Analysis : Maharashtra seamless
About
Maharashtra seamless is in the business of seamless and ERW steel pipes. These steel pipes are made from steel billets and HR coils respectively.
Seamless pipes are used mainly in the oil and gas and other such industries where there is a need to carry fluid under high pressure application. ERW pipes which have a higher diameter are also used in the same industry, in water distribution and other applications in airports, malls and other civic locations.
The company now has a capacity of around 550000 MT in seamless pipes and produced around 220000 MT. In addition the company has a capacity of around 200000 MT of ERW pipes and produced around 115000 MT.
The company is a certified supplier to several prominent O&G companies such as ONGC, Oil india and GAIL and other companies such as SAIL, NTPC etc. In addition the company is also an approved supplier to several global O&G companies such as Chevron, Saudi aramco and occidental oman etc. The company has benefited from the imposition of anti-dumping duties on seamless pipes from china, due to which its products have become competitive in various foreign markets.
Financials
The company has increased its revenue from around 383 Crs in 2003 to 1760 Crs in 2011 with an annual growth of around 18% per annum. The topline growth has however slowed from 2007 onwards. The net profit has grown at a CAGR of around 20% from around 62 Crs in 2003 to around 346 Crs in 2011 (excluding other income).
The net profits have grown at a higher rate than the topline due to improvement in margins. The net margins have mainly improved due to reduction in overhead expenses as % of sales.
The company has paid off its debt completely and now has a surplus of around 700 Crs on the balance sheet. The company raised around 300 Crs of capital via FCCB in 2005 for expansion which was converted to equity in 2006. This capital has however not been utilized as the company has been able to generate sufficient capital from operations to fund its capex, pay off debt and maintain its dividend.
Positives
The company has been able to maintain an ROE in excess of 25% for the last 8-9%. To get the true picture of the core business ROE, one needs to adjust for the excess cash and revaluation of fixed assets. The ROE numbers have dropped in 2011 mainly due to revaluation of fixed assets which caused the networth numbers to go up by almost 67% in one year.
The company has been able to maintain a reasonable growth in topline which has however slowed down in the recent past. In addition the company has been able to improve its margins from 12-13% levels to around 16% levels. It remains to be seen if this level of margin will be maintained.
The company has been able to pay off its entire debt and has close to 700 Crs excess capital on the balance sheet. The company has imported a plant from Romania for seamless pipes which it is installing near its current facility. This new plant will take the capacity up from 350000 to 550000 MT. In addition the company is also going in for backward expansion in steel billets which is a key RM for the seamless pipe (remains to be seen if the expansion is a good move). The company can easily meet all its expansion plans with the excess capital on the books.
Risks
The company sells a product which is a commodity product. The company has been able to maintain its gross margins inspite of fluctuation in steel prices which account for more than 60% of the total cost. It remains to be seen if the company will be able to maintain these margins in a slower growth/ higher competition environment (where other companies are expanding capacity too).
The company has managed the liability side of the balance sheet quite poorly. The company raised around 300+ crs in FCCB in 2005-06 which been idle since then. This is expensive capital which has been lying on the books and earning low rates of return. This excess capital has depressed the return numbers for the company.
Next post: Competitive analysis of the company, management review, valuation and final conclusion.
Paying more for quality
As part of my paid subscription, I recently added a stock in the portfolio. I bought this company at around 16 times earnings and as I am constantly preaching about buying stocks on the cheap, it must have surprised a few subscribers.
A good friend of mine wrote to me and we exchanged a few emails where I shared my thinking behind this pick. I have lightly edited the conversation and added some additional commentary to detail out my thought process. Think of this post as a continuation of the previous post on value traps.
Hi Rohit,
What is the reasoning behind buying XXX? The stock already is trading at P/E of 23+. Also they don’t seem to be in a market where they have monopoly.
Bye,
Kedar
Hi kedar
Because i like the company 🙂 and it will look good in the portfolio
Jokes apart, the company on a consolidated basis is selling for around 16-17 times earnings and earns 60%+ return on capital. In addition the company has been growing at 15%+ (slowed down lately a bit) and expanding globally and in India too.
The company is also making small acquisitions to add to the product/ technology portfolio and is planning to spend 3%+ on R&D in the future. Finally the company has an associate company at book value for 250 crs on the balance sheet, which is worth much more than that.
All in all a good business with good competitive advantage, but it is not cheap.
Hi Rohit,
The business may be good but if the market price is close to fair value, why will you buy it. I have not seen you buying stocks unless the market value is at least at 40% discount to fair value.
regards
Kedar
Hi kedar
It is not really selling at fair value …still a 25-30% discount. There is a key difference in the approach here. I am paying up for quality here.
One approach is to buy at a 50% discount for a decent business and wait for the gap to close…like seamec which is cheap and the returns will come when the PE re-rating happens. As the fair value is increasing slowly, the stock price will rise slowly after that. In all such cases we have the re-investment risk – what to do with the money once the company sells at fair value?
The other approach is to buy a good business which is selling at a smaller discount, but at the same time is also growing its intrinsic value – think LMW, gujarat gas, crisil etc. These are high quality businesses which will increase fair value at a decent rate – call these steady compounders.
In such cases you can get a step jump due to re-rating of the PE as the market recognizes the quality of the business. At the same time as the fair value is growing at a fair clip, one can hold onto the stock and get above average returns from the rise in fair value. This increase will not happen in a nice smooth upward trend, but over time it works out pretty well.
The best situation will be to buy these companies at a discount ..isnt it ? but that is not likely to happen very often ..unless there is a crisis in the market like 2008, but then we have to wait forever for that.
I have been thinking on these lines for some time and have always invested this way (Crisil, LMW etc are in that bucket) , just now doing more explicitly with the new picks.
A personal experiment
My drift towards higher quality companies has not been a sudden one. I still cannot resist a cheap stock :).
I have maintained a dual portfolio for sometime now. The main portfolio has carried my high conviction bets with sizeable positions in each of the idea. At the same time, i have maintained a smaller portfolio of cheap, unloved stocks such as ultramarine pigments, Denso india etc.
The results, as expected have been mixed. A few companies such as Denso india gave high returns, but others such as ultramine pigments have dissapointed. In the final analysis, the main portfolio has beaten the cheap , graham style portfolio by a wide margin.
I will continue to opportunistically pick the cheap and unloved stocks, but at the same time i am more comfortable now with quality stocks and paying up for it. It is one thing to read about it and something else to arrive at a conclusion based on personal experiences. The latter remains with you much longer.
The anatomy of value traps
The number one problem faced by value investors is not a big permanent loss of capital, due to overpayment for growth, but the weak and anemic return from an average business bought at a cheap price.
Let me explain further –
A typical value investor (who are far and few anyway) generally tend to be conservative in paying up for a business. The deep value types go for the really cheap stocks (as measured by low PE or P/B ratios), whereas the others would pay up a bit for the quality of the stock and growth, but not too much.
A deep value investor typically looks for a company which is selling in low single digit PE ratios and in some cases if you back out the cash or other assets on the balance sheet, the core business could be available for almost nothing.
What is a value trap?
The problem with most of these investments is that the underlying business is stagnant with a comatose management who is not interested in either growing the business or ready to return the excess cash to the shareholder. In such cases, the market discounts this cash heavily and refuses to bid up the stock price.
Let me a give a personal example – Kothari products. You can read my earlier posts on this company here and here
Let’s look at the price history for the company below
As you can see, that the stock has gone nowhere in the last 5 years. If one includes dividends then, the return comes to around 15% for the entire 5 year duration. The index during this period has more than doubled.
Even a savings account would have done better!!
What are the key causes?
There are several causes for such value traps. The primary cause is a stagnant or declining business with a management which keeps pouring capital into the sinkhole. If on the other hand, the business is generating excess cash, the management keeps hoarding it and refuses to return it to the shareholder.
The second reason is that the underlying economics of the business has deteriorated and the market realizes it with a lag. Case in point – the telecom industry. The economics of this industry has gone into a tailspin for the last few years, with almost everyone bleeding money (except probably bharti airtel). In such cases, if you keep looking at the past data and do not understand how the economics of the industry has changed, you can get stuck in a no-win situation
The last category of value traps are the low return, second and third tier commodity players. These companies have a low return on capital over the entire business cycle, and unless you can dance in and out of the stock in time, you can get stuck with very low returns.
How to indentify value traps before hand ?
That’s the tough bit.
For starters, investors like me need to get out of the low PE, cheap stock mindset. A really cheap stock is often cheap for a reason. It makes sense to dig deep and understand the business in detail to figure out why the market is valuing the company at such low valuations ?
If a company has been cheap for the last 5 years, why should it suddenly get re-rated just because smart lil me bought the stock?
One needs to understand the economics of the business in depth and also confirm that the management is creating value for the shareholder and not just twiddling their thumbs. Only if you have a strong belief that that business is doing well and will continue to do so and the management is also good, then should you think of making a commitment to the stock
What if you are caught in value trap?
There are no easy answers. For starters, swallow your pride and sell the stock. That’s easier said than done – ask me!. The unfortunate bit is that people like me take 10 years to realize it :). Luckily for me these mistakes have not been big enough to damage my long term returns.
The risk of holding onto such investments is that although you do not lose money on paper, in reality you are losing the benefits of compounding by not investing the same money in other opportunities. It would be silly to compound your money at 10% in a value trap, when the index itself can give you 15% without any effort.
If you have invested in one of those low return commodity stocks, hope that the commodity cycle turns and market in its temporary fits of insanity, re-prices the stocks. As soon as this happens, sell the stock and never look back !
It is always a constant struggle to avoid value traps, as they come in various shapes and forms. One has to be vigilant and learn to exit them, once you have realized that you are stuck in one
Evaluating banks – Putting a picture together
I have discussed about the various factors or parameters in analyzing a bank in some earlier posts (see here and here). In this post, I will use these parameters to evaluate a real example.
A warning before I proceed – The wieghtage given to each factor and conclusions derived depend heavily on the temperament and biases of an individual. If you are an investor who likes growth and are ready to take some risks to get a multi-bagger, you may overweight the topline and bottom line growth and pick a bank which is growing rapidly.
On the other hand if you are conservative in nature, you may overweigh the CAR ratio and may actually get nervous if the bank is growing too rapidly. I personally prefer a middle path – I would prefer a conservatively managed bank which is growing at 1.5-2 times the GDP growth rate and hence is likely to give a 15-20% growth rate.
In my world a 15-20% growth rate is adequate, if it can be sustained for 5-10 years. I am not looking for shooting stars.
I am taking the example of Axis bank for this post to demonstrate the process I go through when evaluating a bank. I do not have any position in the stock.
Profitability and its source
The first factor I would look at for in any company is the Return on capital (ROE in case of banks). Any company earning below the cost of capital (over the business cycle) is out of contention. The bank or the company should have an average ROE in excess of 15% over the last 10 years. Axis bank has had an ROE of around 23% over the last 10 years. The ROE has dropped from 32% in 2001 to around 20%, but has generally been maintained above 18% during the entire time period.
I am also interested in understanding the source of the above average returns. In case of a bank, the ROA (return on asset) is an important number. A number in excess of 1.3% is considered good. Axis bank has improved its ROA from 0.8% in 2001 to around 1.6% in 2011.
The improvement in ROA was driven by higher net interest margins and better other income, resulting in higher net profit margins which have gone up from around 1.8% to around 3.7% . So in effect the bank has improved the profitability, both from lending and fee based sources.
Asset Quality
A bank may be very profitable and showing great results, but may have very risky loans on its books. Asset quality is an important factor in evaluating the quality of the earnings of the bank. Unfortunately there is no easy and direct way of doing it.
I typically look at the NPA number, the level of provisioning of the NPA and profile of the assets. It helps to review the distribution of credit risk by industry in the notes to account, to confirm that there is not too much concentration of lending to any specific industry or borrower.
The truth of the matter is that one cannot get a perfect read of the asset quality and has to trust the management. This is the main reason why a long term track record and culture of the bank is important. If the bank has a past history of conservative lending over the business cycle, then one can expect the same to continue.
I am a bit concerned on this count with Axis bank. The bank has been expanding rapidly, especially on the home loans and other retail assets. One cannot be sure if the bank has been conservative in lending.
Safety
The next factor I would look at is the safety or capital cushion of the bank. The ratio to look for is the CAR (Capital adequacy ratio). The bank has on average maintained a CAR of 12.5% and may need to raise more capital to fund future growth.
The next factor to evaluate the sustainability of the earnings is the gross/ Net NPA and level of provisioning. The bank has a gross NPA of around 1% and net NPA of around .26%. The bank was provisioned around 68% in 2010, which means that 32% of the NPA have not been provided for (and could hurt the profitability if these loans cannot be fixed).
The NPA number is very crucial for the banks. It is difficult to be sure about the true NPA of the bank as a bank can play a lot of games to modify this number and thus come up with a desired profit number. One has to just trust the numbers, based on the overall feel of the management.
Growth
If I am satisfied with the profitability and safety of the bank, I would move on to the growth in topline and net profit for the bank. In case of Axis bank, both the numbers have increased in excess of 30%. Clearly the bank is in a lot of hurry to grow.
In addition to the income and profit, the bank has grown its branch network from 139 to 1390 in 2011 and the ATM network from 490 in 2002 to around 6270 in 2011. The bank is thus expanding the retail network which is healthy growth as it helps the bank on the liability side (gather low cost deposit) and also lend to the retail segment (in the form of home loans, personal loans etc).
Cost analysis
Cost is an important factor in the analysis of any industry and more so in the case of the bank. The two crucial cost elements are the cost of funds and the overhead costs.
The cost of funds in case of axis bank has dropped from around 7.5% to around 5%, due to the increasing current and savings deposits. This is a good trend and has enabled the bank to earn a decent net margin (3.7% currently).
The cost to income (or overhead) ratio has gone up from 30% to around 40% level mainly due to the cost of new branches and other such investments. If this ratio is up due to expansion of the branch network, then I am all for it. Axis bank is clearly investing in expanding the branch and ATM network and is benefiting from this expansion too
Competitive advantage
It is also crucial to evaluate the strength of the bank’s competitive advantage and if the bank is working on enhancing it. The competitive advantage comes from the following factors
– Brand : Axis bank is now a well know brand, especially in the urban areas and is constantly being strengthened through advertising and promotion
– Customer Lockin : The bank is improving the lockin by increasing the number of branches, ATM and by providing a wide range of products. The bank can keep increasing the customer lockin by constantly improving the service levels and adding new products.
– Production side advantage : The bank has been able to expand the branch network and increase the number of customers. This provide the bank, economies of scale in gathering deposits (and lower cost of funds) and reduce the per customer cost of servicing them.
– Entry barrier: There is certain level of entry barrier as RBI does not issue new licenses easily (which may change now). As a result the private banks have been shielded from relentless competition and have been able to grow rapidly and achieve scale. Any new banks will to incur years of investment to achieve the same scale.
Management quality
This is the most important and the most difficult factor to evaluate. In the case of axis bank, I can offer a few view points, but these are just that – views or impressions. Each one of us will come up with their own impressions.
I find the management quite aggressive in expanding growing the bank. In some ways, the bank looks like a version of ICICI bank when it was in the growth phase. Some of you may find that comparison unfair as ICICI grew too rapidly and then had to fix the asset quality issues. I am not implying that axis bank has the same issues, but one cannot sure in cases where the growth has been rapid.
The disclosure levels of the bank are quite adequate and the bank provides a lot of detail about asset profile and distribution.
Overall the management is definitely doing the right things and has strengthened the balance sheet and increased its competitive advantage over the years.
Conclusion
I have covered how I would evaluate a bank based on the various factors. As you can see, there is no checklist or points system where if the bank scores well on most of the factors, then at the end of the exercise you would have neat conclusion to buy or sell.
I find the bank passes most of the checkpoints in terms of fundamental analysis, except for my concern on asset quality. The key reason for not pulling the trigger is price – I find the price higher than what I would like to pay.
Ingredients and recipes
The idea for this post came from a question from a reader –
Rohit – you gave us the ingredients in the last two posts on banking (see here and here for various factors on analyzing banks), but these ingredients or factors alone are not sufficient. Where is the recipe? How do i combine the various factors to come up with a final decision or idea?
This is a very interesting question, and I plan to publish a post on how I would combine these factors to arrive at a decision.
The analogy with cooking
Most of us have watched cooking shows or would have seen recipes in a book or a magazine. These cookbooks list out the various ingredients with the precise amounts and then they guide you through the steps of putting these ingredients together to come up with a final dish.
Personally, I am an atrocious cook – I can even burn water :). There have been times when my wife has given the list of ingredients and the exact steps and yet I have managed to mess up the dish completely. Even if you are not as horrible a cook as I am, you must have had the experience that inspite of the following the recipe to the T, the final dish does not come out as good as you thought it would.
There is an art to cooking and after all the instructions and teaching, there is no substitute to practice and experimenting. One tends to get better at it over time and there are subtle nuances that cannot be written in a cookbook (which is why old grannies can cook great food, without any formal training).
If you think of it, there is a lot of similarity with investing. I can tell you all the factors and maybe some kind of recipe , but in the end there is no substitute for actually doing it. You may mess it up once a while, but over time if you are interested in the craft of investing, it will work out for sure.
The case for fund managers or chefs
Now that I have decided to bring in the analogy of cooking, let’s take it a step further. Even if you can cook, you still prefer to go to a restaurant to eat once in a while. The reasons are many – variety, better food, less effort etc.
The case for mutual funds or PMS can be similar too. You may be able to invest well if you worked hard at it, but a lot of times you have other priorities in life and would like to hand over the job of investing to a professional (hopefully a good one) who does this full time.
The same logic applies to almost everything else – otherwise we would be growing our own food, milking our cows and doing most of the other basic work too.
The need for oversight
If you decide to outsource some aspect of life, it does not mean that you should ignore it completely. Do you hire a carpenter or a plumber for some job, pay him cash and ask him to do whatever he wants with no oversight from anyone ?
Why should it be different for a mutual fund or a PMS ?
On the other extreme, do you instruct or monitor every nail that you carpenter hits ? Evaluating weekly or monthly portfolio performance is akin to that.
Irrationality in money
The reason the above points raised by me sound funny or absurd is due to the irrational relationship we have with money. A lot of people either ignore it completely (and hope things will work out) or think it is a form of entertainment to invest money / trade in the market.
I can think of only one rational reason for investing – wealth creation. You invest money so that you are able to build an adequate amount of wealth over time which will help you to realize your goals such as retirement, healthcare or children’s education etc. All of the rest – whether you beat the market by X % or find a hot stock is fluff.
By the way – Although I invest my own money, I will never eat my own cooking unless I want to torture myself 🙂
Evaluating banks – More factors
In the previous post, I covered several important variables in analyzing a bank. These factors are a good starting point in evaluating a financial institution, but they are not sufficient to arrive at a conclusion.
I am listing several additional criteria I consider personally, when analyzing these kinds of companies. Some of these factors are commonly used by other analysts, whereas some are of interest to me (even though others don’t care about them)
Growth – This is one of the top criteria used by a majority of the investors. A high growth trajectory (in deposit and advances) throws most analysts and investors into ecstasy. As some of you have realized, I like growth, but I am not a big fan. For most businesses, a moderate growth (between 12-15% per annum) is usually more sustainable, attracts lesser competition and provides good returns over the long term.
In the case of banks and other financial institutions, I am almost allergic to high growth. Financial institutions are highly leveraged institutions (read high debt) and as a result, a focus on growth can result in shaky loans which can haunt it in the future.
Take the example of ICICI bank – Don’t get me wrong on this one. I
invested a miniscule amount in the bank IPO way back in the 90s and exited in the mid 2000s.I liked the bank service then (in late 90s the service was actually good!) and liked the way it was conducting its business.
However by mid 2000, the loan growth started increasing and my personal experience (and that of a few friends) of their underwriting standards (criteria to give you a housing or other loan) left me worried. They were much more lax in their standards than other banks. The bank has since then, slowed down its asset growth and is trying to work through its bad loans.
The key point of this story is this – An above average growth is good (though it does not guarantee conservative lending), but a high growth in a bank is a risky proposition. It may all work out in the long run, but I will not bet big on it.
Cost ratios
There are two costs ratios i look at closely when analyzing a bank or financial institution. The first one is borrowing costs, which I covered in the previous post. The other one is the operating cost ratio for the bank.
The operating cost ratio covers all the overheads of the bank such as salary for the employee, branch opening expenses, pension costs etc. I would prefer a downward trend in this number, unless the bank is expanding its network and is incurring the associated costs.
The new private banks such as Axis bank, which are expanding rapidly have an operating cost ratio in the range of 22-24%, where as the older private or public sector banks have this number in the range of 16-18%. I would expect the number to stabilize in this range for most banks as they expand their retail network and the growth slows down.
Credit deposit ratio
This is another important ratio to track. This is the ratio of deposits gathered by the bank to the amount lent out as loans. The RBI guideline is that this number should not exceed 75%. So if you see the number inching to 75%, the bank may have to resort to bulk deposits which are more costly than retail deposits – which means lower spreads and thus lower margins
In case you have a sneaky feeling that your bank is able to take a deposit at 7% from you and lend at 12% and make a nice spread on it – you are right. Banks have a nice thing going with its customers (you and me) – where they get money on the cheap and also charge money for all the other services they provide to us.
Yield on assets
One of the last commonly used ratios is the yield on assets – the return the bank makes on all the loans and other investments. I would like to see a high number, but too high a number could mean risky loans which could hurt the bank profits in the future.
So what is a high or low number? There are no absolutes here. The best option is to compare it across banks and get sense of this number. Currently, the average seems to be around 9.5-10%.
Let’s now look at additional factors which are not commonly followed
Contingent liabilities
I have yet to find a single report which talks of this. So what are contingent liabilities?
Think of these as possible costs, under certain circumstances (such as a particular level of interest rate changes) and hence they are called contingent. If you look at the balance sheet of a bank, all the open derivative and other contracts are included under this number.
For example, this number is around 3.2 Lac crore (yes not a typo) for axis bank which around 2 times their asset base. In a similar fashion this number has ranged between 3-4 for Yes bank and is as low as 25% for public sector and old private banks.
So whats the significance of this number? Does it mean a Yes bank or Axis bank is liable for 2 their total asset value (or 20 times networth ?).
The key point to remember is that these contingent liabilities are a notional value (total contract value) and not the amount which the bank would make or lose on these contracts. The amount which the bank can lose or gain is also provided in the notes to account.
If your head is hurting on hearing some these terms such as notional amount, derivative etc – I will not blame you. I cannot do justice to these topics in the post – you can easily Google it and find out.
The key point to remember is that contingent liabilities are off balance sheet risks (remember Lehman brothers and other investment banks ?). In good times, these derivatives help the bank in making money and are a nice source of ‘other income’ (the stuff which analysts like). However, if the market crashes or something nasty happens, then these contingent liabilities can kill the bank.
Does it mean Axis bank and Yes bank are risky banks ? Frankly I don’t know and an outside investor cannot evaluate the derivative book of a bank. However if you just use common sense in this case, a 25% ratio of contingent liability to asset (as in case of KV Bank) is definitely less risky than a 400% ratio in the case of Yes bank.
If you look at this ratio, the performance of several of the new gen, aggressive banks will make you pause and think
Other contingent liabilities
If you think, I have something against private banks, that is not the case. Public and old private banks have their cockroaches in their kitchen. These banks have pension and gratuity liabilities which have not been provided for. The RBI guideline requires the banks to provide these liabilities in phases and hence we are seeing the impact of these provisions on the results of the banks ( for ex: SBI in Q4).
I am however less worried about these kind of liabilities as they are not open ended and will be provisioned by the banks in the next 2-3 years.
No. of branches and ATM etc
I also like to track the growth in the number of branches, ATM and employees. The raw numbers alone are not enough. One also needs to look at the quality of the expansion – Is the bank expanding in clusters or is it making a thrust into the rural areas (which is good in the long term , though could hurt profits in the short term)
Technology adoption
There are no numbers for this factor. You have to read the annual report for the bank for the last few years and get a sense of how the bank is investing in the technology aspect of the business. Is the bank at the forefront of technology adoption or is it a few years behind the curve ?
Another easy way is to go to a local branch and see if you can get the various services such net banking, anywhere access etc from the bank.
Asset liability profile
Another data point which can be found in the notes to account. This table gives an indication, on whether the bank is exceedingly funded by short term deposits alone. It’s difficult for me to cover this topic in this post, but as a quick pointer – Higher the longer duration deposits, better the risk profile ( remember the term asset liability mismatch ? – if not, please look it up if you plan to invest in a bank)
Management
We now come to a very important and the most difficult factor to evaluate. These are no numbers or tables to evaluate the bank’s management, but if you read the annual report and follow the management, you will get some sense of it.
For ex: Axis bank, ICICI and Yes bank have aggressive management which is looking at growing the bank on both the retail and lending side. HDFC has an aggressive management, but it is also very risk conscious. There are several old private sector banks, which have conservative managements which are growing the banks at a nice pace and with low risk.
Finally we have the public sector banks, where the management is essentially government deputed officers and so it’s difficult to get any picture as such banks (though in some cases there have been individuals who have done well, but then they are posted to some other institution)
Are you exhausted 🙂 ?
We have looked at all the factors which can be used to evaluate a bank. There is unfortunately no mathematical rule to combine all these factors. One has to put all these parameters together and come up with a composite picture of a bank. I will take an example or two in the subsequent posts to evaluate some banks.
Evaluating banks – Key factors
I recently started analyzing financial institutions such as brokerages, banks and HFC (housing finance companies). I wrote about brokerage firms here and here.
In this post, I will be looking at some key factors in analyzing banks. I have written about banks earlier – see here, here and here. I have covered several factors important in analyzing a bank, in these earlier posts and will be analyzing some additional factors now with some current examples to emphasize my point.
Key factors
Return on equity – This is a critical factor in analyzing a bank. A high ROE is good and low is bad – right? It’s not completely black and white. Other factors being equal (which are listed below), a high ROE is good. However this number has to be looked at in context of CAR (capital adequacy ratio) and quality of assets (NPA number). Most of the top banks such as HDFC, Axis etc have an ROE in excess of 20% or higher.
An additional number to look at in conjunction with ROE is ROA (return on asset). A number in excess of 1.3% is generally good.
CAR – This is the ratio of equity to risk weighted assets. The RBI has a guideline on the minimum CAR ratio for a bank and if the CAR ratio falls below this number, then the bank has to either raise equity or reduce the assets (read loans) to get the number in line with the guidelines. You can think of this number as fuel for growth – higher the number, higher the amount of loans which the bank can make. In addition a high number also enables the bank to absorb loan losses.
The CAR number for most of the banks has improved in the last few years and banks like HDFC, Axis , Karur vyasa bank (KVB) etc have CAR ratios of around 15% (v/s statutory number of around 9%)
Net or Gross NPA – This number points to the amount of bad loans (interest over due by 90 days) on the bank’s books. A low number is always good. An NPA number (net NPA) of more than 4% is alarming and points to a considerable amount of bad assets. In addition, one can expect the bank to take provisions (keep aside some of the profits) to reduce the NPA
This number has dropped considerably in the last few years for most banks and is as low as 0.2% for banks such as Axis, HDFC bank and Yes bank.
Provision / GPA – This is another key factor to look at from an asset quality standpoint. One can look at this number in conjunction with Net NPA. Provision/Gross NPA tells us how much of the bad loans have been accounted for (profits set aside to write off the loans). A 100% number would mean that the bank has set aside the entire bad loan amount from the profits.
The current guideline from RBI is that all banks need to have a minimum 70% coverage ratio.
Borrowing cost – This is the equivalent of raw material cost for a manufacturing company. A low number is always good. A bank is able borrow money via the savings/current accounts of its customer and through bulk deposits. The savings/ current account generally payout a low interest rate and is the best source of low cost funds for the bank.
An associated number to track for the bank is the CASA ratio (current and saving account/ total deposit). A high and growing CASA ratio, means that the bank has a low cost of funds and is growing this source further.
Banks such as Axis bank or State bank of India which have a high CASA ratio, have cost of funds which is as low as 5%. On the other hand the newer banks such as Yes bank which are still putting their retail network in place have a low CASA ratio of around 10% and a much higher cost of funds. One can expect these banks to keep expanding their network and drive down their cost of funds .
NIM (net interest margins) – This is the difference between the borrowing costs and the lending rate. A higher number is good, but upto a point. A number much higher than industry average can be risky as the bank may be lending to risky borrowers (real estate developers, brokers etc) and may face bad debts at a later date.
This number has seen an improvement in the last few years to around 3% levels for most banks due to a combination of reducing loan losses (NPA) and improvement in cost ratios (operating costs)
NII (non interest income) – This is the non lending type income – think of it as the icing on the cake (in some cases a lot of icing). This includes income from investments (in bonds and government securities), brokerage/ service income from distribution of financial products, income from derivative and forex contracts etc.
There is almost an unsaid assumption, that NII is good and higher the NII, better the quality of the earnings. I don’t agree with this assumption. I prefer to look at the composition of NII. If the non interest income is through trading or through gains in the value of investments, then the quality and sustainability of the earnings is not high.
Next post : More ratios and some non financial factors and how to look at them to develop a composite picture of the bank.
You don’t have to be smart often
Lets say you have a portfolio of around 15 stocks, which I think is sufficient diversification for most of us. Now let’s say, you are one of those odd guys who for some inexplicable reason, believes in long term investing – that is buying high quality companies at decent prices and then holding the stock for the long term.
Let’s assume, for argument sake that the average holding period is around 3 years. In such a scenario, you are buying/ selling 5 stocks per year. Now let’s say, you are able to spend around 5-6 hrs each week on searching for decent ideas and are able to analyze 1-2 companies each week. At this rate, you can analyze 50-60 companies each year.
If you look at the above math, you need to smart or lucky around 10% of the time. I don’t consider that as a high threshold.
What wrong with the above logic?
For starters, the above reasoning assumes that you will be able to find attractive ideas on a regular basis – one every 2-3 months. As most of us who have been investing in the market for sometime know that, these things don’t work on such a smooth schedule. Investing ideas tend to come in clusters and in short periods of time – especially when the short term outlook is clouded.
The other assumption is that one will spend a 5-6 hours a week, diligently looking for stock ideas. Unfortunately, I don’t know of any shortcut to make money in the market. A lot of cheats claim to know ‘techniques’ to make money with minimal effort and are able to find enough fools to sell their techniques.
The logic actually works even better
The above logic works even better than what i claim in the post. Let’s say you are able to indentify some high quality companies such as a titan or crisil and make a purchase at decent valuations. Once you purchase such a company, I don’t see any reason to sell the stock unless the valuations go beyond all reason. In such a case, the portfolio turnover drops still further and the number of new ideas required each year is even lesser.
A 60-70% success rate of your ideas, where 3-4 ideas will either make no money or lose a bit for you is quite reasonable. At this success rate, one will still do well on an aggregate portfolio basis.
If you put it all together, I think one needs to pick a successful idea 5-10% of the time or around 1 in 10 ideas evaluated.
The only downside in the above approach is that you cannot share any exciting stories of your stock market coups with your buddies over a drink.
The comparison with trading
I genuinely believe that trading is much tougher game than long term investing. Even if one leaves aside what is required to be a successful trader, the basic math tends to work against you.
Even if you are a moderately active trader and buy/sell 10-15 stocks a year (1-2 per month), the success rate (no. of ideas invested/no. of ideas looked at) required is much higher than a long term investor. I think one has to be much smarter to be a successful trader than a successful long term investor.
Is that what you do?
Short answer to this question is – Yes. I typically evaluate 2-3 ideas each week in some depth and may end up picking just one idea every few months. In most of the cases, it is either some fundamental issue which turns me off or it may just be that the valuation is not attractive enough.
If the idea is good, but the price is not right, then it goes into my tracking list. I tend to review the tracking list once a month to see if Mr Market is offering some bargain on a decent idea.
Economics of the brokerage industry
I thought my previous post on the brokerage industry would receive minimal hits as it is quite a dry topic and has no entertainment value. However, I am glad that I have been proven wrong. Considering that a lot of users are interesting in reading such dry topics, I will continue to publish such analysis in the future.
I had given a brief overview of the industry in the previous post. I will try to analyze the economics of the industry in this post
The typical research report (at least the free ones) on industry analysis typically give pages and pages of past and current statistics, without attempting to look at the broader picture or overall dynamics of the industry.
Why is that important?
If one has to make a long term investment in a company, it is crucial to understand the long term economics and direction of the industry and the company in particular. The statistics and various parameters of the industry are just the starting point of the analysis.
Lets try to evaluate the brokerage industry
The brokerage industry is currently characterized by a large number of companies (private or unorganized). In effect it is a fragmented industry with a large number of participants.The industry thus has monopolistic competition (text book term) – a large number of firms selling a slightly differentiated product.
Let analyze the industry based on Michael porter’s five factor model
Barriers to entry
The industry now has a certain level of entry barriers. The primary brokerage firms need to have a certain scale and size as the business involves a high level of fixed costs in the form of technology platform, distribution network and back office operations. In addition brand recognition is also important to attract new customers.
A new entrant in addition to the above also needs a reasonable level of capital to fund the working capital requirements of the business (finance to customers, deposits with exchanges etc).
These scale requirements are increasing constantly and as a result a new entrant will require higher levels of investments in the future to enter the business. As pointed out by ansh in the comments, it is unlikely that we will see many new entrants in the industry. On the contrary, it is likely that the smaller players will exit by selling out or closing shop.
Supplier power – not relevant in most segments except investment banking, where employees control client relationships and hence have to be highly compensated
Buyer power – This is important in the institutional brokerage business which involves high volumes and low brokerage charges. The extent of buyer power is very low to non-existent in all kinds of retail segments
Substitute product – Not applicable
Rivalry determinant – This industry is now in a fairly high growth phase. However the brokerage industry is very cyclical and is impacted by the activity levels in the markets. During the downturns such as 2008-2009 period, the smaller players were squeezed out of the business. As a result there is a constant consolidation happening in the industry.
In summary the industry has moderate to low level of competitive advantage. There is low level of customer lockin and a customer will move his/her business if the brokerage rates are not competitive with the rest of industry. The only competitive advantage for the companies in this sector comes from size and scale which enables them to leverage their size to reduce average costs and thus make a profit on low brokerage margins.
Other points of analysis
In addition to the high fixed costs, the industry has very low marginal cost. As a result the cost of adding an additional customer is low and per transaction costs are limited. Due to this reason, we are seeing a constant pressure on the brokerage rates (similar to telecom which also has a very low marginal cost). This downward pressure on the brokerage rates has intensified the competition in the industry and is resulting in consolidation with the top players.
The basic brokerage business is now sometimes a loss leader to enable the brokerage firm to acquire customers and sell other products such as wealth management services, PMS or third party mutual funds. The agency business is thus a Iow margin, lower risk and a fairly predictable kind of business. This segment will provide adequate returns in the future for a company with scale.
The capital business involving financing is similar to a banking operation and is mainly a lending or a support business for the brokerage operation. This is a high risk and sometimes a high return business. It is easy to grow in this segment by taking large quantities of debt and then investing in high risk assets. However the risk of a black swan or plain old recession wiping out your business is very high.
Finally the treasury business is a trading operation driven by the skills of a select set of individuals. In the same manner business such as investment banking is also a very competitive business driven by key customer relationships. It is difficult to evaluate the competitive advantage in these businesses as it is driven by a few key employees, who can leave and thus take away your revenue streams and profits
I personally prefer low to moderate businesses with above average returns. In view of this preference, I am likely to reject high growth/ high risk businesses in the brokerage space and likely to focus on companies which are focused on the agency business.