been accruing to the company and one way of compensating the company would be to extend the 30 year operation period for the company. In other words, the company may be allowed to run the toll bridge for a much longer period.

The leasehold title is definitely a risk for the company. Anything related to land always has some kind of political risks.

One irritant for me is the staff cost. The staff cost for the company is way too high. The company has around 15 employees and wage bill of almost 6 Crs. The key management personnel (CEO and a manager) are paid a salary of around 4Crs. I think the compensation costs of the company are high.

Finally, the company will generate quite a bit of cash flow once the debt is paid off. It is not clear what the company intends to do with the excess cash, though the company has started paying dividend in the current year

Conclusion
My own valuation estimate is around 50-55 Rs per share with an assumption in traffic growth of 5% and fare rate increase of around 3-5% per annum. You have two options – either take my estimate on face value, or you can use the assumptions I have provided to estimate the value on your own.

My personal preference is to consider a range of assumptions for traffic growth, fare rate changes and cost parameters to arrive at a range of fair value.

Noida toll bridge has a much higher probability of increasing revenue, though anything can happen to prevent it (such as people will start walking instead of driving). On the flip side, there is a limit to the growth and upside as the maximum capacity of the toll bridge is fixed and once that is reached, further increases will be limited to fare increases only.

At current prices, I am not buyer of the stock as it is not very attractive yet. I have small position in the company. As always please read the disclaimer before making a decision to buy or sell the stock.

Short analysis – WIM plast ltd

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I typically look at 1-2 companies every week in some detail, to figure out whether they are attractive enough for further analysis. As I have said in the past – rejection is easy for me. It takes me 10-15 min or sometimes lesser than that to reject a company.

Investing into a company is like marrying or atleast a medium term relationship for me (unlike a one night stand) and as a result all the stars have to align themselves for me to commit my money to an idea.

WIM plast is one of those companies which has passed the initial filter phase and I am doing a little more detailed work on it.

About
WIM plast is in the business of plastic moulded furniture (brand – cello) and into extruded cello bubble guard sheets which have multiple applications such as false ceiling, signage etc.
The company has been in this business for the last 20+ years and is part of the cello group.

Financials
The company has had an erratic performance in the past. Most of the analysis you will find on the web and in broker reports talks about the great performance since 2007. These reports breathlessly report the doubling of the sales in the last 3 years and a 60% per annum growth in profits during the same time. This is a perfectly idiotic way of analyzing a company

One has to look at a much longer time period to analyze the performance of the company. I typically look at the last 10 years of performance (nothing sacred about that). A long term performance shows how the company has done during past slowdowns and gives a much better idea of the sustainability of the current performance.

The 10 year performance of WIM plast shows a very different view. The topline -sales dropped from 80 odd crores in 2000 to around 56 Crs by 2006. The profit also dropped during this period from 11 crs to around 2 Crs in the same period. I have not been able to find why the topline dropped over the span of 6 years. Most likely it looks like a combination of increasing competition in moulded furniture and slowing demand.

The company has since then been able to increase sales to almost 140 Crs in 2010 and had a net profit of around 16 Crs. During the current year, the company is likely to clock a topline of around 150-160 Crs and net profits of around 14-15 Crs (profits likely to stagnate due to rise in raw material cost which depend on petroleum prices)

The company came up with a new product – Cello bubble guard in 2004-2005 and completed the plant by 2006. The product seems to have started selling well from 2008 onwards. Again the company does not disclose the product splits, so I am guessing that this is the reason for the growth during the 2006-2010 period.

The positives
The company managed its balance sheet well during the down years. The company has been able to keep debt low (below 0.5 times equity) and is now debt free. In addition, the company has an above average ROE of 20%+, has been able to keep inventory and debtor levels low and improve the net margin during the 2006-2010 time period

The company has had a very good dividend policy and has kept the payout high even during the down years. The company has now started increasing the payout (dividend yield is around 2.5%) as its performance has improved.

The company is also investing around 100 Crs in its baddi plant for cello bubble guard to expand capacity and thus increase the turnover (see here)

Finally the company sells at a low valuation of around 6-7 times earnings

The questions
As I said earlier – I am still in the dating phase :). I have not made up my mind. There are still a lot questions in my mind
– Why did the performance drop from 2000-2006?
– How is cello bubble guard doing? What is the competitive situation for the product, its margins and what are the substitutes for this product?
If you or anyone has looked at this company or used its products or know someone who uses the products (cello bubble guard), please leave me a comment or email me on
rohitc99@indiatimes.com

Conclusion
I need to do further research on the company. The key to the success of this idea is the future performance of the cello bubble guard product. If this product does well and can get a good margin, then the net profit will increase and the stock price will improve too.


disclosure – no postion in the stock as of today

Continued analysis – Hyderabad industries

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Statutory warning – Long post detailing further analysis of the company. Can knock you off to sleep – please be seated while reading 🙂

I described my process of analyzing two companies from the sector – construction material, in an earlier
post. At the end the analysis, the only conclusion I reached was that the companies were still attractive enough to continue my analysis and invest more time in them.

I had a look at visaka industries and for non quantitative reasons have decided not to go further with it. The main reason is management. I am not comfortable with the open ended risk of the investment in the power plants at a cost of 5000 crs. I do not have clarity on it and hence in view of a risk which I cannot evaluate, I decided not to pursue the analysis any further.

We can debate back and forth on this, but my personal approach is to look at it as a binary decision. If I am not comfortable with the risk, I tend to quickly move on. There is no point in doing some fancy calculations here. I may have missed quite a few opportunities in the past, but this approach has also helped me avoiding risks which I don’t understand. I would rather commit the error of omission than the error of commission.

Hyderabad industries
I have initiated a deeper analysis of Hyderabad industries now. The performance of the company has been good, but unspectacular in the last few years. Ofcourse one cannot expect spectacular performance in a commodity and mature industry such as building construction material.

The company re-structured in 2004 and has since then been doing fine. The company has been able to maintain a net margin in the range of 6-9%, ROE in excess of 15% , a top line growth of around 10% and a bottom line growth in excess of 15%. It is important not to take 2009 as a representative year in making these calculation, as margins were far above average in that year and these margins are already trending down in the current year.

Rough cut valuations
Once I am comfortable with the fundamentals of the company, my next step is generally to do a very rough cut, fundamentals based and price based valuation (see page – other valuations in my valuation template).

The reason for a two fold check is to quickly see if the fair value of the stock is below the current price and then to compare the current valuations (current PE) with the valuations in the past (around last 10 years). The past history of the valuations allows me to look at how the market has valued this company in the last 10 years. In addition, when you compare these valuations with the fundamental performance, you tend to get a lot of insights into how the market looked at this company in the past (more on it in the next few paragraphs)

The normal earnings of the company can be taken as around 40-50 Crs over a business cycle. So one can very roughly value the company at around 400-550 crs.

The last ten years of valuation shows the company’s PE has ranged between a low of 4 and a high of 10-12 (ignoring the extreme low valuations of 2008-2009 when everything crashed). These valuation levels have to be compared with the earnings of the company which have been very volatile.

It is obvious that the company saw rapid price increase in 2004-2006 when its fundamentals improved and saw a PE of around 10 times peak earnings. After 2006, the margins started dropping due to higher capacity and so did the stock. The stock price did not recover till late 2009 when the fundamentals started improving again.

The current valuations and price may appear as bargain based on the recent history, but looking back a few years, it does not look like a no-brainer.

A 20% price drop from here could make it a very compelling buy.

Question – what if the price runs up and I miss the opportunity?

Response – Well that’s the risk of being patient. I would prefer the price to come to me, rather than chase it. If not this company, then there are 5000 other companies to look at !

Checklist analysis
At this stage, even if I am not completely bowled over by the price, I will perform a checklist analysis on the company. I have listed various checks on the accounting, business model, management factors in my valuation template, which I run though to find any specific red flags.

Some of the key highlights of the checklist review
– Company has around 35 Crs of contingent liabilities (taxes etc). This translates to around 6 months of annual profits. Nuisance, but not too much to worry about
– The company has a foreign exchange risk due to import of asbestos which accounts for around 50% of total raw material costs.
– No specific accounting red flags

Competitor/ industry analysis
The next step for me usually is to analyse the industry and competition and see where the company stands viz-a-viz other companies. This industry is partly fragmented, but the top 4 players account for almost 65% of the market share.


The top four players are
Hyderabad industries
Visaka industries
Ramco industries
Everest industries

On checking the fundamental performance of all these companies, it seems that their average ROE is in the range of 13-20% range. The debt varies from 0.4 (for visaka) to .75 for ramco industries. Sales for the top 4 companies have grown by an excess of 20% and bottom line by around 10-15% range. These are not exact numbers, but they paint a decent picture of the industry.

Some key takeaways are
– The ROE for the industry over a business cycle is around 13-15%
– The topline for the industry is growing (as expected), however competition has ensured that profits have not grown as fast
– The net margins for the industry are in the range of 6-7%.
– No specific company has a breakaway performance from the rest of group, yet Hyderabad industries and Visaka seem to have slightly better performance and low debt levels
– Small amount of industry consolidation seem to be happening as the top players are growing faster than the market.

In summary, the industry leader – Hyderabad industry is only slightly better than the other competitors and seem to selling at cheaper levels.

Multiple model analysis
I have borrowed this approach from Charlie munger, who has stated that one should apply various mental models from multiple disciplines to improve decision making. For example – economic models of demand and supply, psychological models etc.

A few key takeaways for Hyderabad industries
– The demand and supply elasticity for the industry is high. In plain English that means that any drop in demand will cause commensurate drop in price which is bad for profitability
– Competitive advantage in the industry is weak and limited to brands, distribution network and to sourcing from the production side.
– Management seems to be rational and has disposed off weak businesses in the past.

Inverting the problem
What will cause one to lose money on this idea? I always ask myself this question to find disconfirming evidence. I can think of two points
– Demand supply situation worsens with new capacity. This would cause price to drop and a lowering of profitability. 2009 profitability was much higher than average and reversion to mean will not be good for the stock
– Industry is cyclical and hence net profit and stock price may trend downwards in the subsequent months (capacity addition or surplus capacity is available)

Final conclusion
I could go on and on in terms of further analysis, but in interest of keeping the post to a reasonable size, let me summarize my thinking till now

The sector seems to have above average profitability over a business cycle. In the recent past, the margins and hence profitability were above average and hence the stocks in this sector appear very cheap.

It is important to value stocks in this sector based on normalized profits and make a decision based on that value. The past few years of data shows an average margin of around 6-7% for most companies – except for extreme demand collapse or shortage conditions. In view of this, Hyderabad industries seems to have fair value in the range of 500-550 Crs for the company. At current price, it is at a discount of around 40% to fair value.

I do not have a position in this stock and will continue to analyse further and may or may not take a position. The above analysis was for illustrative purpose only and if needed, to put you to sleep 🙂 …sweet dreams !

Construction material companies – Visaka and Hyderabad industries

C

I recently came across this industry as this sector seems to have been beaten down by the stock market. The stocks in this sector are selling at PE of 5 and below. Anything cheap always catches my eye!!

So if the stocks seem so cheap, one should sell his house, his cows and everything else and load up on these stocks? Not really. A low PE does not always mean undervalued and vice versa.

About the Industry
The construction material industry includes cement, steel and various other raw materials required to make a residence. However, I am specially referring to companies such as Hyderabad industries and visaka which are mainly in the business of cements asbestos and other fiber based roofing sheets and flat products such as pre-fab panels and boards

These products are mainly used by the poorer sections of the society in roofing their houses as they move from a tiled house to a better constructed and durable house. In addition the pre-fab panels and boards are used as partitions and in other applications where plywood or particle boards are used. So these products are mainly a substitute for these wood based products.

The macro opportunity
I think it is obvious that there is a macro tailwind behind the industry. The rise in the per-capita income, especially in the rural areas, is resulting in investments in better housing. The rural poor tends to improve the quality of shelter and the graduation is from thatches and tiled roof to better roofs such as asbestos or GI roofs. In addition the government also has several housing related schemes for the rural areas, so there is definitely ample demand in the sector.

A growing demand and large opportunity may be a good starting point for an attractive investment, but it is not always the case. A good investment needs to satisfy several additional criteria.

The industry economics
We now come to the more crucial aspects of the industry. The industry topline is likely to do well (other than the issue of the asbestos ban – more on that later) due to the growing demand, but that need not translate into a bigger bottomline or higher net profit.

Although the industry is characterized by a large number of companies in the sector, the top 4-5 companies account for almost 60% of the market share. The top 2 companies – Hyderabad industries and visaka account for 35% of the market share alone. So the industry is not too fragmented.

At the same time, one can see that the entry barriers in the industry are low. It is not too difficult to setup a plant (takes around a year to do so). The main barriers are mainly the marketing, distribution and branding of the product. However as the product is mainly regional in nature (due to high bulk), a company can build capacity in a small region and build out its sales and distribution network in the region at a reasonable cost.

In addition, although brands could make a difference, I don’t think brands enjoy too much pricing power in the industry. The financial results of the companies show that margins are highly dependent on the demand and cost factors such raw material pricing. A company with powerful brands and high pricing power will have stable margins over a business cycle. That does not seem to be the case with this industry.

Raw material such as asbestos and cement account for more than 55% of the total cost of the product. Transportation and fuel account for further 10-15% or more of the total cost. As a result the industry has been impacted by the rupee-dollar rate (asbestos is mainly imported) and other raw material based cost factors in the past (2008 being one such year).

The industry also has competition from substitute products such as GI roof and other materials and so the demand depends on the price of these substitute materials too.

Due to the part commodity nature of the industry, there is a lot of competition between the multiple players in the industry and hence one cannot claim there is a high competitive advantage for the main players in the industry.

Performance of the top two players

Hyderabad industries
Hyderabad industries is a C K Birla group company and has been in this business for 60 odd years. The company has one of oldest roof brands called charminar.

The company used to have a loss making division –heavy engineering till 2004 and as a result was not a profitable company. This division was sold off in 2004-2005 and the ample cash flows during that year were used to reduce the debt. The company has been able to bring down the debt equity ratio from 1.3 to 0.3. The total asset turns have remained steady at around 2.1, with substantial improvements in debtor turns and additional investments in plant capacity to meet the growing demand.

The net margins of the company has ranged between 5-7% in the last 5 years, with last year’s margins in excess of 12%. The margin improvement has been mainly due to reductions in manpower and interest costs.

Finally the company has been able to grow the topline at around 12-13% and bottom line at around 20%+ levels in the last 6 years.

Visaka industries
Visaka industries is a Hyderabad based company and has been in the business for the last 20 odd years. In addition to the roof and other building material segment, the company also has a textile products division which accounts for 20% of the revenue and is a fairly profitable division in itself.

The company has improved the ROE from 15% levels to 20%+ levels in the last 6 years. The improvement has been mainly due to a slightly improvement in fixed asset turns and an improvement in debtors turns (debtor as % of sales has reduced). The net margins have held steady between 6-7% with slight drop in interest and manpower cost, being offset by increase in raw material costs.

Although the company has been able to bring down the debt to equity ratio over the years, the overall debt has gone up as the company has used a combination of debt and profits to expand capacity and put up new plants across the country.

The company has been able to grow the topline at 20%+ levels and the profits at 30%+ levels.

My current thoughts
The entire post till now has been a narration of the facts and past performance. The past performance of an industry has to be used as a starting point of our analysis to think about the future economics and performance of the industry (not the next quarter!).

It is quite obvious that the companies in this industry do not enjoy a great competitive advantage from current and future competitors. As a result it is unlikely that the industry as a whole would enjoy very high returns as seen in 2009, over a period of time. The high demand is already driving a lot of capacity addition in the industry (both visaka and Hyd industry are adding capacity) and this will have a depressing effect on prices.

In addition, if the demand slows down or if there is any other hiccup, the margins can drop even further. If one looks over the last 6-8 yrs, it looks reasonable that these two companies are likely to make around 6-7% margins over the entire business cycle and an ROE in the range of 10-14%.

If one takes visaka as an example, it seems to be selling at around 5-6 times 2009 cash flow. Hyderabad industries is selling at around the same valuation levels too.

Are these levels cheap? Now that is difficult to say, though prima facie it appears to be so.

Current conclusion
I am still in the process of studying and analyzing these companies. I have on purpose written a post in the middle of my analysis to show my process of evaluating stock ideas and arriving at a decision.

I have already completed the quantitative part of the analysis and read up the annual reports of the two companies. I have completed around 70% of the analysis and 50% of the thinking. At this stage if I have not rejected the idea, I will proceed with my valuation template (download from here) and start a structured thinking process to arrive at a conclusion.

I have several questions in my mind which I need to resolve –
– Visaka industries is planning to invest 5000 Cr in power project. How does that change the risk?
– Hyderabad industries and visaka have had poor profitability in the past (2007-2008 and earlier) when the capacity ran ahead of the demand. Are we in that phase already and likely to see depressed profitability in the coming quarters?

The annual reports and the numbers are always the easier part and only a guide to make a decision. If the past numbers alone were sufficient, then the whole work of fundamental investing could be converted into an automated program. Fortunately for my style of investing, it is not likely to happen anytime soon.

Additional disclosure: I do not have any position in the stock. As I continue with the analysis, I may decide against creating a position due to various qualitative factors. Please make your own decision before buying these stocks.

A relook – mangalam cement

A

I analysed mangalam briefly here and here and recently started analyzing the company again as I was looking at some other cement stocks. This is what I found –

The good
The company has a 2MT plant and supplies to the northern markets of Rajasthan, MP, Haryana and parts of western UP.

The company was a BIFR case till 2002-2003, but has been able to turn around the performance. The company has been able to maintain an ROE in excess of 20%. The topline has grown at around 10% and the net profits have gone up by a factor of 7 in the span of the last 7 years.

The company has been able to bring power cost as % of sales (power is a big component in cement) from 35% to around 24% levels. In addition the company has captive power plants and windmills, so it is not be exposed to fluctuations in power costs and cutbacks in the supply. The company now has a net profit margin in the range of 15-18% which is comparable to the other companies in the industry.

The company has excess cash of around 90 Crs on the books and is now planning a 1.75 MT brownfield project at the cost of around 800 crs. The total capacity should be around 3.75 MT by 2012, when the plant goes into production. In addition to the plant, the company is also setting up a 17.5 Mw captive power plant which should go onstream by the end of the current year.

The bad
The industry – cement – is a very cyclical industry and a pure commodity play. I really doubt consumers would pay too much premium for a brand. Pricing in this industry is driven by local/ regional demand and supply situation.

The upside is that the demand is growing rapidly, but at the same time there is quite a bit of supply coming online too. As a result pricing is unlikely to get too firm, with occasional dips on the way.

The ugly
The company board recently announced a merger with Mangalam timber (see here) in the ratio of 1:10. It may appear that the mangalam timber shareholder is getting hurt, but I would say they are not the only ones hurt by this transaction.

Unless you believe that the true value of mangalam cement is the current price, it is not difficult to see that the management is giving out quite some value to the Mangalam timber shareholders. The merger is in the ratio of 1:10 and if one assumes a fair value at around 400 rs per share (difficult to explain this valuation in single line, so just play along with me even if you don’t agree), the management is giving out 40 Crs in value for the sister firm.

One can debate whether the merger ratio is fair or not, but I find cannot understand the logic of the merger. Please don’t suggest that the management is building a construction company – that way a steel company should buy a car company and imply that they are integrating forward.

The management is allocating 40 Crs on behalf of the shareholders and should be doing so in the best possible opportunity which adds value. Is mangalam timber the best value??

Anyway, inspite of this merger the company will still not lose too much of its value though it definitely does not give confidence to a minority shareholder.

Conclusion
I still think the company is fairly undervalued and is selling at 40-50% below fair value. I do not have a position in the stock and will continue digging further before I make up my mind

As always, please do your own research before you make a decision.

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