AuthorRohit Chauhan

The curious case of runaway stocks

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I am getting frustrated these days.

I had filtered 2-3 stocks and was fairly comfortable with the business and the valuations. So after doing my slow and steady analysis (I have do my detailed analysis!!), I was ready to pull the trigger. On checking the stock price I realized that the stock had jumped 15-20% and had literally run away from me.


Multiple cases
Now, if this happened once or twice I would be fine. However there seem to be too many value investors out there now :). For some reason, a lot of undervaluation is getting corrected across a wide variety of stocks. There have been phases in the market such as in 2007-2008, when real estate or some other sector was hot and people like me could find nice and cheap stocks in the
mid-cap, IT or pharma space. No such luxuries now !

Some examples
Well, I am not going to let the analysis go waste. So let me list the stocks I came close to buying and then missed. These stocks are in my list and I could buy some in the future if the price is right and the fundamentals still good, but for now its wait and watch

Hawkins cooker – This is one of the first runaway stocks for me. The company is in a duopoly kind of a market for branded cookers. It is also into cookware products. It is fundamentally a strong company, with high ROE, decent growth and a strong balance sheet. The Company has decent competitive advantage via brands, extensive distribution network in its niche and has improved its performance too in the last few years.

I was asked about this stock by prabhakar kudva and found it to be a sound stock. The stock was selling at around 20-30% discount to its fair value then (my estimates) and as result I did not create a postion. The stock has since then gone up by 50%. I do not regret ‘not’ buying this stock as much as it was not cheap enough for me. Ofcourse the counter point can be that my estimates were too conservative.

Mangalam cement – I analysed the company here and placed an order at around 130 levels. I don’t recall the exact price, but my order did not get filled due to a 2-3 re difference. It now gets interesting! I got anchored to this price of 130 and wanted to buy the stock at a discount of 40% to my estimate of fair value.
The market had other plans and the stock suddenly jumped by 8-9% and it now trades in the 160-170 range which is not a price at which I would create a position in this stock

Amrutanjan – The company is a 100 yr FMCG company in the business of headache balms, cold rubs etc. The company has a strong balance sheet, with almost 70 crs of cash and investmentd. The company has an ROE on invested capital of around – 30%+ and competitive advantage from the brands and distribution network .

The company recently sold off some excess property and has been using the cash to do a buyback and also gave a special dividend. Overall the company has good fundamentals, strong competitive advantage and the management is allocating capital well. Finally the company was available at a PE of 8 (excluding cash) a month back. This was decent stock to buy, but I missed the boat on this one too.

So whats the point ?
Is it a case of sour grapes or a case of wanting cry in public for missing such nice opportunities to make money 🙂 ?


I do my weeping in private :). The point is this – This risk is not missing these stocks. I am likely to miss such ideas during bull markets as the window of undervaluation closes quickly. The bigger risk is a change in my thought process.

I find myself getting impatient now, once I find a half attractive idea. In past when there was no risk of such stocks running away from me, I would analyse the company in detail and take weeks on end before making a decision. Now due to the above risk, I have done superficial analysis in some cases and later found that I missed some risks in the company. I have been lucky till date that I have not shot myself in the foot due to my impatience, but will have to be more careful in the future.

It is better to commit an error of omission than an error of commission (miss on a good stock than buy a lousy one).

A follow up on sulzer

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A disclosure first – This idea was originally brought to me by ninad during our discussions and I have been analyzing it with ninad and arpit since then. Its amazing how soon one forgets the source of an idea, especially a successful one 🙂

Since my last post on sulzer, the price has corrected to around 1200 levels and is steady at this level. This is roughly around 85-90% of my estimate of fair value. I am now planning to exit this stock over the next few weeks.

The delisting process would take a few months and I plan to keep a track of the stock. If the price drops or some new information comes up to indicate a higher price for delisting, I may initiate a new position.

The returns ofcourse would be 8-10% at best, as the major gains are generally made at the time of the announcement. However an 8-10% gain over a period of 2-3 months is not a bad deal and actually fairly good from an arbitrage point of view. So stay tuned!

On options trade
I have received several responses via comments and emails. The key point of the post is a focus on risk. The most critical aspect when dealing with options to understand and manage risk. I am looking at two ways of doing so

Position size – I have created a small position as I am still a novice in options. If I lose money, it will sting me but not kill me. On the other hand a gain would pay for my coffee for a month – I have expensive tastes !

Focus on downside – My focus has been on much I can lose. One of the reason to post was to hear from other readers on the likely risks in this approach. If you feel that risks which I have not considered in the post, please leave me a comment or drop me an email at rohitc99@indiatimes.com.

Selling covered calls – An options approach

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Some of you, on reading the title must be wondering – Rohit is again on his options trip ! this dude is going to get kicked big time, one of these days 🙂

Well, in the spirit of learning and experimenting lets look at an options strategy, that I think marries the value investing approach with options quite well.

What are covered calls?
You can read about call options here. Selling covered calls mean selling a call option in the market while holding the underlying stock. Selling a call option without holding the underlying stock is naked selling (no its not selling without wearing your clothes :), but you could lose them if the naked selling bet goes wrong).

How does it work with value investing ?
The logic is as follows – Suppose you hold a stock which is a mid to long term holding. Lets say you bought the stock for 60 Rs and think the fair value is 100. Now let’s assume that the stock is selling for 95 and you plan to start exiting at 100-105 as you really do not want to hold above fair value. In such as case, one can sell a call on the stock for a strike price above the current quote, say around 110-115.

If the stock continues to climb, the call will get exercised and you will get the 110 exercise price + the premium amount. If the stock drops back and if you had planned to hold on to the stock for the long term as long as the price was below fair value and the fundamentals are good, then you pocket the premium and continue holding the stock.

An example
Lets take the example of a favorite of mine – Infosys technologies. My own estimates of fair value for the stock are around 2700-3000. The stock is currently selling for around 2700 which is close to fair value.

The first option for me is to sell the stock once the price crosses 2700 and be done with it. The other option is to start selling covered calls with a strike price of 3000 or higher. If the stock keeps rising and the call gets exercised, then I will end up exiting at 3000 + premium as planned. On the contrary if the stock drops from here, I can pocket the premium for free. The flip slide is that I will lose money on the stock as it drops.

The risks
If someone ever tells you that there is no risk in an investing strategy, ask him what he is smoking or drinking.

There are several risks in the above plan and it works only for a very specific situation. I would sell a covered call on a stock which I think is selling close to fair value and I would not mind holding it if it dropped below this price – the second part of the statement being the key. As a corollary, the reason I would not mind holding if the price dropped is because I think the company will continue to do well and will increase its intrinsic value at a good rate.

A valid question would be – why not sell and move on? . One reason for trying this approach is plain experimentation – with limited amounts of the stock. The second reason is that I would continue to hold on to the stock for the long term as the company is still doing fine and selling covered calls increases my returns. At the same time if the stock gets too overvalued, I would exit it by selling via the covered call.

If you do not want to hold the stock for the long term and would regret holding it if the price drops, then one should just sell the stock and move on. In summary this is a strategy of trying to be a bit too clever and squeezing out a few percentage points of returns.

As an aside which options should one sell in this case ? – I would prefer to sell the ones with the longest duration (May 2010 exercise) as I would also benefit from the
time decay and the premium is also worth the effort.

A delisting idea – Sulzer india

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I had analyzed sulzer here. I had written the following

Sulzer has tried to delist the company in the past and current holds 80% of the stock. I will have to stretch my imagination on the point, that the company will suddenly start looking at improving the returns for the minority shareholder. In such a scenario, it is quite difficult to put an appropriate number on the intrinsic or fair value of the company.

Well, one part of the comment came through – the company
announced delisting yesterday. I had also written that it is difficult to put an appropriate number on the fair value. That did not stop me from evaluating the stock. I have uploaded a detailed analysis here.

I typically use this spreadsheet to do a detailed analysis of a company to ensure that I am evaluating the company from all aspects (I need to get a life !!)

My fair value estimate of the company is between 1250-1300 and it remains to be seen if the stock will appreciate still further in response to the delisting offer. You can read the guest post by ninad on the delisting framework here.

I have been building a position in this stock for quite some time now and have built a 60% position ( I am too slow !!). I am definitely pleased with this outcome. The stock however is now a delisting play and my approach will be different. It is likely I may exit the stock if the price approaches my estimate of fair value

An offer to my broker
I recently opened a new account and have a new broker. The broker is quite good and provides me good service. To appreciate the business he gets, he has been sending me 4 line stock recommendations. For ex: One of the recent recommendations was Tata motors.

I could not believe that someone would buy a stock based on a 4 line recommendation – apparently quite a few do. I think people do more research when buying a pressure cooker than a stock !

My offer to my broker is (in jest) – if you don’t give me advise and don’t send me recommendations, I will give you 1% extra commission on my trades

Company analysis – Sesa goa ltd

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About
Sesa goa ltd is the largest private sector iron ore producer and exporter. It has access to 240 Million Mt of ore with mines in Goa, Karnataka and Orissa. The company achieved a turnover of around 5221 crs in 2009 with a net profit of 2710 Crs. The company exports almost 85% of its production to china

The company has three divisions with Iron ore accounting for 85% of the revenue, Pig iron representing forward integration represents 12% of the revenue and rest is accounted by Metallurgical coke. The company is principally a mining operations and logistics company.

Financials
The company achieved a topline growth of 30% and a profit growth of around 16% in 2009 inspite of the severe recession in Q3 and Q4 of the financial year. The company was able to achieve this performance due to the increase in volumes and pickup in demand in china, which account for 84% of its total volume.
The company has around 4000 crs in cash and equivalents on an asset base of 4800 crs. This translates to a stated ROE of 60% and 300% on the invested capital.
The company has a 10 year topline growth of almost 35% per annum, with majority of the growth coming in the later years. The net profit has grown by an even higher rate, with the last 5 year CAGR coming to around 33%.

Positives
The company has clearly been able to manage the business well during the downturn. It has been able to keep costs under control and maintain its profit levels. The company has a very strong balance sheet with a lot of surplus cash to re-invest in the business.
In addition, over a 10 year period the company has become fairly efficient and profitable. The net profit margins are close to 50% as the mines are owned by the company and the business enjoys considerable operating leverage (overheads do not increase in proportion to volumes).

Risks
China accounts for almost 84% of the total demand for the company. China currently accounts for almost 40%+ global steel production and hence the demand supply situation in china will have huge impact on the fortunes of the company.
In addition, iron ore export is a sensitive topic and the government can and has imposed export tariffs to favor the domestic steel industry. This can impact the net profit levels of the industry and the company in particular.
Finally, the company at the current rate of production (without growth) will exhaust the reserves in around 16 years. As a result the company needs to constantly explore and add to existing reserves on an ongoing basis. The cash on the books is not really free cash as it will be required to sustain the business in the future.

Management quality checklist
– Management compensation – Fairly low, based on the size of the company. Good for the shareholders.
– Capital allocation record – This is difficult to evaluate as the company has kept the dividend low and retained most of the profits which is now held as cash and equivalents. It remains to be seen how the capital will be deployed. The management has stated that the intention is to acquire mining assets with the excess capital.
– Shareholder communication – The shareholder communication is actually quite good. I have rarely seen Indian companies (outside of some IT companies) discuss their operations with honesty and detail. The company has actually detailed all the risks to the business quite clearly and with complete honesty.
– Accounting practice – appears conservative.
– Conflict of interest – doesn’t look like conflict of interest, but a 1000 Cr intercompany deposit with a fellow subsidiary is not something good over time.
– Performance track record – good in terms of operational performance. Capital allocation (investing the surplus cash) performance needs to be seen.

Valuation
Sesa goa is a mining company and it would be silly to value this company using a PE approach or Discounted cash flow. I have seen valuations where the company is said to be cheap as it sells at a PE of 13-14. That is stupid. The simplified equation should be
Company value = value of current reserves + future value from reserves to be added.
The company achieved a profit of around 130 crs per Million MT of ore . As the existing reserves are around 240 Mn MT, the asset/ cash value of the company is around 19000 crs (if the company were to develop no new reserves). This is the current cash or baseline valuation of the company. If the company sells below this price, it’s a bargain as it was in early 2009.
The company currently sells for 30000 crs which includes the value the company will generate through additions to its reserves and new mines. I need to evaluate the average reserve additions over the years to get a sense of the company’s capability to add to its reserves.
My current thought is that the company seems to be fairly valued till I can get a better sense of how the reserve addition will work out in the future.

Conclusion
The company is performing fairly well and has a strong balance sheet to support additions to ore reserves. At the current price however the company does not look undervalued to me. In addition there was a recent FCCB conversion which has added to around 3% to the equity base. Finally there seems to be some fraud investigation going on regarding the company. I have not been able to find much in terms of details and not sure how it impacts the company.
The company was bargain at any price below 200.

The art of not investing

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You have a lot of cash burning in the pocket and are looking for an opportunity to invest. An old time favorite is now selling for cheap. All and sundry feel that the company is undervalued especially if a series of ifs and buts get resolved. You look at the annual report of the company and it appears cheap by historical standards. Feeling confident, you go ahead and put in a decent amount of money.

Smart decision? maybe, but then maybe not.

Looking forward
Although no one can predict the future, it is an unfortunate reality of the stock market that stocks are priced based on the expected future of the company. I am using the word ‘expected’ as no one knows for sure. If someone claims that they are a 100% confident, then either the person is a complete moron or trying to sell you something.

If you are in the business of stock recommendations and tips, appearing anything but 100% confident is professional suicide. So I would blame the investor more for the garbage sold in the market than the seller. Do you really think all this junk would sell if there was no demand? anyway I digress.

So if one cannot predict the future, how does one invest? There is no surefire approach, though one can improve the chances of success by picking a company in stable industry. If the industry is fairly stable and not undergoing too much change, it possible to guess (all investing is finally a guess ..sometimes a good one or sometimes bad) with reasonable accuracy on how the company will do in the next 3-5 years.

An example
Let’s consider two companies. I am comparing these companies not from a valuation or investing standpoint, but purely trying to contrast their business performance. Stock performance in the short term is a different issue.

Let’s take the example of Gujarat Ambuja and Bharti airtel.
Gujarat ambuja is in the business of manufacturing and selling cement. It has grown at an average CAGR of 13-15%, maintained a net margin of 15% and an ROE in excess of 25%. It is not possible to know the exact profit or sales (many try that though) for the next 2-3 years, but looking at the business and the economics one can make a fair guess that business could clock 5%+ growth and 15% ROE for the next few years. Anything can happen, but the probability of the business achieving these numbers is high.

Bharti telecom is a telecom service provider, which has done extremely well over the last few years. The company has grown the topline at 30%+ and profit at 45% per annum for the last 5 years. The company has maintained an ROE in excess of 25%. These kind of numbers would warrant a PE in excess of 20. However the market is currently assigning a PE of 11 which values it as a commodity business. So is the market wrong? Some would say so looking at the past performance.

However there are certain structural changes and realities in the telecom industry

1. The industry has been witnessing severe price competition for sometime now. All the other companies other than bharti do not have great fundamentals (please look at the complete financial statement for all these companies and not the P&L account alone to understand what I am saying)

2. The industry has faced a lot of change in the past and will do so in the future. Do you really think anyone can be sure how the industry will look like in the next 5 years? What will be the technological changes, new entrants, government regulations etc?

3. Bharti is now expanding internationally via the Zain acquisition. They are looking at additional acquisitions too. All this activity at the very least introduces more uncertainty into the equation.

The reason I have taken the example of bharti and ambuja cement is because I have analyzed both the companies in the past and gave a pass to both for different reasons. Ambuja cement was not cheap enough for me.

In case of bharti, if i was looking at the just the past data, it would be an incredible buy. However as I said earlier, investing and valuation requires looking ahead and in case of bharti my crystal ball is completely cloudy. It may be my own limitations, but that is precisely the point. If one does not have the confidence of being able to assess the long term economics of a company and its industry, then one should give the stock a pass. The last thing one should do is depend on someone else’s analysis to make a decision.

There is no penalty for missing on a stock idea – there are 5000 public companies and a decent portfolio requires 15-20 stocks at the most. I see no point in buying something where there are too many unknowns and I am not confident on how it will all work out.

Whats on my mind – Feb 10

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I wrote a post in Nov 09 discussing some general topics such as dollar depreciation, auto sector etc. I also promised a monthly post, which I have not done for the last two months. Maybe my mind went blank for the last two months 🙂

Dollar depreciation
Predicting the demise of the dollar is an industry in itself. I wrote about it in November and think the long term direction for the dollar may be down. However there is a catch in this thinking – down against what?. Currency values are relative. The dollar could go down against the rupee, but appreciate against the Euro (as it is happening now due to the Greece debt crisis).

One has to be careful in making such open ended comments. However as this a personal blog, and no one will hold me accountable for it, I can write what I think :). Heck, others get paid for writing the same crap and are still not accountable for the stuff they write !.

So let’s see where the dollar goes in the next few years. My investing decision are rarely top down and I have not factored the dollar depreciation, central govt budget, the infrastructure boom in india or the mating habits of the kangaroo in my portfolio decisions. I will let the smarter folks do that ..for me the equation will remain the simple ..buy below fair value and sell when the price exceeds it. It has worked in the past and most likely to work in the future.

Stock ideas
A lot of work is going on here, but as of yet there is no output. The key is to keep analyzing companies, understand their economics and estimate the fair value. If the price is not right, then it makes sense to just wait for it to come to you. I don’t think cash has ever burnt a hole in my pocket and sometimes doing nothing is a good choice too.
As of now I am analyzing graphite india. I came close to pulling the trigger on Mangalam cement, but the price suddenly spiked , before I could start my buying.

Quarterly results
I have completed the quarterly result review of all my holdings and published
a few here. In general, the results are as expected and as a result my estimate of intrinsic value has remained more or less the same for most of the companies.

In the case of BEL (bharat electronics), I have been surprised by the improvement in the performance. I had a major concern about BEL. The business had become extremely skewed by 2008, where in almost 80% of the profit was booked in the last quarter of the year. This is generally not good as it results in a sales push in the last quarter to meet the numbers and as expected, the accounts receivables started going up.

BEL has since then reduced the skew considerably and has improved its cash flow position. I have increased the fair value of the company by around 15-20%.

Waiting for a crash ?
I think this year will require more effort in generating decent returns. 2008-2009 was a test of guts. If one had the guts or the foresight (depending on how you look at it) to invest a bunch of cash in early 2009, one would have made a great return by now. However the common mistake a lot of investors do is to wait for history to repeat itself. I can bet there are quite a few investors waiting for the next crash to happen.

It may happen, who knows ? I am however not basing my decision on such hopes. Investing has to be done based on what we know now, not what may happen or wish will happen. The best preparation one can do for a crash is to be mentally prepared and have some spare cash lying around.

Working on mental blocks
It have started looking at the various mental blocks I have and am currently working on eliminating them. One mental block I have is an aversion to commodity companies (not banks as some readers think). I am currently reading and analyzing such companies – steel, cement, metals etc in more detail and working out the fair value of such companies.

At the current prices, I don’t find any of them attractive. I have developed a spreadsheet where I analyze and record the fair value of each of these companies and track it with the market price. When the price drops below a certain level, I will start building a position. So it’s a wait and watch mode for most of these companies as of now.

I do not have mental block against options and derivatives. I only have a different opinion of these instruments. These instruments in the hands of a new investor is like a blade in the hands of a monkey – most likely the monkey will hurt himself.

If you are wondering, I belong to the same monkey class and hence other than some small positions, I have yet to go whole hog on these instruments. My plan is to learn more of these instruments, start small and then increase my commitment over time. If this monkey is going to get cut, it’s likely to be a small razor blade and not a 2 feet sword 🙂

Special opportunity framework

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Following is a guest post from ninad kunder. I have been working with ninad and arpit on arbitrage deals for some time and we exchange notes and ideas. In the post below ninad has explained the framework we follow for an arbitrage or a special situation.

In addition, I have upoaded a template which I use to track such opportunities (look for file – arbitrage delisting template).
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My friend Rohit had in his earlier posts detailed out the Elantas Beck opportunity and the various milestones associated with the special situation opportunity.

The objective of this post, taking the example of Elantas Beck, is to list down the framework (in our limited intelligence 🙂 for managing a special situation opportunity and the thought process associated with it.
Before I run thru the framework and the thought process, let me just run thru a brief background about Elantas Beck.

About Elantas Beck
Elantas Beck is the subsidiary of Altana AG which is a specialty chemical major based out of Germany with operations spread across the world. Altana historically had a pharma business and a specialty chemical business. The company divested its pharma business and transformed itself into its current form.

Altana has four key divisions
1) ECKART
2) BYK
3) ACTEGA
4) ELANTAS

Elantas beck India is a 88% owned subsidiary of Altana and is aligned to the Elantas division globally. The other divisions at present have a marginal presence in the Indian market.

Process Framework
In any delisting opportunity and the same framework can broadly be applied across other special opportunities, there are 3 risk points in the transaction
1) Time Risk
2) Price Risk
3) Deal Risk

Let me address each of these risks with respect to the Elantas opportunity.

1) Time Risk
In any arbitrage opportunity even though the deal might go thru and at the price that we had defined, there could always be time delay involved in the deal which will shave off potential returns. This is especially true in the Indian context when there are court approvals required in certain special situation opportunities like mergers.
In the Elantas beck deal time risk was eliminated by constantly monitoring the milestones achieved in the deal. The entry point was timed only post the shareholder approval and once the company had filed with the BSE for the delisting process.

2) Price Risk – There were 2-3 ways to handle price risk in this transaction. This of course would be different for every transaction.

a) Valuation – As Rohit pointed out step 1 was to ascertain the fundamentals of the company and Rohit & Arpit (They are good at this :-)) arrived at a fair value of Rs 600 for the Elantas stock.

b) Ability / Inclination of the parent company -The interesting point is that the largest shareholder of Altana is taking Altana private and Elantas was the only listed subsidiary in the world. Market cap of elantas was 360 crores. So the parent would have had to cough up about 40-50 crores to do the delisting. It wouldn’t have been a big amount considering their balance sheet and 15-20% more wouldn’t have been difficult to stretch. Also having run their global balance sheet and other communication, it was clear that India was a high focus area for Altana and the other divisions were waiting to enter the country.

c) Expectation of market participants – When the delisting was announced ICICI emerging star had about 2.25% stake of the 11.5% public holding. They exited at around the 460-470 mark post the delisting announcement. So market participants who bought that 2.25% holding, at that price clearly bought it with an intent to tender it at a higher price in the delisting process.
Factoring in all the above variables Rs 600 was a reasonable estimate that was arrived for the delisting price.

3) Deal Risk – which brings us to the most imp variable in this transaction. We saw a high deal risk because of the dispersed nature of shareholding and out of the 8 lac outstanding shares there were 2 lac shares in the physical form. Though the current SEBI amendment has allowed physical holders to tender in the delisting process, we saw not too many shares getting tendered on this front.

Factoring in a high deal risk we defined 2 clear exit points which ever came earlier.
1) Price point – 520-525 levels (my comment: take advantage of the 10-15% pop in the prices)
2) Time point – Exit midway thru the book building process.

The call was clear not to wait till the reverse book building process closes and take whatever money was available on the table and not live with the deal risk. There is of course the behavioral angle to the transaction where the dopamine kicks in when one is actually in the thick of action and tends to not necessarily follow what was defined at the start of the transaction :-).

Quarterly result review

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Lakshmi machine works
LMW reported
Q3 results recently and overall the result are as expected. I have analysed the company earlier here . The company had a terrible 2009 and reported an almost 60% drop in profits. This was expected in view the recession in all the developed countries.
The topline growth and the profits have now started recovering and are back to around 50-60% of the pre-crisis levels at around 30 crs per quarter. It will ofcourse take a longer period (I don’t know how long) to reach the pre-crisis levels and surpass it. Overall the company is performing as I thought it would.

You can find the detailed analysis here – look for the file valuationtemplatelmw.xls. Finally, I think the intrinsic or fair value of the company has remained unchanged.

IT results – Infosys, NIIT tech and Patni
I have a holding in all of the above companies, though I have been cutting the position size for some time now. Most of the IT companies have declared their Q3 results and it has been mixed bag overall. I am reviewing the result for the three companies I hold.

Infosys had a small drop in the topline (1%) and and similar drop in the bottom line. They have reported a small (around 8%) growth in the net profit for the first 9 months of the year. The company has almost 13000 crs of cash on the books and continues to earn a high return on equity and a much higher return on tangible capital (building , receivables etc). The company has given a guidance of a small growth for the rest of the year and has yet to give a guidance for 2010. The stock price currently is discounting some growth for the next few years. My own estimate of fair value is around 2600-2800 and hence I have been reducing my position in the stock.

NIIT tech reported a 7% drop in topline on YOY basis and 2% increase on QoQ basis. The net profit went up by 10% on QoQ basis and doubled on an annual basis. The increase has been mainly due to reduction of the hedge losses. If one were to eliminate the impact of the hedges on topline and bottom line, the revenue and net profit are more or less flat. The company has reduced the impact of the hedges on the balance sheet and in the investor call have indicated that they will keep a limited currency hedge going forward – some return of common sense there. The company expects moderate growth going forward. I have also revised the fair value of the stock upwards by around 10%. My personal estimate of fair value for the stock is around 240 rs.

Patni reported results which are in line with that of the industry. It reported a 3.3% growth in topline on QoQ basis and a 8.9% drop on Yoy. The net profit dropped by 17.2 % on YoY and now stands at around 171 crs. The company should be able to deliver to deliver around 500 crs in terms of net profit in 2009 and carry around 2000 crs of cash on the books by the year end. The company also completed a successful buyback during the early part of 2009 at an attractive price. The company results are not great, but more or less in line with the industry and as per expectations. I have revised the fair value of the company upwards by around 5%. My personal estimate of fair value for the stock is around 530.

I think on an overall basis, the IT companies I hold have performed as per expectations. In addition, they are now showing signs of growth for 2010. At the same time the valuation of these companies reflects that and more. As a result the stock price for most of these companies is now much closer to the fair value and I have started reducing my position size as the prices keep rising.

Container corporation of India (CONCOR)
The company reported a 5% growth in topline in the current quarter and a flat bottom line. The company has achieved a 10% growth in topline for the first 9 months and 5% drop in the profit for the same period. The company has two business segments – exports and domestic. The company provides containerized transport for exported goods, mainly out of ports and also provides for domestic transport of goods, mainly through rail services. As expected the export part of the business has shown a drop in profitability due to the slow down. The company has been able to reduce the impact by improving the performance of the domestic business.

CONCOR is a great business with enormous competitive advantage, conservative and good management and good growth opportunities. The company should start growing again once the export business recovers. The company however is not cheap and sells close to its fair value.

Additional note : I am not buying any of the companies reviewed in the post. If however the stock price keeps rising, I may start reducing my positions further.

Clarifications on previous post

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The special situation discussed in the previous post was a delisting announcement by Elantas beck. The plan was to benefit from the price appreciation between the deal announcement and the actual delisting.

A few Comments and some emails on the previous post made me realize that understanding delisting norms is really not everyone’s idea of fun. So let me try to explain it in brief (while omitting some details)

If you hear a thud sound while reading this post, it is likely you have fallen asleep and hit your keyboard while reading this post 🙂

Delisting process
You can find the delisting norms here. In brief, the rules for delisting apply when a company wants to delist all its shares from the exchanges (i.e go private with no public shareholding). It needs to go through a prescribed process which can be described in short as follows

1. Board approves delisting
2. Company seeks shareholder approval for delisting the shares. For the delisting to be successful, the company has to buyback atleast 50% of the publicly held shares. So if the public holding is 11.5 % (as in case of elantas), then the minimum buyback has to be 5.75% of the total shares for the company to delist from the exchange.
3. Shareholders approve the buyback.
4. The company launches reverse book building to discover the price at which it can buy 50% of the outstanding shares. The shareholders tender their shares to the company at their desired price. If the company finds that more than the outstanding number of shares have been tendered and the price for the 50% of the shares tendered is within their target price, then they can declare the offer successful. The company is then obliged to buy all the shares that have been tendered at or below the declared price.

Let’s try to understand this with an example. For simplicity, let look at the case of elantas beck.

Elantas announced a delisting and the share price jumped from 250 levels to around 450 levels in response to it. Finally the company announced on 7-dec, that the board has approved a buyback with a floor price of 219 which is the minimum price based on the delisting norms. In addition the board approved a price of 330 as the offer price. This would be the minimum price paid to the shareholders, if the discovered price turns out to be at or lower than 330 during the reverse book building process.

The price was steady around 470-480 levels and as the reverse book building date approached, it crept upto around 500 levels. Finally after the first two days into the book building process, only .5% of the shares had been tendered and the price in the open market was around 525. As the probability of the success of the offer was low, I exited the stock completely booking around 7-8% gain over the deal.

At the end of the tendering period (around 6-7 days), the company received about 25-30% of the outstanding shares and hence irrespective of the price tendered (which ranged from 210-1100), the offer was not successful (as less than 50% of the shares had been tendered).

About the company
It is not crucial to know about the company in detail in an arbitrage or special situation such as delisting. However when analyzing such a deal, it is important to have a look at the fundamentals of the company and evaluate if the company is overvalued by a large margin at the current price.
Elantas beck is into specialty chemicals for insulation and construction industry. It has performed well in the last few years with an ROE in excess of 20%, zero debt and a 10% growth in bottom line. The company has cash equivalents of around 35 crs which is almost 10% of the market cap. At the time of delisting the company was selling at around 16-17 times earnings which is right around fair value of the company.
If the valuation at the time of the announcement is high, the downside risk of the deal is high if it fails.

The calculations
The matrix in the previous post is the expected value analysis. The formulae for expected value is gain*probability of gain+loss*probability of loss.

I estimated that the delisting price would be around 580-600 and hence there was an upside of around 100 Rs. On the downside I expected the price to drop to around 360-370 levels and hence a possible loss of around 110-120 Rs. The probability estimates for each of the events was a subjective number and it depends on one’s experience and guess.

All this work for a measly 7%?
The return was around 7% for 1.5 months, which works out to 56% annualized. My return expectations are 20% per annum from arbitrage over the course of the next few years. There will be some deals which will work out well and some where I will lose money. In aggregate i am targeting 20% or more. I don’t expect too much from myself 🙂

The advantage of arbitrage is that the returns are not correlated to market returns. If you can evaluate the deals well, the returns are independent of the market. This helps in reducing the volatility of the portfolio and it is always a better to have an additional tool to invest and make decent returns.

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