AuthorRohit Chauhan

Coca-cola, Marico and dogs

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There is a class of companies which enjoy a very strong competitive position in their respective markets. These companies have strong brands with their customers, great return on capital and finally good management.

The market really loves these companies due to all the above mentioned factors. Consequently, these companies enjoy a fairly high valuation.

There is ofcourse one small problem – Some of these companies are not growing rapidly. They are probably growing in the range of 10-15%, which is slightly higher than the GDP, but definitely not at the 20%+ rates of the past (which got them in the present position).

Lets call this the coca-cola effect. Why coca-cola ? let me explain

Coca-cola is one the most admired and high quality company. It has a very strong brand which has thrived for 100+ years. In addition the company has a global distribution network which cannot be matched by any company in the foreseeable future (in beverages for sure).

The company grew rapidly in the late 80s and 90s and was valued at 40+ PE levels by early 2000

On top of this, the company was held by warren buffett. What could be a bigger endorsement?

There was one little problem – the company growth had already slowed, but the price was not reflecting this new reality. So what happened since then?

The company did quite well, but the stock went nowhere.

So lets define the coca-cola effect now
–           High quality company with great brands, strong competitive position and good management
–           Past history of high growth
–           High valuations
–           Slowing growth and lower probability of repeating the high growth of the past (key word – probability)
–           Price stagnates (low returns) as the earnings rise slowly , while the PE multiples contract in face of the new reality

Does this look familiar? I think so. I can think of a few companies in the indian market which will go through a similar phase. I will not give names as these are universally loved names and I will get hate mail and comments for suggesting that.

Let me however give a past example from the indian markets

Infosys ltd: see this chart below. The company has done well (profit grew by 15% CAGR during this period)  but investors have made around 6% CAGR in last five years (excluding dividends)

Why does this happen?
I can think of two reasons

Hindsight bias – investors are looking at the past, whereas returns depend on the future growth ! As they say, you do not get to go to heaven twice for the same reason. So if the future growth slows down, the returns are likely to be sub-par.

Contrast effect / Frog in boiling water syndrome – The slow down or price change is not dramatic. Price does not drop drastically, but kind of bobs around for a while. So after 4-5 years of holding a company, an investor wakes up one day and realizes that they have made a paltry level of return.

How to manage this?
For starters, one should get over the warm and fuzzy feeling of holding such a stock (I am guilty of this too). It is easy to fall in this trap as the company has done well in the past, rewarded you handsomely and is still universally admired.

The second step to take is to look at the future growth prospects and try to arrive at an upper bound for it. If company sells at a high valuation and is unlikely to see a further multiple expansion, then this growth will define the future returns for the stock. If the expected returns do not match your minimum threshold, start exiting the stock slowly over time (few are able to do it in one shot due to the emotions involved).

The caveat around continued growth
Some of you would saying to yourself by now that my previous argument does not square entirely with reality. There are a few companies which do not fall in this bucket. Recall my earlier point about coca-cola : Past history of high growth and slowdown in the future.

The companies which do not stagnate are those which are able to maintain an above average growth in the future. Such companies may appear to be overvalued for sometime, but are able to keep growing and hence justify the valuation. As a matter of fact, some of these companies even appear to be undervalued in hindsight

So what happens when you confuse these kind of companies (with good growth prospects) with my earlier example (coca-cola). Let me call that the marico effect !

A close friend of mine used to work in Marico and based on my understanding of the business (and inputs from my friend), I purchased the stock in around 2002-2003 time frame at around 5 times earnings (no typo there).

Fast forward to 2006, and after a lot of analysis and mumbo jumbo, I sold the stock as it seemed overvalued at around 30 times earnings. I was right, for a period of 3 years and then spectacularly wrong. Have a look the price action below

If you are comfortable with the long term growth prospects of the company and believe that the company will do well over the next 5-10 years, it would be silly to sell the stock as the earning would slowly catch up to the valuations in time and once that happens, the stock returns would match the earnings growth

There are no short cuts here – you have to decide if you are holding a cocacola (high quality, low growth), a marico (high quality, high growth) or a dog (no quality, just fluff) and act accordingly.

There is one action, which you should take without hesitation if you are holding a dog – Sell before everyone else realizes that it is a dog. A lot of investors in 2015 bought dogs and have only recently realized – too late, they are holding dogs !
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Stocks and dogs ! discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions. Please read disclaimer towards the end of blog.

A shift in retail

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I recently tweeted the following

The current assumption is that the local corner retailer (kirana) which has survived the large retail chains will continue to do well inspite of the online threat. Let’s look at some of the arguments made to support this thesis

Convenience
It is undeniable that the local kirana store offers a lot of convenience and personalized service. My own mother continues to buy grocery from the local guy and he is able to provide personalized service and home delivery at the same price. What can really beat that?

My point – is this a real differentiator for all products? The current mobile carrying generation may really not care as much about it. Now it’s true that rice, oil and other staples will still be bought from the local kirana store, but what about the higher value items – both FMCG and otherwise ?

Will the consumer not use a blend of these two options? Buy the bulky staple from the local guy as it cheaper to do so, but buy the higher value (read higher margin) items online where the price could be lower and selection larger.

What happens to the profitability of the local store which uses the staples as a loss leader to drive sales for the other products?

Credit
That’s true for a large portion of the poor/ unbanked population. But is that also true for the middle class? What happens when newer forms of banking and credit options start proliferating? Does the local kirana store still have an edge?

Personalized relationship
This is a difference no online retailer can meet ..right? Welcome to the world of data analytics. Look at Netflix and Amazon who are now able to look at your purchases and make recommendations. With the improvement in data analytics, mobile and AI, this will only get better

Trend in other markets
There is a consistent trend in several markets towards the following

 Big box stores such as Costco/ Walmart etc which sell high volume staples at very competitive prices which no online retailer can beat (yet)
 Convenience stores such as 711 which are able to provide quick convenience at a much higher price/ margin. These stores usually cater to impulse buying (snacks, coffee etc) and also stock a small assortment of staples for emergency purchases (milk, eggs etc)
– Ongoing pressure on brick and mortar stores to match the pricing of their online counterparts

The retailer’s point of view
Till now we are talking of the landscape from the customer’s point of view. If you turn this around and look at it from the retailers’ point of view, the situation can appear quite bleak.

What happens to the profitability of the physical retailer if the high value/ high margin items continue to migrate online and all that remains are the bulk and low margin items which are more efficiently served by the high volume/ low margins chain stores such as D-mart ?

The retailer still has all the overheads for inventory, real estate and labor costs which are rising, whereas the margins keep shrinking. The end result is a drop in the return on capital. What does this do to the small time and marginal store?

I have tried to raise highlight some of the points one needs to think about when trying to answer this question. I don’t think that the small store/ kirana will disappear completely, but it is quite likely that they will keep shrinking and their share of the economic pie is surely to go down.

In addition this trend will not remain limited to the local grocery stores. One can extend the same logic to any other goods which has some level of standardization and does not require a high level of touch and feel.

The above speculation is based on the current level of technology. Now combine that with ongoing developments in Artificial intelligence/ Machine learning, advances in drone tech to reduce delivery costs and finally 3D manufacturing.

Does it still mean that retail as we know now, will remain the same? —————-
Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions. Please read disclaimer towards the end of blog.

Not everything that counts, can be counted

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In an earlierpost, I wrote about the two types of risks faced by an investor – risks faced by all investors irrespective of the nature of the investment and business risks associated with a particular investment.

In this post, I will try to describe a variety of business risks and how I use it via a checklists to further evaluate a business. The list I present below is by no means comprehensive (as I am not writing an academic paper) and just represent the ones I have faced in the past or can think of as I write this post.

Advance warning – this is a long post even if it is not comprehensive and there is no silver bullet or blue/red pill at the end to make investing easier.

Regulatory risk [earning excess returns from favorable regulations]
If a company is able to make above average profits due to a favorable regulation, then it is exposed to this risk. For example, think of a banking license or the right to supply natural gas to a specific geography such as Delhi in the case of indraprastha gas.

In these cases, the company has a pseudo monopoly due to a favorable regulatory position. If the terms of the regulation changes, the company could find that the economics of the business has worsened or worse, it no longer has a viable business at all.

There are a lot of examples of this kind of risk. For example, PNGRB – the gas regulator announced in april 2012 that they had the authority to fix gas prices and asked IGL to drop its price by 50%+. The company lost more than 50% of its value after the day of the announcement and since then has recovered most of it, after the supreme court overturned the decision. In spite of the favorable response, an investor in this stock has done worse than the index during the same time period.

The same story has played out for several companies in the mining space after the Supreme court order banning iron ore mining due to the illegal mining problem in some states. This kind of risk is critical in the case of telecom, power, finance and other heavily regulated industries.

The key point is this – If the business model of a company depends on specific regulations, then the company is always exposed to this kind of risk. . The company could be doing well for a long time and then suddenly the regulator or the government can change its mind and put the entire business at risk.

I have noticed that the market is usually sanguine about this risk and it is generally not priced in. However if the risk materializes, the reaction is swift and brutal. The only way to mitigate this risk is either to avoid such companies altogether or hope and pray that the regulator/ government does not change its mind on the key regulation.

Reputation risk [earning excess returns based on reputation/ brands ]
This is a key risk in those businesses which depend on the reputation of a brand or a company. If the company earns an above average profit due to a favorable image or brand position, then it is very important for the company to safeguard the brand.

In the event that there is some incident where the brand image is impacted, the management should react swiftly and prevent further damage to it.

Case in point – Maggi from nestle.  Irrespective of the merits of the case, the response of the company to the whole lead content issue and subsequent recall was appalling. The issue surfaced in April and the company finally responded in June when the issue blew up in the media. This is a 1.2 Bn dollar brand and the management did not react to the situation till it finally got out of hand.  Net result – The company lost close 20% of its market cap in the aftermath.

This risk is critical when the company you invest makes money based on the power of its brand and trust. The only way to mitigate this risk is to have a management which reacts promptly if it sees a risk to the reputation of the company or its brands.

Management risk [Poor quality management]
This is a risk commonly understood, accepted but least followed by a lot of investors. If you talk to someone who has been investing in the markets for a period of time, they will agree that it is important to invest only with a high quality management.

Lets first define what is high quality which I like to think of on two parameters

Capital allocation and distribution – does the management allocate capital at high rate of return in the business and distribute the excess to shareholders via dividends?

Ethical behavior towards all stakeholders – Does the management behave ethically or treat other stake holders (such as customers, employees, shareholders etc) in a manner they would like to be treated if the roles were reversed?

The first parameter is quite objective in a nature and can easily be verified by looking at the return on capital of the business over an entire business cycle. It is amazing to find that people end up investing with managements which have consistently destroyed wealth (several airlines come to mind). I understand that at a certain price, even a value destroying business can give good returns, but a majority of the investors end up buying such companies at the peak of a cycle when the profitability seems to be high (but is just a mirage)

The second factor is far more difficult to evaluate and needs careful study of the management’s actions over time. Again it is not easy to define the right behavior in several cases such as high compensation or bending regulations to gain an undue advantage in business.

Even if we leave aside some of the fuzzy stuff, it is quite easy in a lot of cases to just reject a company if several red flags pop up. In the end, my own experience has been that if you ignore this risk, it eventually catches up. A particular investment with unethical and incompetent management may not go south, but over time the law of averages work and the overall result will be poor.

The only way to mitigate this risk to avoid such companies and management. It will prevent a lot of anxiety, heartburn and sleepless nights

Customer concentration risk [All eggs in one or few baskets]
This risk arises when a company derives a large percentage of its revenue from a handful of customers. Although this is an easy to understand risk, it not necessarily as easy to evaluate.

For example, is it better for IT and other service companies to focus on their top customers who provide 80% of their revenue instead of spreading themselves thin? I don’t have an answer to this question.

There is one crucial factor to consider when thinking of this risk – Customer lock-in. If a customer is locked in with a company and cannot easily switch then it makes sense to devote enough resource to maintain this competitive advantage.

However if a customer can easily switch suppliers based on price, then customer concentration will kill a business. A company fighting price based competition and earning its revenue from a limited set of customers is never going to earn profits above its cost of capital and is likely to remain locked in a low return business.

This risk turns up in surprising places. China as a country is the largest consumer of most commodities such as steel. So when this ‘customer’ slowed, the price of the product collapsed and has hurt all suppliers in the product category. It does not matter if as a steel company you don’t supply to the Chinese market. Once the no.1 customer in the steel industry (accounting for 50%+ of global demand) slowed, everyone in the industry was going to get hurt.

There is no easy way to mitigate this risk and it requires a case to case decision. One needs to be aware of the level of concentration for the company and check if the management is focused on either reducing the concentration or has such as hold on the key customers, that it will not be exposed to price based competition.

Competitive risk
The easiest way to think about this risk is to count the number of companies in an industry and tabulate their market share. If you find just one company and that company has a 100% share, then you have found a monopoly with no competitive risk.

At the other extreme if you start listing the companies and end up with a long list of firms with each company having a tiny share of the market, then you are looking at an industry with high competition and poor returns.

I have generally used a simple thumb rule to evaluate this risk. If the top 3-5 companies account for 60%+ of an industry and most of them earn over 15% return on capital, then the competitive intensity within the industry is low. On the other hand, if I have to spend over a week finding all the companies in an industry and if the top 10 companies account for less than 50% share (assuming I can even get this number), then it is very likely I have stumbled into an industry with high levels of competition and poor profitability.

For example – most consumer brands have limited numbers of companies and high profitability. On the other hand, industries such as cement, textiles etc are the other end of the spectrum with a large number of companies and poor profitability.

As an investor, you can manage this risk by first diversifying across industries so that a sudden worsening of the economics in a particular industry will not sink the entire portfolio. The second way to manage this risk is to study each company and its competitive position in detail so that you are atleast aware of the risks and do not get blindsided by it. Finally, as an investor one is paid to understand and manage this risk.

Change or obsolescence risk
This risk is especially relevant in fast moving industries where the underlying technologies are going through a lot of change.  Think of telecommunications – this is a fast paced industry which needs a lot of investment, but at the same time the underlying technology keeps changing rapidly (see my post herea long time back on the same topic).

We have seen the technology go from 2G to 3G to 4G to who knows what ( 5G is already being tested in labs and can do 1 gbps ). There is wifi, satellite or balloon internet and all sorts of communication tech coming up. Is it easy to predict what will be the shape of this industry in 2020? Doing a DCF analysis and putting a terminal multiple on the valuation of a telecom or similar company is sheer insanity.

The way to mitigate this risk is to have a very deep understanding of the particular industry, monitor the changes closely and not overpay for the stock. However if you do not have any specialized understanding of such an industry, it is best to stay away – discretion is often the better part of valor in investing

Commodity risk
This is the case where the price of a specific commodity drives the profitability of the business. This is obvious in the case of industries such as steel, metal, oil etc.

It was not so obvious in some other cases, till the commodity price dropped and hurt the industry badly. Take the example of jewelry/ gold loan companies.

These companies became the darling of the markets in the 2010-2012 period when the price of gold was going through the roof. A lot of these companies got a double boost from rising demand (due to rising gold prices) and from an increase in the value of their inventory.

Once the tide turned, some of these companies have struggled to remain profitable.

A similar story has played out in the agri space for seed companies (where the price of commodities have dropped) or mining firms.

One way to mitigate this risk is to evaluate a company over the entire business cycle and see if the company is merely the beneficiary of a lucky tailwind from rising commodity prices or will do well inspite of the commodity prices.

Capital structure risk
A company having a high debt equity ratio is generally a riskier company. What is ignored sometimes when evaluating this risk are the hidden liabilities which are the equivalent of debt, even though they do not appear as such on the balance sheet.

Take the example of tata steel and its pension liabilities or airplane lease and other fixed costs in case of airlines, which are a form of quasi debt.

The deadly combination is when some other form of business risk hits a highly indebted company. In such cases, the end result is often bankruptcy (atleast for the minority shareholders in india, promoters have no such risks)

How do you mitigate this risk? Learn to read the balance sheet carefully and understand all forms of fixed obligations which cannot be reduced even if the revenue goes down. Try to answer the question – How long will the company survive if its revenue dropped by 20%.

Valuation risk/ growth risk
This not a risk of the business risk. If you pay for the growth and it does not happen, then you are in trouble. An example which comes to mind is Hawkins cooker. A lot of investors continued to give high valuations to the company even when the growth slowed.

However once reality hit the market, the reaction was swift and sudden. As much as investors curse the management after such an event, I do not blame them for it. One can fault the management on not doing its best to deliver the highest possible growth, but then if growth is not visible, nothing stops an investor from exiting the stock for better opportunities.

There are several other companies (Which I will not name) which seem to be in a similar place – low growth, but high valuations. If we are lucky the drop in the multiple would be slow and gradual unless the growth picks up and justifies the valuations.

How do you mitigate this risk – simple, don’t follow the herd and think for yourself. If you don’t understand why a company sells for a high valuation, move on. Investing is not an exam paper where you have to answer all the questions to pass!

How to think about risks
Are you still reading? congrats !! you are true fan of this blog and also like to read boring stuff on investing J

It is easy to go on and on about risks and there are books on each type of risk. I cannot do justice to all of them in a single post. As an investor one has to evaluate all of these risk and more for each investment idea and identify which ones are the most critical.

Let me give an example – I used to hold Noida toll bridge company earlier in my portfolio . As I started thinking of the risks associated with the company, there were two key ones I was able to identify

Reinvestment risk: The company had been generating a good level of free cash flow, but had no opportunity to re-invest it. A company which cannot re-invest its cash flows is equivalent to a long dated bond and will get valued as such. Hence in this case, once the company reached its steady state cash flow, the future returns were likely to follow the growth in cash flow which was expected to be in the range of 6-8%.
  Regulatory risk:  The Noida toll bridge is a BOT project with an assured 20% return during the operation period (around 30 years). On top of that if the company did not make these returns in any year, the company could just carry forward the shortfall to the subsequent years. This meant that by 2011-12 the company had close 2000 Crs+ of shortfall on its books. The ground reality was that the Noida authority had refused to raise the tolls even by the level of inflation and every time they did, there were protests and dharnas. So the chance of realizing this shortfall was low.

The key point in the above idea was that the upside was limited and there was a regulatory risk which if it materialized, could completely destroy the investment thesis. So in a stroke of brilliance, after having held the stock for 2+ years and with a minimal gain, I decided to wise up and exited the company.

In July 2015, the management announced that company was re-writing the contract which would now end by 2031 and its likely the company will not be able to recover the prior shortfall. The stock dropped promptly as the market had assumed that company would be able to make up some part of this shortfall by an extension in the lease term or land development rights.

 

The above case is instructive of a variety of business risks. A lot of business risks are fuzzy and grey and one cannot put a precise number behind it. In addition, these risks do not materialize for a long time. However if one does materialize, the stock market is quite efficient in resetting the valuations promptly.

As an investor, you can ignore business risks at your own peril.


No mathematical precision
You would have noticed that I have not used any greek letters or volatility measures till now to measure the business risk. It should be quite obvious that these academic measures do not represent the risks for a company.

Think of the example of Noida toll bridge – did the past volatility of the company give any indication of the regulatory risk faced by the company?

The best one can do is to be aware and analyze these risks on an ongoing basis. If you are being compensated to bear this risk (in the form of expected returns), then you continue to hold the stock. If the returns are inadequate or if you think the downside from the risk will be too severe, then the best option is to sell and move on

My current approach to evaluating the risk is usually as follows

       I have a checklist of all the above risks and use it to evaluate which of these risks are relevant for the company I am analyzing.
       I try to dig deeper into the critical risks for the company and understand what are the key drivers and how it could hurt the company and its valuation
       My job as an investor is to evaluate the upside from the bull case of the company versus the downside from all the risks facing the company. If the downside risk seems too high, I will just move on to the next idea.

One final point – if this sounds complicated and difficult to implement, let me assure you – it is and will always be. The upside is that with an increase in competition for investment returns, this may still be an area where a hardworking and diligent investor will continue to have an edge over others.
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Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions. Please read disclaimer towards the end of blog.

The value of ‘overvalued’ stocks

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I recently tweeted the following

This tweet was prompted by the debate – online, and sometime offline between the different approaches to value investing. These debates appear like religious arguments with each side claiming their god is the superior one.

I have never quite understood the point of these debates.  There is obviously no single way of making money in the stock market. There are short term traders, buy and hold guys, debt specialists and all kinds of people in-between. Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses and no one can claim that a specific approach is inherently superior to the other, unless they are equally proficient in both.

I have come to realize that the most important factor to long term success is to understand which approach suits your temperament.

The value of learning
Some of you who have followed me on my blog, would have noticed that I try not be a dogmatic about any specific style. I have tried multiple approaches and continue to do so. I do have a dominant style which suits my temperament – buy decent quality companies and hold them for the long run, but I have tried deep value, arbitrage, options and all other types of investing.

Most of my experiments have been failures (see here and here) from a monetary perspective, but they have deepened my understanding on what works and does not work for me.

A valid question would be – why bother? Why not find an approach which works for you and then just stick with it (and maybe even publicly defend it as your faith 🙂 )

Let’s consider an analogy – let’s say you are a sculptor who likes to make figures using wood, stone and other materials. Let’s assume you are exceptionally good at making stone sculptures, but not so great on wood. You go to an exhibition and see some great wood figures and happen to meet the artist. The artist tells you about his techniques and the tools he uses. Assuming you want to get better on wood, will you start laughing at this artist and belittle his tools?

In a similar fashion if you are a deep value investor, what should be your reaction to the success of investors who buy and hold seemingly overvalued stocks?

Durable success
I know what the first objection is to this line of thinking – The success of these investors is just dumb luck. These guys are not really practicing value investing, but a form of momentum investing. It is just that the momentum has lasted for 5 years in some of these cases, and sooner or later this bubble would burst.

My counter point – sure that is possible, but what if this bubble has lasted for 10-15 years in some cases. Will you still just wave away these anomalies and label them as flukes?

I prefer to take a different approach. There is no religious debate to this in my mind – if something has worked for 3+ years in the stock market, then it is worthy of investigation. A lot of bubbles and temporary fads usually get washed out in 2-3 years and so 3 years is good cutoff point.

Why not 5 years? Well now we are moving from the physical to the meta-physical 🙂 and debating the nature of reality.

So what can one learn from this oddity where some companies manage to sell for seemingly high valuations for a very long time.

New business model or value capture
I think the first point to look for is whether there is a change occurring in the business model/ design, wherein due to changing customer needs and priorities, a new type of design is now more suited to meet them more profitably.

I would recommend reading the book – value migration, which goes over this concept in quite a bit of detail. The main point is that changing customer needs and priorities cause a change in the business design best suited to meet them. Companies which can identify and develop a business model to meet this new reality are able to accrue a lot of value for their shareholders.

For example, a rise in the income levels has caused the retail consumer to now value quality, brand image and convenience in addition to the price. As a result, companies which can meet this new set of needs have been able to create a lot of value.

It is easy to see this phenomenon around us – Bathroom fittings, automotive batteries, garments etc. Some of these products were commodities in the past, sold largely based on price. However increasing consumer purchasing power has meant that the priorities have shifted beyond price. Companies which have been able to adapt their business model to deliver on these new priorities of brand, quality and convenience in addition to price have delivered exceptional returns

Example: Cera sanitary ware, Amara raja batteries, Astral polytechnic etc

Opportunity size with durability

It is not sufficient to be able to meet the changing needs of the consumer, better than the competition. For starters, the opportunity size should be large so that the company can grow for a long time to come.

This is a major advantage of the Indian markets over almost all other foreign markets. Even niches in India have a market size running to millions of consumers and hence a company which can build a good business model can easily grow for years to come.

An additional point to keep in mind is the need for the company to develop a durable competitive advantage. Let’s take the case of the telecom industry in the early 2000s. The need for communication and mobile telephony was recognized by a few companies such as Airtel in the late 90s and these companies moved in quickly to satisfy the needs.

The market size was in the 100s of millions and most of the telecom companies were able to scale rapidly. However the edge or competitive advantage turned out to be transitory and as a result after a few years of high profitability, we soon had a lot of price based competition. As a result by 2007-08, most companies were losing money and did not create (actually destroyed) wealth.

In such cases seemingly overvalued companies were truly overvalued.

Kings of their domain

A productive area for finding multibaggers is in the microcap space, where the company operates in a niche and is growing rapidly as its business model is uniquely suited for that niche. In addition, the niche is large enough for the company to grow for a long time, yet not so big that it attracts large companies initially.

There are a few examples which come to my mind – Think of air coolers a few years back (symphony), CPVC pipes (Astral poly) or various niches in pharma and information technology.

A small company develops a unique set of skills for this specific segment and is able to dominate and grow within the segment for a long time. In addition as the niche is quite small, it does not attract much competition till it reaches a certain size.

However by the time the niche is big enough to catch the attention of larger companies in the overall space, it is too late as the specific company has established a dominant competitive position and cannot be dislodged.

A lot of these companies appear to be overpriced after they have started growing, but this ignores the possibility of above average growth and a dominant position for the company.

Capacity to suffer

This is a term used by Thomas Russo (see talk here) to describe companies which are capable and willing to make investments in the business for the long term, even though it penalizes the profits in the short term.

In most cases, due to market pressures, companies are not willing to hurt short term profitability to build the business for the long term and hence the few companies which are willing to do so, appear to be overvalued due to depressed profits.

Look at the example of Bajaj corp (an old holding which I have since exited). The company acquired no-marks brand in 2013 and started deducting the brand value on their P&L account. In reality the brand value is actually going up as the company continues to spend heavily on advertising (17% of sales) and hence the profits are understated.

The market did not like this short term penalty and punished the stock in 2013. The stock price has since recovered and we have a company which appears to overvalued due to the high investments in the business.

Platform Business
This is good note on what is a platform business

I do not have an example in the Indian markets, but will try to explain this using the example of a well know US company. Its 2004 and a well-known company called google decides to launch its IPO at a then PE of around 65. A cursory look shows the company to be grossly overvalued and as a result most of the value investors tend to give it a pass.

The company has since then delivered a return of around 26% p.a and I am sure this qualifies as a great return. So why did a company which appeared so overvalued turn out to be a 10 bagger.

My own understanding is that this result came about from multiple factors. To begin with, the company operates in a winner take all kind of a market where the no.1 company tends to dominate and capture almost all of its value. Once google had a 60%+ market share, the network effects kicked in and the company just kept getting more dominant in the search space.

Once this base was built, the company extended it to other platforms such as mobile where the next leg of growth has kicked in. These type of companies also have a very low marginal cost of production and hence any growth beyond a threshold, drops straight to the bottom line.

This however does not explain fully the reason behind its success – We have a management which in the words of Prof Bakshi in this note – are intelligent fanatics and also have the capacity to suffer (as referenced by Thomas Russo). As a result they have continuously invested in long term ideas (called as moonshots) even if it meant losses in the near term. You tube, android etc which are now bearing fruit were drains at one point of time.

Such companies have been referred as platform companies and usually appear highly overvalued in the early stages of growth. Another similar company seems to be Facebook.

A point of caution – For every successful platform company, there are atleast 10 pretenders which destroy value. So it is not easy to identify such companies ex-ante (atleast for me)

Rate of change matters
Let me introduce a new concept – business clock speed which I read here. This is the rate at which a business is changing. For example the rate of change in the social media business is high and conversely there are business such as paints or undergarments where the rate of change is low.

I think it is quite obvious that businesses with low rate of change can create a durable competitive advantage for the long term and hence a seemingly high price turns out to be cheap.

On the contrary very few high change businesses (google, Facebook being a few exceptions) turn out to justify their sky high valuations.It is difficult to establish a strong competitive position in an industry where the basis of competition keeps changing every few years – Just look at IBM which has had to re-invent itself almost every decade to stay in business and grow its value. For every IBM, there is DEC or Sun microsystems which did not make it.

It is quite rare

It is important to understand at this point that it is quite rare to find overvalued companies, which in hindsight turn out to be undervalued. A lot of overvalued companies, actually turn out to be just that and so it is important for a value minded investor to be cautious about such companies.

In addition it is not easy to identify such companies upfront (there are no simple screens for it) and one has to think deeply to develop the right insights to buy and hold such companies.

So why study ?
As I stated in the beginning of this note – If you want to be a successful investor, it is important to have as many mental models in your head. Investing in a cheap, low valuation companies is one such mental model. However this does not mean one should just wave away any company which is selling at a high price.

The advantage of understanding the drivers of success is that the next time when you are evaluating a company, it makes sense to check if this company fits into any of these models? One can ask some of these questions

           Is the company overvalued simply because the management is investing in the business for the long term which has suppressed the near term profits?
           Is the company developing a new business model which meets the changing requirements of the consumer much better than competition
           Does the company have a durable advantage and a large opportunity space (the case for a lot of FMCG companies in India)
           Does the company have network effects or is it a platform company run by an intelligent fanatic?
           Has the company identified and developed a unique business model for a niche which it will dominate for a long time?

My post above does not cover all possible reasons why a seemingly overvalued company, will turn out to be cheap. There is no standard formulae or screen which will give you the answers. One has to study the company and the industry deeply to develop any useful insights (as fuzzy as they may be).

Inspite of the odds, if however if you do manage to get it right, it would be stupid to sell the company based on a PE ratio which appears higher than normal.
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Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions. Please read disclaimer towards the end of blog. 
 

A catalogue of risk

A

Beta – This is the term used by academics to represent risk. In other words, for them volatility is equal to risk. This definition of risk makes sense, if one is a short term trader, but is completely useless for an investor.

I have never used beta or any such silly measures to evaluate risk and as an individual investor could not care less for an academic definition of risk.

In my view risk is multifaceted, fuzzy and grey and it cannot be boiled down to a single number. It is not even possible to minimize all forms of risk at the same time – for example you can minimize the risk of a quotational loss on your portfolio by increasing the cash component, but that increases the risk of missing out on the gains if the market moves upwards.

In a set of posts, i am going to list some of the risks which come to my mind. I will try to explain these risks and give some example too. In the end, I will share a framework which I use to think and make investment decisions.  As always, if you are expecting a magic formulae at the end, you will be disappointed.

I am going to break down an investor’s risk in two sections – Risks faced by investor independent of the company/ stock and the business related risks of a specific investment. This post will cover the risks faced by all investors, irrespective of the type of investments.

Stage of life/ Age risk

This is a widely understood form of risk – As one grows older and approaches retirement, the capacity to bear risk reduces. As a 25 year old, one can afford to lose a large portion of one’s portfolio and can still recover from it as one has a long working life ahead. I personally managed to lose almost 25% of my portfolio in my 20s and although it hurt emotionally, it did not make much of a dent on my long term networth.

I personal think that all kinds of experimentation and trial and error should be done by an investor as early in their working life as possible. However once you cross late 30s or 40s, it is important to focus on risk reduction and avoid losing a large portion of your portfolio (small losses are however inevitable in equity investing)

The duration / cash flow needs

This is usually but not always related to the age of an investor. A younger investor can afford to take a very long term view of his or her investments and think in terms of multiple decades. An investor in his or her late 50s however has several cash flow needs on the horizon such as education for children and hence needs to design the portfolio accordingly. As a result, any capital which is needed in the next 5 years, should not be invested in equities. If you do so, you are exposing yourself to the risk that the market would drop at the time when this invested cash is needed, turning a temporary loss to a permanent one.

The interesting point is that this advantage is usually wasted by the younger investors. I have rarely seen investor in their 20s who are patient and long term oriented. At this stage in life, one usually feels invincible and smart. On top of that if you have graduated from some of the top colleges in the country, you close to 100% sure that you will beat the market in your sleep.

A majority of such over confident guys (and they are mostly guys) get their back side kicked and blame everyone else for their failure. A few however are sensible enough to realize their stupidity and work to fix it over time.

Emotional/ Attitude risk

This is a rarely discussed risk. Let me explain what I mean by this – One can call this temperament or maturity. There are some people who have temperamentally more suited to the stock market as they are calm, humble and eager to learn. In addition these people do not get swept by greed or fear. As a result such people are able to do fairly well over the long term.

On the other hand, you will often find people who are eager to invest in equities but are impatient and bring a level of arrogance to the stock market. They seem to believe that the stock market owes them high returns. As a result a lot of them assume that all they need to do is to buy some random stock touted by a talking head on TV and the money will start rolling in.

This attitude is however not specific to any age or gender, though I have seen it mostly in men. Women either stay away from financial decisions or if they are forced to manage it, are far more sensible as they realize their limitations.

Lack of knowledge + arrogance + greed/ fear is guaranteed recipe for disaster.
Knowledge risk

This is a risk a majority of investors in india face due to the huge amount of misinformation and misguidance by the financial services industry.

A lot of investors have been exposed to the traditional forms of investments such as fixed deposits or gold/ real estate. They are however approached by banks/ brokers and other financial agents from time to time on mutual funds, stocks or insurance and I have personally found that majority of this advice is toxic (see my post here on ULIPs).

The only way to manage this risk is to educate yourself on the basics and never to listen blindly to your friendly broker/ agent whose interest is in the commissions and often not your financial well being.

Inflation/ Cost of living risk

Quite self explanatory, but a very under-appreciated risk. A lot of people assume that if they invest in fixed income options, they have taken care of their investment needs. My own parents were guilty of this mistake in the past.

This risk unfortunately is a very slow and stealthy form of risk where one thinks that his money is growing, but in reality one is falling behind in terms of buying power. This risk comes to bite you at absolutely the wrong time – retirement. At that time, you realize that the nestegg is not sufficient to take care of a lot of your needs. In such cases, in absence of a social safety net, one either has to continue working or depends on others to make ends meet.

I see a lot of educated and young people in my own family ignore this risk to their peril.

Leverage risk

Leverage risk is commonly understood as the leverage taken by an investor in his portfolio. I prefer to expand this further and consider all forms of non –investing leverage too. For example, if you have a big home loan and other forms of leverage in the form of personal and car loans, then your flexibility as an investor is greatly reduced.

Lets say an individual earns around 10 lacs per year and  has around 50 lacs as various forms of loans. This individual is paying around 50% of his earnings as debt repayment. If this individual has around 10-15 lacs as savings, can he or she really afford to invest in a highly volatile small cap fund ? If this was the financial profile of an individual in 2008, he or she would have panicked  and sold all their stocks at the bottom.

I have personally looked at leverage in the above manner and worked to ensure that my total debt to networth never exceeds 30-40%. This ensures that my debt servicing is within control and any fluctuations in the stock market, will not force me to liquidate my positions to manage this debt.

Professional risk

I have never seen this risk discussed, but I think it influences your investing behavior a lot. If you have a full time profession (job or a business) which will put food on the table irrespective of how the stock market behaves, it is bound to impact your risk appetite.

A stable well paying job allows one to take a long term view and invest without worrying about the market volatility. On the other extreme if your monthly expenses depend directly on the stock markets – either from capital gains or through employment as a financial intermediary, then your risk appetite is greatly reduced.
A combination of risk

It may appear that several of the risks I have pointed out are overlapping in nature. I would agree with that and my post is not provide an exhaustive and non overlapping list of risks faced by an investor. The idea is to look at some risks which are faced by an investor, outside of the specific investment itself.

A lot of times, it is the combination of risks which become financially fatal for an individual. Lets say an individual does not save enough early in his or her career, and due to the inflation risk realizes later in life that his nest egg is not going to be sufficient. In absence of sufficient knowledge about various forms of investments, this investor under the influence of a unscrupulous broker may make wrong investment choices. Such an investor can get hurt very badly during a market downturn. I think I may have described the unfortunate situation for a lot of senior citizens.

I have tried to cover risks which are independent of the type of instrument chosen for investing. I think these risks play an important role in determining the nature of one’s investments and the kind of returns one can make. In the next post, I will discuss about the various forms business risks one needs to keep in mind when investing in equities.

I still stand by my post below on managing  non – investing risks
http://valueinvestorindia.blogspot.com/2014/04/shortest-investment-book.html

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Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions. Please read disclaimer towards the end of blog.

The madness for growth

T


Let me share some actual data, without sharing the name of the company initially


One year return = 69%
5 year return = 75% CAGR
I don’t know about others, but in my universe this kind of performance is something to kill for. At the same time, one has to be insane to expect this kind of growth forever. If one my positions were to deliver this kind of performance, I will consider myself lucky (not smart). 

However I would not run around looking for such companies prospectively as they are like shooting stars – be glad you saw one (or hold one), but do not sit on your terrace forever waiting for one.
If an investor has an investing lifetime of 30+ years, even a 20% return will make him or her insansely rich. A 75% per annum return for 30 years ? look at the numbers below for comparison
1 lac becomes 2.37 Crs after compounding at 20% for 30 years
1 lac becomes 1,95,497 Crs after compounding at 75% for 30 years
However investors keep chasing these shooting stars


And what happens, when they are disappointed, even temporarily?


So what is the name of this mystery company? Its symphony limited
Below is the chart of the company for 5 years


The madness of growth
Is the name even important? This is not a one off case. Look for any company – good, bad or ugly. If the company shows a couple of quarter of growth, the stock price shoots up with no link to valuation, quality or sanity.
On the other hand if the music stops, even for 1-2 quarters, the response is brutal. The herd which rushed in blindly, now heads for the exit.
I don’t think this can be called investing – it’s a mad hunt for growth.
For the slowpokes like me, it is better to just sit and watch. The risk here is that the retail investor will again repeat the same lessons of the past – Buy high and sell low.
Added note: I have taken symphony limited as an example. I am not discussing the merit of this company as an investment. I may or may not hold this stock in my portfolio. The warning holds – if I discuss about gold, real estate or goat, I may or may not be buying or selling it. So please do your homework if you plan to buy anything discussed here, including the goat!

 

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Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions. Please read disclaimer towards the end of blog.

The same rules apply

T

The best way to analyse any asset class is to look at the long term return for it

For example

Fixed income : inflation +/- 1%

Gold : Inflation + 1.5%

Real estate : Inflation + 3-4% (or more ?)

Equities : inflation + 6-7%

Now based on timing and in some cases, asset specific skills can help you beat these returns, but over the long run no matter how much you love the asset class, these returns do hold.

In 2011-2012, even my mother who only wishes the best for her son, was encouraging me to look at Gold and real estate. When people who truly love you start recommending an asset class , for your good, that’s a good sign of a bubble.

In this case, I bought a little gold for my mother and wife and they were quite happy about it. Now that was a decent investment – one cannot measure happiness 🙂

 

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Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions. Please read disclaimer towards the end of blog.

A picture worth a thousand words ?

A
It is said that a picture is worth a thousand word. Hopefully ,some of the crudely drawn ones below, by yours truly are worth atleast a few words.

The Matrix
Time, Value and price

 

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Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions. Please read disclaimer towards the end of blog.

Cheap and durable (price matters !)

C

Starting note: This is a long post and I am going to cover a lot of ground. I have tried to cover a vast topic in a few pages, which is usually the subject of entire books. As a result, I have tried to simplify and generalize in several cases to make a point.

In the previous post, I tried to make the point that it is not enough to say that a company has a moat and then rush to your broker to put in an order. One needs to answer a couple of questions

  • Does the company really have a sustainable competitive advantage or a durable moat? A high return on capital is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to demonstrate the presence of a moat
  • It is also important to judge the depth and durability of the moat. Deeper the moat and longer it survives, more valuable is the company

 Do not focus too much on the math

I received a few emails asking me about the calculations on how I arrived at the PE ratios. As I said in my previous post, the math is not important for the point I am making – longer a company earns above its cost of capital, higher is its intrinsic value.

I would suggest that you use the standard DCF model and apply whatever assumptions you like for growth, ROE, free cash flow etc and just play around with the duration of the moat or the period for which the company can earn above the cost of capital. It should be quite obvious that longer the duration, higher is the value of the company.

For the really curious, I have uploaded my calculations here. Prepare to be underwhelmed!

 Market implied duration

The other point i would like to make is by turning around the equation – If the company has a high PE ratio, the market is telling you that it expects the company to earn above its cost of capital for a long time.

For illustration, let’s take the example of Page industries (past numbers from money control, future numbers are my guess).

Future expected ROE = 50% (roughly 53% in 2014)

Future growth rate = 30% (40% growth in 2010-2014)

Terminal PE = 15

Current price = 14000 (approximately)

If I put in these numbers into DCF formulae, I get a Moat period of around 10 years.

So the market expects the company to grow its profit by 30% per annum for the next 10 years and maintain its current return on capital. This means that the company will earn a profit of  2000 crs by 2025.

So do I think that page industries will maintain its moat for 10 years or longer and grow at 30%?

I don’t know !

However if I did own the stock or planned to buy it, my next step would be to analyze the competitive strength of the company and see if the moat would survive 10 years and beyond, because if it didn’t I would be in trouble as a long term investor.

 Precision not possible

In the previous example I used a fancy formulae and a long list of assumptions to suggest that the market considers page industries to have a competitive advantage period or moat (CAP for short) of 10 years.

Once you put a number to some of these fuzzy concepts, it appears that you have solved the problem and are ready to execute.

Nothing could be farther from the truth.

Anytime someone tries to give you a precise number on intrinsic value of a company, look for the assumptions behind it. As you may have read, the best tool for fiction is the spreadsheet.

The above calculation should be the starting and not the end point of your thinking. I typically do the above kind of analysis to look at what the market is assuming and put it into three broad buckets

2-5 years : Market assumes a short duration moat

5-8 years : Market assumes a medium duration moat

8+ years : Market assumes a long duration moat (bullet proof franchise)

Let’s look at some way to analyze the moat and bucket it in some cases

 Measuring the moat

A substantial part of my post has been picked up from this note by Michael Mauboussin. The first version of this note was published in around 2002 and the revised one in 2013 (download from here)

If you are truly interested in learning how to discover and measure moats, I cannot stress this note enough (some important parts in the note have been highlighted by me) . Read it and then re-read it a couple of times. The only point missing from this note is the application of the concepts – Michael mauboussion does not provide any detailed examples of applying the concepts to a real life example.

 Model 1: Porter’s five forces analysis

I am not going to write a detailed explanation of this model – you can find this here. I have used this model to analyze IT companies in the past – see here. A few more posts on the same topic can be found hereand here.

Let me try to explain my approach using an example from the past. Lakshmi machine works was an old position for me (I no longer hold it). As part of the analysis, I did the five forces review of the company/ industry which can be downloaded from here

A few key points about the analysis

  • The entry barriers were quite high in the textile machinery industry. Once a company like LMW has established itself and achieved a market share in excess of 50%, it was difficult for a new competitor to achieve scale. A textile mill with only LMW machines finds it easy to maintain and repair these machines (due to accumulated learning) or get this done from LMW which has a large service network. LMW, due to a large install base, is able to provide a high level of service (network effect) at a low cost (due to scale of operations). So we have a case of positive loop here–  Largest company is able to provide a cost effective solution and high levels of service and still earn a good return on capital
  • The other factors such as Supplier power, substitute products etc are not critical to evaluate the industry
  • There is a certain level of buyer concentration, but the machinery segment has far higher concentration and hence the balance of power is still with LMW
  • Finally rivalry is muted as LMW has a level of customer lockin . A satisfied customer will prefer to continue with the same supplier (Who is also cost effective) as it allows it to achieve a higher uptime in operations and lower cost of maintenance (maintenance team needs to maintain only one brand of machines)

The above is also visible in the form of a very high return on capital for LMW – The company  had a negative working capital for 10+ years and earned 100% + on invested capital at the time of this analysis

As I analyzed the company in 2008, I felt strongly that the company had a medium (5-8) or a long duration moat. It was not important to arrive at a precise number then, as the company was selling at close to cash on books and the business was available for free. Surely a business with a medium term moat was worth more than 0 !

 Model 2: Sources of added value

The second mental model i frequently use is the sources of added value – production advantages, customer advantages and government (pages 34-41 of the note)

I have uploaded the analysis for CERA sanitary ware (current holding), I had done in 2011. Look at the rows 14-19 for the details.

A few points to note

  • The company enjoys scale advantages from demand, distribution, advertising etc. As the company gets bigger, these cost advantages would increase ensuring that the company will be able to price its product at the same level as its competitors and still earn a good profit
  • The company also enjoys customer side advantages from brand/ trademarks and availability
  • As you run through this checklist/ template, you will notice that a company could have either production or customer advantages due to various factors. However a company which has both has a powerful combination. If these two sources of value are working together and growing, then we may be able to say that the company has a medium or long duration moat
  • In case you are curious, I thought that CERA had a small to medium moat in 2011. This has expanded since then and the company most likely has a long duration moat now.

 Model 3: High pricing power

Another key indicator of competitive advantage is the presence of pricing power. The following comment from warren buffett encapsulates it

 “The single most important decision in evaluating a business is pricing power. If you’ve got the power to raise prices without losing business to a competitor, you’ve got a very good business. And if you have to have a prayer session before raising the price 10 percent, then you’ve got a terrible business.”

How do you evaluate this ? Look for clues in the annual report or management responses to questions in conference calls. Does the management talk of margins being impacted severely due to cost pressures ?

For example – Companies like Page industries or asian paints are generally able to pass through cost increases to customer without losing volumes. When the input costs drop they can either increase their margins or use this excess profit in advertising and promotions and thus strengthen their competitive position. Can steel or cement companies do the same ?

 Other miscellaneous models

  1. Is the competitive advantage structural (based on the business) or the management. An advantage based on the management is a weak moat and can change overnight if the same team is not in charge
  2. Industry structure : A duopoly or an industry with limited competition is more likely to have companies with competitive advantage. Look at batteries, two wheelers or sanitaryware for example. One is likely to find companies with medium or long duration moats in such industry structures.
  3. Govt regulation : This can be due to special ‘connections’. If you find a moat due to this factor, be very careful as this can disappear overnight

A brief synthesis

I have laid out various models of evaluating the competitive advantage of a company. Once you go through this exercise, you can arrive at a few broad conclusions

No moat: A majority of the companies do not have a moat. As you go through the above models and are hard pressed to find anything positive, it is an indicator that the company has no competitive advantage. Even if the company has been earning a high  return on capital in the recent past, it could be a cyclical or temporary phenomenon. Look at several commodity companies which did well in the 2006-2008 time frame, only to go down after that.

Weak moats : If the moat depends on single a production side advantage such as access to key raw material or government regulation, it’s a weak moat (think mining or telecom companies). The company can lose the advantage at the stroke of a pen, law or whims and fancy of our politicians. In addition the pricing power of such companies is very low. I would categorize such a moat as a weak one and not give it a duration of more than 2-3 years.

Strong, but not quite : If the moat depends on customer advantages such as brands or distribution network, the moat is much stronger. A company with a new brand which is either no.1 or no.2 has a much stronger moat. I tend to give the moat a medium duration (5-8 years). The reason for being cautious at this stage is that the company clearly has a competitive advantage, but the strength has not been tested over multiple business cycle. In addition, in some case the business environment is subject to change and one cannot be too confident of the durability of the moat. The example of LMW or CERA in the past is a good one for this bucket

The bullet proof franchise :These are companies with multiple customer and production (scale related) advantages. These companies are able to command high margins, can raise prices and at the same time have a very competitive cost structures due to economies of scale. These companies have demonstrated high returns of capital over 10+ years and continue to do so. In such cases, one can assume that duration of the moat is 10+ years. These cases are actually quite easy to identify – asian paints, nestle, Unilevers, pidilite, HDFC twins and so on.

Moats are not static

A key point to keep in mind is that moats are not static, but changing constantly. In some cases the moat can disappear overnight if it depends on the government regulation (such as mine licenses), but usually the change is slow and imperceptible and hence easy to miss.

If you can identify the key drivers of a company’s moat, then you can track those driver to evaluate if the management is strengthening or weakening the moat. For example, the moat of an FMCG company is driven by its brands and distribution network. As a result, it is important to track if the management is investing in the brand and deepening/ widening the distribution network.

In the case of LMW, I think the moat has slowly shrunk due to the entry of Reiter ltd. Reiter was the technology partner and equity holder in LMW. The two companies have since parted ways and Reiter is now competing aggressively in the same space.

LMW has repeatedly indicated that they are now facing a higher level of competition in India and consequently there has been a slow drop in operating profit margins. In addition one can see an increase in the working capital usage too. I cannot precisely state that the moat duration has shrunk from 10.7 years to 6.3 years, but there is increasing evidence that the moat is under pressure. As a result, I exited the stock a few years back.

Putting it all together

Let’s assume that you have done a lot of work and figured out that company has moderate moat possibly 5-8 years. At this point, you can plug in the required variables into a DCF model and analyze the market implied duration of the moat (the way we did for Page industries)

If the market thinks that the company has no moat or a minimal moat, than you have a probable buy. If however the market implied moat is 10+ years, then the decision would be to avoid buying the stock, not matter how good the company

The above sounds simple in theory, but is far more difficult in practice – I never promised that I will be giving you a neat, fool proof formulae of making a lot of money by doing minimal work 🙂

The moat of a long term investor

If the all of the above sounds too fuzzy and cannot be laid out in a neat formulae, you should actually feel very happy about it. Think about it for a moment – if something is fuzzy and requires a combination of a wide experience, insight and some thinking, it is unlikely to be done successfully by a computer or fresh out of college analysts.

Can a research analyst go and present this fuzzy thinking to his head of research, who wants a precise target price for the next month ?

So any investor who has a long term horizon and is ready to invest the time and effort to do this type of analysis will find very little competition. It is a general rule of business that lower competition leads to higher returns – the same is true for investing too.

If you buys stocks, the way most people buy shoes, TV or fridges – after due research on features, durability (how long the consumer durable will last) and then compare with price, the result will be much better than average

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Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions. Please read disclaimer towards the end of blog.

 

It is all about durability

I


The easiest way to justify a high PE stock is to say that it has a moat or in other words a sustainable competitive advantage. Once these magic words are uttered, no further analysis or thinking is needed. If there is a moat, it does not matter if the stock sells at a PE of 30 or 70. It is all the same.


On seeing this type of analysis I am reminded of the following the quote from warren buffett
“What the wise do in the beginning, fools do in the end.”
Moat =high PE, but high PE is not always = Moat

A company with a moat may be justified to have a high PE, but a high PE does not mean the mean presence of a moat.

Even if the company supposedly has a moat, it is important to judge the depth and durability of this moat. In addition , the company should also have the opportunity to re-invest future cash flows into the business at high rates of return to create further value.

Lets explore some of these aspects in further detail

More than knee deep

The depth of the moat is simply the excess returns a company can make over its cost of capital. If a company can earn 30% return on capital, we can clearly see that the moat is deep (18% excess return).

This aspect of the moat is the easiest to figure out – Just pick the financials of the company for the last 10 years and check the return on capital of the company. If the average returns are higher than the cost of capital , then we can safely assume that the company had a moat in the past (the future is a different issue).

I personally use 15% return on capital as a threshold. Any company which has earned 15% or higher over an entire business cycle (roughly 3-5 years) is a good candidate for the presence of a moat in the past. Its important not to consider a single year in the analysis as several cyclical companies show a sudden spurt in profitability, before sliding into mediocrity.

The durability factor

The presence of a moat in the past, is only the starting point of analysis. 

The key questions to ask are
          Is the moat durable –  will the moat survive in the future ?
          How long will the moat survive ?
          Will the moat deepen (Return on capital improve), remain same or reduce.

All these factor are very important in the valuation of a business.  Let try to quantify them. I will be using the discounted flow analysis (without doing the math here) and will also be making some simplifying assumptions
  1. EPS = 10 Rs
  2. Return on capital (ROC) = 22%
  3. Growth in profits = 15 %
  4. Company is able to maintain this return on capital and growth for 10 years. After that the ROC drops to 12% and growth to 8% (leading to a terminal PE of around 12)
If you input the above numbers into a DCF model, the fair value comes to around 230 (PE = 23) 
Lets play with these numbers now – Lets assume we underestimated the durability of the moat. The actual life of the moat turns out to be 20 years and not the 10 years when we first analysed the company. If that is the case, the fair value comes to around 430 (PE=43)
I just described the case of several companies such as HDFC bank, Asian paints, Nestle etc. In case of these companies, the markets assumed a certain excess return period, which turned to be too conservative. Anyone who bought the stock at a high looking PE, was actually buying the stock cheap.


The above point has been explained far better by prof. sanjay bakshi in this lecture.
Lets look at a few more happy cases. Lets assume that the company actually ends up earning an ROC of 50% with a growth of 20%. If you plug in these numbers, the fair value  turns out to be around 440 (PE=44). I may have just described what has happened to page industries since 2008.

 So what are the key points?

The market  when valuing a company is making an implicit assumption on the future return on capital, growth and the period for which both these factors will last (after which they regress to the averages). 

An investor makes an above average return only if these numbers turn out to be better than the assumptions built into the stock at the time of purchase.

What happens if the moat turns out to be weak or non existent ?

You have a dud !

Lets assume in our example, that the business tanks after you buy it. It is never able to earn more than 12% return on capital and grows at around 8%.

If the above unhappy situation happens, then the true fair value of the company is around 120 (PE=12). If this turns out to the case, then you will suffer from a 50% loss of capital as the market re-values the company.

Examples ? Look at the case of  bharti airtel. The company was selling at around 470 or PE of 23 in 2007. The company had an ROC of 31% and growth in excess of 15%. The market was assuming an excess return period of 8-10 years at that point of time.

What has happened since then ? The stock price has dropped by around 25% from its peak over the last 8 years – a loss of 2% per annum, which is not exactly a great return.

The reasons are not difficult to see (as always, in hindsight). The telecom market after growing at a breakneck speed till 2007-08 started slowing down. In addition the competitive intensity of the industry increased with almost all other players losing money for most of the time. If these problems were not enough, Bharti went ahead and made an expensive acquisition (Zain) in Africa which suppressed the return on capital further.


In effect all the key drivers of value, turned south from 2007-08 onwards resulting in a loss for the long term investor.

We can derive some key points from the discussion till now
          A high return on capital in the past is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to demonstrate the presence of a moat
          It is also important to judge the depth and longevity or durability of moat. If your estimate is correct and turns out to be higher than that of the market, then you will excess returns. If not, be prepared to lose money or at best make market level returns .
          As a corollary a buy and hold works only if you get the durability aspect correct. If the moat shrinks and disappears, a buy and hold strategy will not save you  

So how does one figure out the durability of the moat. There is no magical formulae where you can punch in a set of numbers and out will pop the duration. It is a highly subjective exercise and the topic of the next post.


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Stocks discussed in this post are for educational purpose only and not recommendations to buy or sell. Please contact a certified investment adviser for your investment decisions. Please read disclaimer towards the end of blog.

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