AuthorRohit Chauhan

NIIT tech: A falling knife ?

N

I received a question : NIIT tech has dropped from 100 to around mid 50s. Is it a falling knife which one should avoid ?

I have written a post on the above topic earlier. So the point is how does one avoid a falling knife scenario ? In other words when it is wise to increase the holding as the stock price is dropping versus avoid averaging down.

Two factors
I would answer the above question based on two key factors one should keep in mind when purchasing a stock. The first factor is the intrinsic value of the stock. One should have decent idea of the Intrinsic value range of a stock. If the stock price is dropping and the stock is more undervalued now, one can look at increasing the holding.

The second factor is position size or risk management. Personally when I am looking at a stock, I make a decision on whether the stock would be a part of my core portfolio or the cheap-graham portfolio. Once I have made that decision, I have pre-set limit on the position size. One can have an amount or percentage of the portfolio – position size. I typically start off with a 50% position (50% of the full position) and keep adding as the stock price drops.

Once I had built the full position, I will not add to the position even if the stock price is dropping. This is the key to risk management. I regularly check my thesis to confirm if any of my basic assumptions are incorrect and if my estimate of intrinsic value is too high. However I will not add to my position even when the stock price falls. There is no averaging down for me, once I have built a full position

70% strike rate
I have read that most of the top investors typically have 70-80% hit rate. That is 20-30% of their stock picks result in losses, either due to bad luck or incorrect analysis. I don’t believe I will do better than that. I have now started working with an assumption that 20-30% of my picks will fail. In such a scenario, the risk management aspect is crucial. To do well on a portfolio basis, my successful picks should do better than my failures.

What about NIIT tech ?
In the case of NIIT tech or any other company, my focus is on intrinsic value and not on the stock price. The stock price can get disconnected from the intrinsic value for sometime, but it eventually converges to it.
My own estimates of intrinsic value for the company have not changed. The current quarter results show a bottom line drop of around 50%, mainly due to forex losses. I do not consider them as core losses (just as forex gains are not permanent gains). I have seen a lot of people get all worked up about forex losses, which does not make sense to me.
Unless the company is speculating on forex (via non effective hedges), I think the forex gains and losses should even out over the period of few years and hence one should be concentrating on the core profits to value the company.

As an example look at the results of the airlines such as southwest (in the US). Southwest airlines has been consistently profitable for the last 20+ years. They have had 2-3 quarters of hedging related losses due to oil price volatility. Do you think they have a problem in their core operations?

Anyway, I digress. Coming back to NIIT tech, I have not changed my estimate of intrinsic value and I have already built my planned position. As a result even if the price drops, I will not add to my position to manage the risk (if I am wrong about NIIT tech).

Management issue
However if you believe that in light of the satyam episode, you cannot trust the management , then the only course of action is to exit the stock.
Personally, the moment I lose faith on any management and cannot trust them, I will exit the stock irrespective of the loss I have to take on my position.

As an aside, my previous post was in jest. I received a few personal emails ‘challenging’ my prediction and one guy asked me why I did not predict the level, if I knew the time . I have no clue where the market will be in the future. However if you want to pay me, I can guess for you 🙂

Hoping for a quick rebound ?

H

Have you been hoping for a quick rebound and a re-start of the bull market? I would not hold my breath on that. No one knows when the market will rebound. Those who claim to know are guessing. If you need a forecast fix on when the rebound will start, let me give you one – 11:22 am, 22 April 2009.

If the above forecast comes out to be false, I will just keep mum and issue a new forecast.

If the above guess turns to be correct, expect a banner on the blog proclaiming my brilliance and infinite wisdom (hail rohit !!). I will start issuing regular forecasts after that and will charge you for it.

Now this would be an easy way to make money, as long as I can find enough suckers …sorry ‘investors’ for it.

So are you willing to sign up for my hourly, daily, weekly, quarterly and annual forecasts? If you sign up today, I will give you a special 20% discount and throw in two extra forecasts, absolutely free !!!.

Moving the feed account

The feed to this blog is on feed burner (see here to understand what is a feed). Google (which owns feedburner) is moving all feedburner accounts to google accounts.

I am planning to move my account to google too. Hopefully it should be a non event. However in the event, there is some technical glitch and you do not receive an update in 3-4 days, I would request you to check the blog and leave a comment for me. Being a super duper tech whiz, I will immediately get down to fixing it :).

In case you are new to the blog or have not subscribed to the blog, you can use this link to subscribe to my blog. you could all the juicy forecasts in your mailbox 🙂

Cash – good or bad ?

C

I was recently referred to an article by Prof. Bakshi (read here). Prof bakshi has written about a few companies which seems to be cash bargains (selling less than cash on the books), but are suspect due to their accounting and corporate governance.

Readers of this blog would be aware that I have a bias for companies with low debt and high cash on books. I do not get excited by growth as high growth companies are usually fairly valued or overvalued. However slow to moderately growing companies with a solid business model are frequently undervalued. Excess cash on the book only adds to the attractiveness of these companies.

Low debt and cash on books is usually a good thing, but excess cash holdings for long periods of time are not good for shareholders. It usually signifies that the management is allocating capital poorly and in absence of high return opportunities is letting the cash idle. This is ofcourse better than spending the cash on stupid acquisitions. However a shareholder friendly management should return the cash through dividends or buybacks.

The above holds true if the cash is actually present. After the satyam episode, one cannot be completely sure of that. I have always looked at the management quality and corporate governance of a company in the past, before committing my money to it. It is easy to identify cases of bad (see aftek here, which the prof has also referred to in his article) or good governance. The problem is identifying managements which are not good, but not overtly bad. The bigger problem is identifying complete frauds, where the !@## (put your choice of expletive) auditors are hand in glove with the management.

There are books, which discuss this topic (of financial fraud) in detail (see here). There are no clear-cut formulae to identify aggressive or fraudulent accounting. A deep understanding of accounting and experience, will throw up red flags when one is reading and analyzing the annual report of a company. A single red flag may not be a cause for concern, but several of them together should alert you. I will be covering some of these red flags in a future post.

Let me come back to another example in the article – HTMT global. I have discussed about the company in the past and have a small holding in the company (it is part of my diversified graham styled portfolio). The key reasons for my investment are – cash on books higher than the market cap, decent topline and bottom line growth and ultra cheap valuation. However the negative on the stock is corporate governance. As indicated in the article, the cash is held in a subsidiary in Mauritius.

The CFO indicated in the analyst meet that the cash is being held to avoid the 30% tax and for acquisitions. During the analysis of the company, I read this explanation (I was searching for it) and found it plausible. However on reading, prof bakshi’s article I was disappointed to read this

HTMT has deposited cash in Mauritius. When asked about keeping its money outside India, Anand Vora, CFO, said: “We have been getting a lot of queries, because PwC is our auditors and have a considerable amount of cash on our books. We don’t want to comment till we get a clearance from our legal team. So, while your questions (on overseas accounts and account balance and cash on books) may not be very sensitive issues, we will still like our legal team to go through it.”

There are two red flags in the above statement : PWC and the reluctance of the CFO to give a straight response. If you have cash on the books, why do you need the legal team to go through it?

Does the above mean that the cash does not exist? Should one exit the stock? To be honest, I don’t have an answer for that. If one cannot trust the management and the auditors to tell the truth, then it is not possible to invest in a company. The entire financial system depends on this trust. No one will invest, if the management and auditors cannot be trusted to tell you the truth.

So where do we go from here? For starters I am reviewing all my holding to check their cash holdings closely and tie it with the interest income. I have checked these numbers in the past, but with only a passing interest. I will however be looking at these numbers far more closely now.

In addition, though I have focused on corporate governance in the past and rejected several ideas for my core portfolio, I have been more tolerant in my graham styled portfolio. I plan to give more wieghtage to this factor in my stock picks in the future. I have purchased companies, which are statistically cheap, even if they are not upto the mark in corporate governance. I plan to put more wieghtage on this factor going forward.

I am still thinking about HTMT and have not decided yet. However my comfort levels have dropped a lot with this company and my gut feel is not good (yes, I listen to my gut feeling ..ignoring it in the past has been costly). I may decide to exit the company even if I have to take a small loss. This may be an over-reaction to the satyam episode as there is still no factual basis to distrust the company. However there should be no tolerance on corporate governance and transparency. In the end i would rather err on the side of caution than repent later.

Added note : I just glanced at Satyam’s annual report. The company reported 3300+ crs of cash with scheduled banks and an interest income of 270 Crs. The scheduled banks seem to be bank of baroda, BNP, citibank, HDFC, HSBC and ICICI bank. How the hell did the auditors certify the cash if the management says all this cash was fictitious ? If this news report is true, then one could derive comfort that the statements were not fraudulent and the cash was actually siphoned out.

Stock analysis – Ingersoll rand

S

About
Ingersoll Rand (india) is a subsidiary of Ingersoll rand (US) with a 75% holding of the parent company. The main business (after all the disposals) of the company is air solutions – mainly compressors and other instruments such as air dryers, filters, after-coolers, receivers, water separators, etc.

Financials
The company has been disposed off three businesses in the last 3 years. This includes the road development, utility equipment, Bobcat business and climate control business. The company has realised a pre-tax profit of almost 217 crs in the last 3 years.
Due to the above developments, the topline of the company is not comparable across the years. The remaining business – airsolutions seems to be growing at double digits for the last few years. The net margins of the company has improved to almost 10% (which could be cylical high) and the ROE has leaped from a good 20%+ to 70%+ number (net of surplus cash on the balance sheet).
The improvement in the ROE has come via improvement in margins and asset turns (both inventory and recievables ratios have shown improvements in the last 4 years).

Positives
The company’s balance sheet looks extremely good. Almost 80% of the balance is cash and equivalents. Part of this cash is from the sale of the various businesses and rest has come from the free cash flow of the business. The core business of the company is throwing off a good amount of cash with low Capex requirements.
The company has become more efficient via a combination of improvement in margins (which may drop) and improvement in various ratios (due to improvement of efficiencies).
The air solutions business has been showing decent growth in the last few years. This growth may slow down in the short to medium term, but should remain good over the long term. In addition the valuations of the company are very attractive. The business is selling for 1-2 times the current years earnings (excluding cash).

Risks
The business risk seem to be low. There are 3-4 competitors in this business like Elgi equipment, Atlas copco etc. However the level of competition has not been intense. However with such high growth rates and returns, foreign competition is being expected. This may result in lower returns and low growth in the future. The valuation however discounts this and more currently.

There are several risks for the minority shareholders. The key risk in my opinion is that the company is a 75% subsidairy of an MNC. The parent company has an unlisted company in india and there is a clear conflict of interest. My personal experience with such type of situations has been bad. The minority shareholders in such cases have suffered from poor governance, poor utilization of excess cash (cash continues to lie in the balance sheet with no clear plans) and no special focus from the parent company. In some cases the parent has bought out the minority holders at an unfair price.

In addition, the Annual report is sketchy in terms of the future plans for the business and how the excess capital will be utilized.

Competitive analysis
The main competitors of Ingersoll Rand are Atlas Copco and Elgi equipment. Atlas Copco is twice the size of Ingersoll rand and Elgi equipment is roughly the same size as Ingersoll rand. The various financial parameters such as Net margins, ROE, Sales etc are similar for Elgi and Ingersoll rand. Ingersoll rand is slightly cheaper than Elgi equipment. However the elgi management seems more focussed on the growth of the business (as atleast they are more articulate about it) and have aggressive growth plans for the domestic and international markets, so that may explain the difference in the valuations.
By various measures even Elgi equipment seems to be cheap and it can be preferred over Ingersoll on qualitative parameters
Atlas copco has similar margins (10%), higher turnover (twice) and lower efficiency ratios (ROE of around 20%) . The valuation for Atlas is however much higher than the other two companies and can be used as a reference point for comparitive valuation

Valuation
The company net of cash is selling at 1-2 times of the free cash flow. At the current rate, the business would be a cash bargain in the next 1-2 years. From a pure, numbers point of view, the stock is undervalued by a decent margin.

Conclusion
The company looks cheap and undervalued by quantitative measures. The core business is growing and should pick up steam once the economy recovers. However there are quite a few small things, which make me uncomfortable from a subjective standpoint. The management has no interest in communicating with minority shareholders (who are less than 25%) on the future plans for the business, the cash holding etc.

In addition the parent has an unlisted subsidiary, which is generally not a good thing for the indian shareholder. If I were to consider this company, it would be part of my graham style portfolio and not the core due to above issues.

Additional point: I did this analysis before the satyam issue. There is no change in my analysis due to the above incident. Having cash on the balance is not a red flag for fraud. One cannot invest based on the assumption that all companies are committing a fraud, unless proven otherwise.

Please read disclaimer

India’s Enron – Satyam

I

update 9-Jan
When it rains, it pours ! for satyam it is pouring bad news.
I am reminded of buffett’s comment – There is never a single cockroach in the kitchen.

There are no suitors coming up. Who wants to be associated with a tainted brand ! The value of an IT company comes from three sources – its brand/ reputation, customer relationship and employees. The brand/ reputation is the foremost and a damage to this asset can destroy the other two.

Satyam, with a new board may be able to rebuild the company (though not to its former glory) partly. However the company is facing a cash crunch and if it is not able to get cash for operations, then it could be in serious trouble. Getting a loan is not going to be easy, if the books have been cooked and the banks cannot trust your accounts.

Once clients feel there is a risk, they may press the panic button too. It is not easy to change a vendor, but i will not be surprised if clients have not started working out a contigency plan.

Finally, this episode will impact Indian IT in the long run. Do you think clients will trust other companies as easily as they have in the past ? With Indian companies vying with IBM and the likes for billion dollar deals, trust and faith is far more important. This episode is going to make life diffcult for all the vendors.

——————————————————————————————————–

A few days back, I wrote about corporate governance in Indian companies. I hardly expected this – a full fledged fraud at satyam. I was shocked to say the least. Satyam is not a fly by night operator. There were some concerns on the coporate governance (forget the peacock or whatever ‘bird’ award), but what has come out is not some corporate governance lapse, but outright cooking of the books.

Bad intentions
I personally have no idea of the intentions of the management. However from the letter and from what I have seen in the past on such incidents, is that the start of such a fraud is small and not with malice. The management typically is not able to meet the numbers and fudges the numbers a bit to meet the targets with the hope that they will be able to cover the gap in subsequent quarters. However the gap does not get covered and the management resorts to even more manipulation to meet the numbers till finally they hole is too big to cover. This happened with Enron, worldcom and several other companies during the dotcom bubble in the US.

Bankruptcy
Is satyam headed for bankruptcy ? I don’t think so. This is not a bank where there could be a run on the company. That said, there is more pain ahead and the critical thing to watch over the next few quarters would be how the company manages its customer relationships and employees, which are the bigger assets than the cash on the balance sheet.

Possible to know before hand ?
I received a comment on how to calculate the value of the company if the numbers cannot be trusted ? My response is – you cannot. The entire basis of investing is ‘trust’. When you invest your money in a company, you trust that the management is honest and presenting the true picture. You trust the auditors to be doing their job when they certify the accounts. Clearly both the management and the auditors blew it at satyam.

You can expect articles to come out on how it was evident that something was wrong at satyam. I would say that is complete bullshit. I have not analysed the satyam annual reports till date and plan to do so now to see if it was possible to know the fraud before hand. Most of the times there are red flags on aggressive accounting which would give you a clue that something is not right. You can use these red flags to stay away from the company. However it is very difficult to detect fraud from the public filings such as annual and quarterly reports.

What now?
Such incidents are not unique to India. They have happened in other countries around the world. What is different is the kind of punishment for such a fraud. In the US, the CEO of Enron was sentenced to 24 years in jail. The US law is very strict with white collar crime and gives out harsh punishment for such crime.

In india, I doubt much will happen. We treat white collar crime as no crime. This incident is going to cast a major shadow on all indian companies. If satyam could fudge cash of 5000 crs+, what about all the smaller mid and micro cap companies which have some unknown auditors and a weak to non-existent board.

I hope investors now demand tranparency from companies and vote with their feet (sell !) if the management is not transparent.

Lesson for us
As an investor I can think of two ways to handle such an eventuality – avoid companies where corporate governance is suspect and diversify.

This is a complete tragedy, especially for the 53000+ employees who have worked for years with the company and now face this for no fault of theirs.

Corporate governance – Satyam and other Indian companies

C

I think most of you must be aware of what has been happening with satyam lately. I will not go over the details as you can find it on the net easily.

The key events seem to be
– Satyam decided to buy out Maytas infra using the surplus cash on it balance sheet. The logic provided was that the company was trying to de-risk its IT business and diversify
– The market did not like the deal due to the conflict of interest (Maytas is owned by the same management)
– The stock price of Satyam crashed even after the deal was cancelled
– The Rajus (promoters) had pledged their shares against loans taken by them. Due to the price drop, they got into a margin situation and some of their holdings were sold off.
– This drop in the holding has created an interesting situation as the Promoters held around 8% of the stock earlier which may have dropped further. This has put the company into play and there seem to be several other IT companies/ PE players, which are interested in satyam now.

I have been surprised by the above turn of events. However, i am not a bit surprised by the corporate governance fiasco. Does anyone think that this incident was an exception?

I have been reading and analyzing companies for the last 9 years. I can safely bet that almost 90% of the Indian companies have corporate governance issue. One has to search for companies, which are shareholder friendly. There are issues like huge cross holdings, excessive compensation, poor disclosure, diversion of surplus cash to other promoter firms and in some cases pure apathy where the management just sits on the cash and does nothing with it.

These problems are not limited to Indian managements. MNC’s are worse than Indian companies in this respect. Most MNCs have unlisted subsidiaries which are used to launch new products, whereas the listed subsidiary is allowed to just stagnate. Some of these listed subs have huge cash holdings with no clear plans for the cash. In several cases after allowing the listed sub to stagnate, the parent has come out with a buy back offer at a price which is above the quoted price (but way lower than the intrinsic value). I think that is daylight robbery.

The annual reports of most MNC subs and Indian companies are a joke. There is minimal management discussion and analysis of performance. The disclosures are limited to whatever is mandatory. In some cases the companies don’t even care to post their Annual reports and quarterly statements on their website.

I could go on and on, but the key point is that corporate governance in India is very poor. It reflects our overall psyche. People in power, be it politicians or promoters care two hoots about others. The typical promoters thinks that the company is their personal fiefdom and they treat it as such.

The difference this time around has been that Satyam was listed in the US and has large FII and foreign holdings. These investors are not as apathetic as Indian shareholders and reacted negatively to this incident.

Such corporate governance issues happen in foreign markets too. However these markets have more active investors and thriving M&A market. If the market reacts negatively to the company’s performance or its governance practices, the company is put in play. An undervalued company then becomes a target for buyout or takeover. This threat keeps the management in check.

I personally don’t expect much to change after this incident. Our security laws are weak and managements can get away with anything. There is very weak market for hostile takeovers in India and as a result even if the company is undervalued, you will not find too many takeover bids.

There are a lot of undervalued companies in India (i hold several of them). In the US, a value investor can count on a hostile takeover to eliminate the undervaluation, if the management does nothing about it. I don’t expect it to happen in India.

As an investor my approach is to identify companies, which are undervalued and are a bit shareholder friendly (or atleast are not bent on stiffing the minority shareholder). I have given less wieghtage to corporate governance and management quality in the past. Although quality of management is a subjective issue and cannot be analysed with precision, I plan to pay more attention to this factor in the future.

Now this is one cheerful post to start the new year 🙂

Lure of the long shot

L

Let me tell you a short story : There was once a smart young guy who like all of us was a charming, intelligent and hard working fellow (please replace guy with gal – for the ladies reading this blog). Now this guy, like others knew that the stock market is the place to invest your money if you want to get a good return. So he would occasionally dabble in the stock market and would make a few bucks here and there, nothing serious though.

One day our friend was relaxing at home, watching CNBC, where a smart confident looking analyst recommended the stock of a hot upcoming company (lets call the company longshot). The analyst was extremely bullish and was going ga-ga over the prospects of the company. This was a hot company in a hot sector (hot – hot !!). The company had increased its profits by 5 times in the last 3 years and was growing rapidly. The promoters were confident that sky was the limit and they would be the next infosys of their industry.

Our friend on hearing this tip was intrigued. He decided to call his friends and his broker to find out more (research !). His broker was ofcourse estactic about the company and his friend (who was a budding investor himself ) was also very positive. So having received two solid recommendations, our friend decided to invest 100000 (20% of his networth) in the company.

Fast forward 2 months : The company’s stock rose 4 times during this period. Our friend was completely delerious. He felt like a winner now. Ever since he bought this stock, he was following it closely. He would read every article on the company, every interview by the CEO. He was even participating on various stock forums where are almost everyone was more than 100% sure that the company would do very well. There were a few morons, who kept pointing to the high valuations, but then what would they know !.

The company had been reporting rising profits for the last 10 quarters and the next quarter was expected to be great. Our friend was giddy with excitement. He dreamt of the stock going up still further (everyone believed that !).

Fast forward 6 months : No one saw it coming. The company report good profits, slightly below expectations, but still good profits. The market reacted strangely to this news. The stock dropped 20% !!. Our friend was surprised. However he was re-assured by his friends and fellow investors on the stock forum that this was just a temporary reaction and the management and other analysts believed the same thing.

A few morons again pointed out that the valuation was too high, but they were abused and kicked out of the stock forum (sheesh !! what spoilsports ..our friend thought).

Fast forward 3 months : The company reported profits below forecast. They still reported a good growth, but below forecast. They however reduced the outlook for the next year as recessionary conditions had reduced the order inflow. Once this news came out the stock tanked by 50%.

Our friend was still up by 60%. However he was surprised by the sudden drop in the stock. How could the stock drop so rapidly ? He felt regret that he had not sold when the stock was at its peak. Now the stock had dropped almost 60% from that level. There was no point selling now …so he held on

Present day : The bad news kept flowing in. The stock dropped another 50% and was now below his cost. Our friend was angry with the analysts and the management who misled him. He was feeling cheated. He still visits the stock forum and is now looking for the next PRIL or L&T or infosys (or whatever you can think of)

End of story

I am currently reading a book ‘your money and your brain – the science of neuroeconomics’. It is a great book on the behavioural aspects of investing. I have not written much on emotions and behavioural aspects of investing on my blog. However I think these aspects of investing are equally if not more important than the analytical aspects.

The above story is something which a few of us have gone through or seen others go through. Some will learn the right lessons from it, whereas others will keep their head in the sand and blame others for their losses.

There are several behavioural baises in the above story which I will discuss in the rest of the post.

tendency to consider gain, but ignore the probability of gain
social proof bias
hindsight bais
commitment and consistency tendency bias
predicition bias
pattern seeking bias

Let me go through each of the above now

tendency to consider gain, but ignore the probability of gain : The book mentioned above discusses this bias in detail. I have know about this bais, but when I read about it in the book, it was like a light bulb going on. Humans have a tendency to over wiegh the gain, but tend to underwiegh the probability of gain. This tendency explains why people buy lotteries. The odds of winning the lottery are very low, but the likely gain is very high. An odd of 1 in 10 million cannot be ‘felt’. However a gain of 10 million is vivid. You can imagine all the stuff you can buy with it.

This bias explains why people go for long shots in investing even if the valuation (or odds) is high. The gain appears tangible, but the low probability does not register. This is also the reason why people are looking for the next infosys or the next L&T or PRIL etc. What most people forget is that the odds of finding one is low (would you have predicted that infosys would do as well in 1993 ? the promoters could not !). This bias explains why our friend is still looking for the next longshot.

social proof bias : If others are recommending the stock, then I must be correct. As the above book and countless other books on the same topic have stated – Humans are social creatures and like to stay with the crowd. You don’t want to stand away from the crowd and be proven wrong. Easier to buy a hot stock and be proven wrong, than buy a beaten up stock that no one likes.This bias explains why our friend felt comfortable with the company when others were recommending it.

Hindsight bais : This is the tendency to believe that you always knew the outcome after it has occurred. The book explains this bias very well. You will find a lot of pundits saying that the stock was bound to drop (or rise) after it has done so. What they don’t tell you is that they did not have this insight before the event happened. One of the key reasons for writing an investment thesis and publishing on this blog is to avoid this bais. I am no different than others and could easily fool myself that I always knew what was bound to happen.

Commitment and consistency bias : Once you make a commitment (especially public), you have tendency to be consistent with it. No one likes a person who changes his mind and is not ‘faithful’. Our friend bought the stock, committed to it and hence could not bring himself to selling it when the fundamentals turned bad. I personally try to avoid this bias by publicly not committing to buying or selling a stock on the blog. I prefer to publish the analysis and leave it to the readers to take their decision

Predicition bias – The book explains this bias in a lot of detail. Humans have a bias to predict events. If you toss coins in front them, there is an automatic tendency to predict the next toss even if they know it is random. There is a deep biological basis behind it (too lengthy for me to go into). All of us suffer from it and it seems to be a sub-conscious tendency. This bias explains why people are continously tryind predict price movements in the stock market even though they are random. This bias also explains the attraction for technical analysis.

Pattern seeking bais – This bais also has a biological basis and closely linked to the previous bais. All humans try to find patterns, even in random data. It is an inbuilt tendency and an automatic one. The book (your money and your brain) goes into detail and explains it fairly well. This bias explains why people on seeing 4 quarter of rising earnings or 3 weeks of rising prices seem to find a pattern in it and predict that the next quarter or price will be higher than the previous one. Our friend with others was suffering from the same bias and assumed blindly that the earnings and the stock price will continue to rise.

There are several other such biases which I will cover in future posts. I personally think all of us suffer from these biases (less or more) and the difference between a successful and average investor is that the successful ones are able to reduce or compensate for these baises.

These biases are not weakness. These tendencies come from the human evolution and served us well in the past and continue to do so. If some one yelled fire and everyone started running away from it, would it be smart to be a contrarian to run towards it ? The worst that can happen if you follow the crowd (social proof) is that everyone will look foolish if there was no fire. But if everyone is correct and you go against the crowd, you may pay with your life.

These biases however work against us in the financial markets. They cannot be compensated easily. I have been reading on them (see this article by charlie munger on it) for the last few years and know several times that I am operating under their influence, but can still not avoid acting otherwise. The bigger problem is when you don’t even know that you are operating under their influence and they are hurting you.

Now if believe you are above all these influences and it is others who suffer from them, then you are suffering from another bias – where almost all individuals think that they are better than the average. The book gives example of several experiments which were done to demonstarte this bias. Most investors, drivers etc feel that their skills are superior than the average (even if the evidence is to the contrary).

I personally operate with the assumption that I am influenced by all these biases and instead of ignoring them, I should be focussing my effort on reducing their impact.

A Graham style deep value stock portfolio

A

Benjamin graham is considered as the dean of value investing. Warren buffet was graham’s student and considers him as his mentor. Buffett’s followed graham’s approach to value investing in the early part of his career. However later, he expanded on graham’s approach and started focussing on the quality of the business too.

Graham’s approach is basically picking stocks which are statistically cheap. What that means is that the stock is cheap based on various quantitative measures such as mcap being less than Net current assets, or the stock is selling for less than cash on books. The disadvantage of this approach is that you may end up buying some complete dogs which are cheap for a reason. The underlying business would be going downhill and so the value is just an illusion.

Graham understood this and he circumvented it by diversifying. So the key point in building a portfolio of cheap graham style stocks is to diversify the holding. It makes sense to hold 15-20 stocks at a time and to keep selling the stocks when they reach 80-90% of intrinsic value and to replace them with other cheap issues.

With the current drop, I can see more of such opportunities coming up. The last time I saw such an opportunity was in 2002-2003 time frame.

The initial filter criteria I am using is as follows

Mcap less than 500 crs
Debt / equity ratio less than 0.5
No loss in the preceeding 5-6 years
PE less than 7
ROE atleast 8-10%

I have been developing a list of such ideas and have loaded a list of possible ideas in google groups (stock screen graham). I have holdings in HTMT global, LMW and Denso india. I am still analysing the other stocks in the list and have yet to make up my mind on them.

The key point, and I repeat, is to hold a large portfolio of these stocks via diversification. Some will turn out to be clunkers, but on an aggregate the portfolio should do well.

Now you may have a valid counterpoint – why buy this stuff when there are good companies getting cheap by the day. That is true ..but if like me you also take a long time to analyse each company, then the above mechanical approach is a quick way to assemble a decent portfolio. If you have the cash and the nerve (I could use a stronger word here 🙂 ) to invest when everyone is pessimistic, then the mechanical graham style of investing can be used to quickly assemble a decent portfolio while the opportunity lasts.

Please keep in mind that this list is just raw analysis and not a final list of stocks from which I plan to build my graham style portfolio. I will keep adding and dropping stocks and will upload the revised list when I do so.

Real estate – current reality and some thoughts

R

I had written about real estate and its valuation a year back. I would suggest reading the earlier post before proceeding on this one.

The usual approach to valuing real estate is to look at the rental yields.

Rental yield = net rental after all expenses / capital value.

Investors expect yields to be in the range of 4-6%. This equates the capital value to around 16-25 times the rentals being received on a property.

Ancedotal evidence
I have a few friends who have trying to rent out their apartments in bangalore. They are finding it diffcult to get a rent of 11000 per month on a 2 bedroom, 1200 sqft apartment. Supposedly the apartment is worth between 40-45 lacs (atleast, depending on who you ask).

So based on the valuation thumb rule, either they should get a gross rental (excluding expenses) of around 16000-20000 at a minimum or the property value should be around 25-30 lacs.

Now I can consider my 2 bedroom dinghy, a tajmahal and value it at 50 lacs, but the value has to be backed by rentals. I personally think the litmus test of property values is the rentals one can receive on it. Property values are like stock prices. They have an element of underlying value (cash flows in stocks and rentals in case of property), but at the same time there is a speculative element too. The speculative element appears as a part of the quoted price – stock price or property value.

When investors are optimistic, stock prices are bid up and when they are pessimistic they bid them down. Simple isnt it ? well almost everyone forgot this basic idea for real estate. Property prices rose 2-10 times across the country depending on the location and type of property

Is the valuation approach correct ?
Now you can say that this valuation approach is incorrect. Consider this – if I have to invest in an illiquid asset, will it not expect 14-15% returns over the long term ? So if I am getting 2-2.5% via rentals, then my property should appreciate by 12-13% p.a over the long term to get decent returns.

Well, globally over a range of markets, real estate is known to return 2-3% returns over inflation ( so around 7-8 % in case on india) over the long run.

You may argue, as several of my friends have – this time it is different. India is doing well, incomes are rising, there is limited land and huge demand etc etc. Well, to that I can say, please read the history of the real estate boom and bust in japan in late 90s, in california and florida in 80s and check what is happening in the US, dubai and other markets. Similar faulty logic was given to justify the inflated prices, till the bubble burst and prices returned to reality.

Hope and belief does not count
Investing in any asset, stock or real estate cannot be based on borrowed wisdom. If you want to make money, use common sense and read about it before taking a plunge.

Unfortunately a lot investors in the US and maybe in india got greedy and speculated in stocks, real estate and other assets in the last 2-3 years.

Real estate like any other asset is known to get overpriced from time to time. I strongly felt that the huge surge in global liquidity from 2003 drove the interest rates down in india and pushed the stock and real estate prices up.

All talk ?
You may be thinking – everyone is smart after the fact. If you were so smart, what did you do about it ?
For starters, I was not smart about it. I avoided being greedy and tried to use common sense. I personally like to run my finanical affairs with a margin of safety. For example, when buying an apartment, my primary considerations were the following

– can I afford the EMI – I tried to keep the EMI at 40% of my current gross income (not future income)
– would I be able to keep the house if the worst case scenario happened, such losing my job or loss of income.
– What would my debt equity ratio after buying the property (see this post for more details of my logic)

2003-2004 was a great time to take housing loan. Banks and HFC were giving variable rate loans at around 7.5% and fixed term loans at 7.75%. I had no idea whether the real estate prices would boom or go down. However what was obvious then, was that banks were underpricing debt. Let me explain my logic for the same

A loan by a bank is basically a product which has a cost and a profit margin for the bank.

So interest charged = bank’s profit margin + cost

Cost = interest paid by the bank + loan losses due to bad loans (typically around 1-1.2 %) + overheads (typically around 0.5%)

The interest rates paid by the bank is dependent on the inflation.

So for a 7.75% charge, the bank was assuming a cost of fund of 6% (7.75 – 1.2-0.5 %). This was too low. This is the cost at which the Indian government is barely able to borrow, much less the banks.

The subsequent events have borne out the above logic. The loan losses were underestimated by the banks and the cost of funds was underestimated too. As a result, bank have now repriced their loans and are not likely to underprice them as low as 2003-2004 time frame.

During the 2003-2004 time frame, I strongly felt that the loan rates were too low. In response to that, I refinanced my loans and increased the duration from 15 to 20 years (see an earlier post on the same). The key was to focus on what I know (loan rates were low) and avoid speculating on what I could not know (real estate prices would rise or fall)

Have I gloated enough?
The above thought process turned out to be too conservative. Others who took higher risks in 2003-2004, were rewarded handsomely. So, my decision was not some unqualified success. However I am still very happy with decision as my conservative approach has helped me in avoiding losses in the past.

Being rational and avoiding greed is like virginity. Either you have it or you don’t.

Collateral damage
Not everyone who is suffering in the US or india was greedy or speculated in real estate. Some of the buyers in the US were first time buyers who bought property as their first home at speculative prices. These people are now facing ruin due to drop in home prices. One feels sorry for them.

What does the future hold ?
I don’t know 🙂 ..what one can do is to look at history and try to learn from it. History does not always repeat, but it is good starting point. In most of the real estate bubbles, the market takes upto a decade to recover the earlier peaks.

One should also remember that real estate typically gives a few percentage points over inflation. If you speculate in an illiquid asset, by buying it on debt, you are asking for trouble.

Subscription

Enter your email address if you would like to be notified when a new post is posted:

I agree to be emailed to confirm my subscription to this list

Recent Posts

Select category to filter posts

Archives